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Traditional approaches to questions of executive war power emphasize presidential-
congressional relations, and focus on the meaning and implications of specific 
constitutional clauses.  This dissertation offers an alternative approach by examining 
executive war power through the higher, more normative purposes to which the 
Constitution aims. It views executive war power from the perspective of 
Constitution’s basic but essential goal of self-preservation, and argues that the 
Presidency has a special duty to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution.  
Presidential power, therefore, should be viewed in light of its duties to preserving the 
constitutional order.  Presidential power, however, should not be viewed as “anything 
goes” for, true to republican principles, the people ultimately are sovereign and have 
multiple constitutional means by which to hold their leaders accountable. The 
dissertation focuses its analysis on the Constitution’s text, examining Publius and 
other writings of the Founding era, to help uncover the explicit purpose and implicit 
  
principles for understanding the Constitution.  Understanding “to what end” the 
Constitution provides the lens through which we should view the actions of its 
institutions and officers.  The dissertation then offers an interpretative analysis of 
President Washington’s words and deeds during the Whiskey Rebellion, 
demonstrating that his construction of the executive war power offers an important 
contribution to U.S. constitutionalism.  It also focuses on Lincoln’s construction of 
the executive war power during the Civil War, arguing that although Lincoln 
exercised extraordinary power in meeting the necessity of the situation, he did so 
while remaining true to both the spirit and the letter of the Constitution.  This 
counters conventional opinions that Lincoln’s conduct was un- or extraconstitutional, 
or that he had to act outside of the Constitution in order to save it.  The dissertation 
suggests that the constitutionalism and statesmanship of Washington and Lincoln 
offer much perspective for understanding issues surrounding the executive war power 





















IN TREPIDIS REBUS:  THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF  













Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 













Professor Charles Butterworth, Chair 
Professor Herman Belz 
Professor Steve Elkin 
Professor George Quester 
Professor Irwin Morris 
























© Copyright by 




















“What chiefly attracts and chiefly benefits students of history is just this—the study 
of causes and the consequent power of choosing what is best in each case.  Now the 
chief cause of success or the reverse in all matters is the form of the state’s 
constitution; for springing from this, as from a fountain-head, all designs and plans of 
action not only originate, but reach their consummation.” 



















In memory of my grandfather, Ralph Francis Winebrenner, 1916-2002. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
After explaining to a friend the Constitution’s Office of the Presidency, 
Alexander Hamilton predicted:   “You nor I, my friend, may not live to see the day, 
but most assuredly it will come, when every vital interest of the state will be merged 
in the all-absorbing question of who shall be the next President?”1 Hamilton’s 
prophetic observation underscores the significant constitutional role that the 
Presidency would play in the success of the American experiment in self-government.  
The Presidency represents an innovation in government, reflecting the Framers’ 
explicit intention to reconcile the need for a strong and energetic executive to meet 
the manifold challenges to the nation’s security with a republican form of 
government.  Hamilton saw the Presidency as the centerpiece of the new Constitution, 
reinforcing the national government with the requisite energy for self-defense in a 
potentially dangerous, war-prone world but also containing the appropriate safeguards 
to maintain its republican character.    
Although the question of who will be elected President has become all-
absorbing, it is not for the constitutional reasons Hamilton envisioned.  The 
Presidency today is viewed as a powerful and important institution to be sure, 
particularly in matters of war and foreign affairs, but not because of any 
constitutionally assigned role.  Neither supporters nor critics of presidential power 
base their opinions in a firm understanding of the Constitution. The Presidency has 
                                                
1 According to Governor Lewis, as reported in John C. Hamilton, History of the Republic of 
the United States: As Traced in the Writings of Alexander Hamilton and of his 






become commonly characterized as a modern institution that sometime during the 
20th century threw off its constitutional chains to more ably meet the increasingly 
complex challenges of American society.2  Others, less sanguine about the perceived 
increase in presidential power, particularly vis-à-vis Congress over matters pertaining 
to war and military hostilities, consider it an imperial institution that usurps power 
and undermines American democracy.3  To scholars in the imperial presidency 
tradition, the Presidency is more of a threat to the United States than its adversaries.  
Regardless of which approach one accepts, the Presidency has become detached from 
its constitutional roots, and we are left today without a fixed standard of judgment for 
                                                
2 The modern presidency thesis emerges most clearly from the work of Fred Greenstein who 
argues that the Presidency underwent a “metamorphosis” with the election of Franklin 
Roosevelt.  Accordingly, the Presidency was transformed from a “traditional” office, weak 
and constitutionally restrained to performing mere clerkship-like functions, into a powerful 
institution, unfettered from its constitutional shackles, at the pinnacle of American political 
society.   See Fred Greenstein (ed.), Leadership in the Modern Presidency (Cambridge, MA:  
Harvard University Press, 1988), and Fred I. Greenstein, Larry Berman, and Alvin 
Felzenberg, Evolution of the Modern Presidency: A Bibliographical Survey (Washington, 
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977).  Also see James P. Pfiffner, The Modern 
Presidency, 2nd edition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998).  This thesis also has been 
heavily influenced by the work of Richard Neustadt who introduced the behavioralist 
approach to the study of the Presidency.  Neustadt argued that the Presidency could not be 
understood by any formal powers conferred upon the office by the Constitution; rather it was 
best understood by the specific behavior of the individuals who occupied it.  The informal 
powers of the individuals, their bargaining capacity, their leverage, and their persuasion 
abilities meant more to the Presidency than any “literary theory of the Constitution.” Richard 
E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Polities of Leadership (New York: John Wiley and 
Sons, Inc., 1960). Reflecting Neustadt’s support for the modern presidency thesis, the most 
recent edition of his book has been renamed is Presidential Power and the Modern 
Presidents: The Politics of Leadership From Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: The Free 
Press, 1990). For the enduring influence of Neustadt’s work see Michael Nelson, “Neustadt’s 
‘Presidential Power’ at 50,” The Chronicle Review, March 28, 2010. 
3 Arthur Schlesinger Jr. is the founder of the imperial presidency thesis.  His work The 
Imperial Presidency was first published in 1973 in the milieu of Vietnam and Watergate.  He 
updated it in 2004 with a new introduction critical of the Bush Administration’s response to 
the September 11, 2001 attacks and the war in Iraq.  See Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial 





understanding and holding accountable the President’s exercise of power in times of 
war and emergency.  
Purpose and Research Question(s)  
This dissertation seeks to reunite the Presidency with the Constitution, and 
come to terms with the underlying constitutional logic of Hamilton’s prophesy and 
what he saw in that framing document to make such a bold prediction.  The question 
of who is President should be all absorbing because that office has the principal 
constitutional responsibility for handling the most vital interest of the state: the 
preservation, protection, and defense of the constitutional order.   The central research 
question of this dissertation is: What role does the Constitution assign the Presidency 
in times of war and danger?  Answering that question requires returning to first 
principles to ask: what are the ends of the Constitution and to what higher, more 
normative purpose(s) does it aim?  After addressing these fundamental questions, the 
dissertation then asks:  What role does the Presidency serve in achieving the 
Constitution’s overarching purpose?  And what constitutional means does the 
Presidency possess to achieve the Constitution’s ends? 
This dissertation stems from a desire to use the Constitution as a guide to 
understand the extent and scope of the President’s power in times of war and 
emergency.  It also reflects a deeper interest in the ambivalent attitudes toward 
executive power, particularly within republican regimes.4  Since the power necessary 
                                                
4 Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. famously highlighted the ambivalence of modern executive power.  
His Taming the Prince provides a most thorough and penetrating analysis of executive power 





to defend the nation in times of war can also be abused, executive power is viewed, at 
once, as the promising savior and the potential destroyer of republican government.  
Put differently, it can be the means for preserving a free government as well as the 
cause for its demise.  Wartime, not surprisingly, tends to heighten the tension within 
the debate over the exercise of executive power, and the early part of the 21st century 
has proven no differently.  Since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, 
the Presidency has been at the forefront of America’s response to those attacks and 
efforts to prevent others.  The Presidency, not surprisingly, also has emerged at the 
forefront of scholarly debates over the Constitution in wartime.  Over the past decade, 
views of an imperial Presidency run amok have become increasingly popular among 
scholars, and the President’s power is viewed to be just as, if not more, threatening to 
America as those enemies that seek to attack it.5   
It is no exaggeration to suggest that the prism through which Presidential 
power in wartime is viewed today remains the imperial presidency thesis emanating 
from the Vietnam War and Watergate scandals.6   The exercise of presidential power 
is viewed with suspicion, and imperial presidency scholars discuss the Presidency 
                                                                                                                                      
Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power (Baltimore, MD:  The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1993). 
5 See, for example, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.’s new introduction to his The Imperial Presidency.  
Also see his War and the American Presidency with a new chapter (New York: W.W. Norton 
and Company, 2005) in which he speaks of the “Imperial Presidency Redux” in the post-9/11 
world.  Other works to emerge after 2001 in the imperial presidency genre that view the 
Presidency as a potential threat to the United States include:  Peter Irons, War Powers:  How 
the Imperial Presidency Hijacked the Constitution (New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry 
Holt & Co., 2005).  Also see Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment 
Inside the Bush Administration (New York:  W.W. Norton & Co., 2007).  
6 In addition to Arthur Schlesinger Jr.’s work, cited above, former Nixon White House 
Counsel John Dean epitomizes the use of the Vietnam/Watergate prism by writing Worse the 






primarily through its relationship with Congress, and not the Constitution.7  They 
have too narrowly construed issues of “war power” as conflicts over the power to 
“declare war” neglecting the broader powers and duties the Constitution assigns the 
Presidency to “preserve, protect, and defend” the constitutional order. This 
dissertation challenges such narrow opinions, arguing that we need a constitutional 
perspective of the Presidency; the dissertation offers it by returning to questions of 
first principles to understand the constitutional basis of the executive war power.  In 
doing so, it presents an alternative perspective of the Presidency and its wartime role, 
one rooted in the Constitution that proves as relevant in the 21st century as it did when 
the Constitution was established and ordained by popular consent in 1789.  
Summary of Findings and Overview of the Study 
In exploring the central research questions, this dissertation finds a radical and 
potentially dangerous interpretative principle: the Constitution must be read through 
the lens of self-preservation; it contains all necessary powers for its survival; and it 
entrusts in the Presidency the primary (but not exclusive) responsibility to ensure its 
safety.  That the extent and scope of the threats to the constitutional order cannot be 
predicted with any precision, the power necessary to meet them must be understood 
                                                
7 It should be noted that the critique of presidential power is not simply a product of those of 
a liberal persuasion as conservatives have long held suspicions of a powerful president. For 
example, William Rusher, the former publisher of the conservative magazine the National 
Review, wrote after Watergate that “a presidency whose steadily growing power has for forty 
years been the most serious danger facing the American society.”  He would also criticize 
that liberals “have not been overly generous about admitting that conservatives recognized 
and resisted that menace for decades before they did.”  Quoted in Jack Goldsmith, “The 
Accountable Presidency,” The New Republic, February 1, 2010 published on 
http://www.tnr.com.  Goldsmith provides a short but excellent overview of how political 





to exist potentially without limit.  This understanding challenges conventional notions 
that the Constitution seeks to limit government power, instead suggesting that it 
provides the principal ends and purposes toward which that power should be 
exercised.  That such power may be dangerous does not mean that it does not exist.8   
This dissertation, moreover, refutes arguments that the Constitution leaves executive 
power “ambiguous” and “underdefined”9 positing that the Constitution explicitly 
vests the executive power in the Presidency and defines the higher, more normative 
purposes toward which the President must employ that power.  Similarly, it also 
rejects scholarly opinion that the Constitution is an unfinished product with 
significant lacunae, or that it is a “cryptic text” requiring us to decipher it with other 
constitutional concepts and principles such as international legal norms.10  As such, it 
disagrees with the oft-cited opinion of Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson in 
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, in which he commented that: 
A judge, like an executive adviser, may be surprised at 
the poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority 
applicable to concrete problems of executive power as 
they actually present themselves. Just what our 
forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had 
they foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from 
materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was 
called upon to interpret for Pharaoh. A century and a 
half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields 
no net result, but only supplies more or less apt 
quotations from respected sources on each side of any 
                                                
8 Michael Stokes Paulsen “The Constitution of Necessity,” Notre Dame Law Review, Vol 79 
(2004), 1257.   
9 See, for example, Richard Pious, “Inherent War and Executive Powers and Prerogative 
Politics,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Volume 37, Number 1 (March 2007). 
10 See, for example, Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution:  Sharing Power 
After the Iran-Contra Affair (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1990) and Louis 






question. They largely cancel each other. And court 
decisions are indecisive because of the judicial practice 
of dealing with the largest questions in the most narrow 
way.11 
 
This dissertation affirms that the Constitution itself provides the best means for 
understanding, inter alia, the President’s powers and responsibilities in times of war 
and danger.  The dissertation then offers two case studies of Presidents, who in the 
most profound crises, were forced to come to grips with the constitutional basis of the 
powers of the office to which they were elected.  Therefore, this dissertation looks 
beyond the partisan debate and scholarly speculation to the Founding itself and to 
periods of crises, and to the statesman who led during those times, to answer the 
fundamental questions of the executive war power. 
Though the Constitution contains all requisite powers for its self-preservation 
and the President is duty-bound to “preserve, protect, and defend” it, the President’s 
power should not be understood as “anything goes.” The corollary interpretative 
principle, this dissertation puts forth, is that the Framers attempted to mitigate the 
potential dangers of the executive by explicitly republicanizing it to ensure the 
Presidency maintains a “due dependence” on the sovereign people, who have multiple 
constitutional means to hold it accountable.12  The people must remain the ultimate 
judge of the President’s exercise of power.  Every ingredient of the Presidency—from 
its eligibility requirements, unitary form, mode of election, term of office, and its 
grounds and procedures for removal—received the Framers most careful attention to 
                                                
11 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).  
12 Mansfield eloquently captures the relationship between the exercise executive power and 
accountability in republican government when he writes, “The executive is limited only by 
the end for which it is entrusted by the people, which is the public good as they interpret it.”  





ensure that the Constitution combines in the Presidency the energy and strength 
necessary for the effective and energetic execution of its solemn duties with adequate 
republican safety measures.  
Grounding the study of presidential war power in the Constitution, and 
exploring how it was understood and employed by two Presidents at critical 
junctures, this dissertation makes several significant contributions to the scholarly 
study of the Presidency.  First, it rejects predominant notions that the “pre-modern” or 
“traditional” Presidency was an office with limited powers, hamstrung by the 
Constitution and needing to be unchained from it in order to meet the challenges of 
the 20th century.13  Instead, this dissertation argues that the Presidency, from its 
inception and as understood by Washington and Lincoln, occupies a special 
constitutional position with significant powers and responsibilities to achieve the 
principal ends of the U.S. political order.  Second, this dissertation counters prevalent 
scholarly views that the Presidency, in extreme circumstances such as war, must 
resort to powers outside the realm of the Constitution or even against it to ensure the 
nation’s survival.14  This dissertation argues that the Constitution incorporates 
                                                
13 See Fred I. Greenstein, “Change and Continuity in the Modern Presidency,” in The New 
American Political System, ed. Anthony King (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise 
Institute Press, 1978), 45-48 and Pfiffner, The Modern Presidency, 1-3.  However, the most 
deliberate effort to detach the Presidency from the Constitution came much earlier in the 
writings of Woodrow Wilson and other progressives who found the Constitution as 
institutionally weakening and hamstringing the Presidency.  Of the President's constitutional 
duties and powers, Wilson wrote, “It is through no fault or neglect of his that the duties 
apparently assigned to him by the Constitution have come o be his less conspicuous, less 
important duties, and that duties apparently not assigned to him at all chiefly occupy his time 
and energy.” See Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1908), 67.    
14 The principal basis for discussions of the executive conducting necessary extra- or un-
constitutional measures originates with John Locke’s discussion of prerogative, which he 





necessity into its framework, and that all powers exercised in defense of the nation 
are to be understood as constitutionally justified.  Third, by focusing on the 
President’s duty to the Constitution and his accountability to the people, this 
dissertation argues that the Presidency ought to be understood according to its 
constitutionally assigned duties and responsibilities, not exclusively from its 
relationship with Congress.  The debate over “war powers” today has been narrowly 
construed, centering primarily on the President-Congress disputes over initiation of 
military hostilities15—obscuring the more appropriate lens of viewing the President’s 
duty to the preservation of the constitutional order.  
Furthermore, by examining the Constitution as an overarching and enduring 
framework of government that provides the purposes and ends to which power should 
be exercised, this dissertation offers a broader, more fundamental basis for 
understanding the President’s wartime duties and powers.  As such, it can be 
distinguished from those studies that examine the President’s power in light of one 
                                                                                                                                      
good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it…”  See John Locke, 
Two Treatises of Government, (ed.) Peter Laslett (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 
1988), 375.  Chapter II discusses the concept of prerogative as it compares to the 
understanding of constitutional self-preservation. Chapter IV of this dissertation focuses 
specifically on the applicability of Locke’s prerogative to understanding Lincoln’s 
construction of the executive power during the Civil War, which has broader implications for 
understanding that power more generally.  For more on the concept on prerogative in the 
United States specifically, see Daniel P. Franklin, Extraordinary Measures: The Exercise of 
Extraordinary Powers in the United States (Pittsburgh, PA:  University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1991). 
15 Edward Corwin’s famous suggestion that the Constitution is an “invitation to struggle” to 
President and Congress over the “privilege of directing” foreign affairs has significantly 
influenced scholarly debate over the meaning of the “war power,” which tend to be viewed as 
a subset of foreign policy.  Edward S. Corwin, The President, Office and Powers: History 
and Analysis of Practice and Opinion (New York:  New York University Press, 1940).   See 
Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power, 2nd ed. (Lawrence, KS:  University of Kansas Press, 
2004), who critiques a perceived growth in Presidential powers over war, but focuses the 





particular clause or “enumerated power” within the Constitution, which offer too 
narrow a conception of the President’s power and fail to recognize that the 
Constitution duty-binds whomever occupies the Office of the Presidency to ensure its 
preservation, protection, and defense.  Article II’s Commander-in-Chief Clause 
perhaps best exemplifies the narrow focus on one specific clause as the basis for 
understanding the executive war power, for scholars often reference it as the primary 
source of the executive war power.16   
David Luban, for example, offers an excellent overview of the history and 
basis of that clause, specifically its role in ensuring civilian control of the military.  
Luban, moreover, argues that the Commander-in-Chief clause only tells us that the 
President has that authority but “tells us nothing about what the commander-in-chief 
power encompasses.”17  Yet, as this dissertation shows, Luban’s argument, for all its 
insights, addresses the issue too narrowly when it comes to understanding the basis 
for the executive war power, which can be more appropriately found in the broader 
presidential responsibilities to ensure the safety and survival of the constitutional 
order.  The Commander-in-Chief clause authorizes the President as the supreme 
commander of the armed forces but it represents only a slice of the power—albeit an 
important one—that the President can exercise to meet his (or her) constitutional 
duties. Luban, thus, misses that the President’s exercise of wartime power is rooted 
                                                
16 See, for example, David J. Barron and Martin S. Lederman “The Commander in Chief at 
the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding” 
Harvard Law Review 121:3 (January 2008); David J. Barron and Martin S. Lederman 
“The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History,” 
Harvard Law Review 121:4 (February 2008); and David Luban, “On the Commander-in-
Chief Power” Georgetown Law Faculty Working Papers Paper 40. 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/fwps_papers/40 





more in its obligations to the Constitution, and the higher, more normative purposes 
to which it aims, rather than a particular clause describing a specific function of the 
office.  Luban focuses on the President’s accountability to the Congress and 
Judiciary, relationship that merit observation, but in doing so does not acknowledge, 
as this dissertation emphasizes, the Presidency’s more fundamental accountability to 
the sovereign people.  
To answer the research questions and elaborate upon the interpretive 
principles outlined above, Chapter II of this dissertation offers an in-depth analysis of 
the overarching purpose and meaning of the Constitution, relying primarily on the 
text itself as well as The Federalist of Publius.  Written during the period of 
ratification in 1787-1788, The Federalist helped explain the meaning of the 
Constitution to the people who ordained and established it, and proves just as useful 
in helping to uncover the meaning of the Constitution today as it did then. It tries to 
understand the Constitution as those who framed it did.  Chapter II explores the 
constitutional text, focusing on its Preamble as a way to unlock the Constitution’s 
fundamental purpose to furnish an overarching frame of government that provides for 
the safety of its citizens so that they may enjoy their natural liberties, as articulated in 
the Declaration of Independence.  Grounded in natural law reasoning of modern 
political philosophers, namely Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, this essential 
understanding of the Constitution shows that it must be read through a lens of self-
preservation and that the long-term survival of the political order serves as the 
principal objective to which all measures must first aim and be understood. This 





suggesting that they are competing interests to be balanced.18  Instead, it supports the 
underlying premise that a secure political order, fully equipped to defend itself 
against internal and external threats, provides the best means for individuals to attain 
their natural liberties. That the Constitution was explicitly designed to be an enduring 
framework of government to serve future generations, any and all measures taken in 
defense of the political order thereby should be considered legitimate and sanctioned 
by the Constitution itself.  
      Chapter II also focuses on the meaning and implications of Article II of the 
Constitution, which vests the President with the executive power, or all of the 
necessary means to execute the purpose of the laws and the Constitution.  Measures 
that the President takes to achieve these ends ought to be understood as legitimate and 
Constitutional.  The Constitution requires the President to take a special oath to 
“preserve, protect, and defend” the Constitution before the execution of the Office.  
This Oath is unique to the President, and provides the aims toward which the 
President’s executive powers are to be exercised.  Chapter II employs Publius’s 
explanation of the Constitution to show that the key ingredients of the executive 
power are energy, responsibility, and safety, and explores the importance of each of 
these concepts that, when blended, form the basis for understanding the President’s 
power in times of war. 
                                                
18 Richard A. Posner Not a Suicide Pact:  The Constitution in Time of National Emergency 
(Oxford University Press:  New York, 2006). Michael Howard succinctly captures this 
historical problem writing, “The dialectic between freedom and security lies at the basis of all 
political society.” See his introduction to Michael Howard (ed.), Soldiers and Governments:  






 Using Chapter II's analysis of the Constitution as the backdrop, the 
dissertation then examines the constitutional thought of Presidents Washington and 
Lincoln, specifically how they constructed the executive war power.  These chapters 
explore the writings of Washington and Lincoln as buttresses of the interpretive 
principle of constitutional self-preservation and demonstrate that the necessity of the 
circumstances determines the extent to which power can be employed. Similarly, 
these chapters examine how each President viewed the responsibilities articulated in 
Article II of the Constitution, and how each saw the Presidency as republican 
institution fully accountable to the people.  Chapter III focuses specifically on 
Washington's words and deeds during the Whiskey Rebellion, a crisis that threatened 
the existence of the new political order just a half decade after its founding.  Focusing 
on Washington during the Whiskey Rebellion enables us to discern how the first 
president—who played a, if not the, primary role in each stage of the nation’s 
founding—understood the Constitution and translated it into practice in a time of 
threat to the political order.  Washington, in many ways, helped “complete” the 
Constitution19 by putting the framework of government into effect and showing the 
people to whom it belongs that it could adequately provide for their safety.  However, 
by concluding that Washington made substantive contributions to U.S. 
                                                
19 In his introductory essay to the Pacificus-Helvidius Debates of 1793-1794, Morton Frisch 
argues that Hamilton and Madison’s writings helped “complete” the Constitution.  I take his 
suggestion a step further to contend that Washington, himself, through his words and deeds 
helped complete the Constitution by translating into practice the intent of the Constitution.  
See Morton Frisch, “The Significance of the Pacificus-Helvidius Debates: Toward the 
Completion of the American Founding” in The Pacificus-Helvidius Debates of 1793-1794: 
Toward the Completion of the American Founding, edited with and Introduction by Morton J. 






constitutionalism, and that we have much to learn from his construction of the 
executive war power, cuts against the scholarly grain that holds Washington as more 
of a mythical symbol of national unity than a forceful constitutional theorist.  Chapter 
III, therefore, serves to correct the reputation of Washington’s constitutionalism, or 
lack thereof, by analyzing his contribution to our understanding of the President’s 
duty and power in times of war.   
 Chapter IV focuses on Lincoln’s words and deeds during the Civil War.  This 
chapter demonstrates that Lincoln read from the same constitutional script as 
Washington and Publius as he relied upon the text and logic of the Constitution to 
construct the executive power during the most calamitous event in U.S. history.  
Consistent with the findings of Chapters II and III, Lincoln held self-preservation as 
the fundamental principle by which to understand the Constitution.  He similarly 
viewed the President as constitutionally duty-bound to take all necessary measures to 
preserve, protect, and defend the constitutional order; measures in pursuit of those 
overarching aims, Lincoln showed, were sanctioned by the Constitution itself.  
Whereas Washington’s understanding of the constitutional basis of executive war 
power has been relatively neglected, Lincoln’s remains central to the current 
scholarly debate over presidential war powers.  Yet, as Chapter IV shows, scholarly 
views of Lincoln are diverse, with some extreme critical views holding him as tyrant 
who destroyed the Founders' Constitution while others more sanguinely view his 
exercise of executive power as un- or extra-constitutional but nonetheless necessary.  
In either case, scholars caution against learning any lessons from Lincoln either 





offer anything useful for understanding the Presidency.  This dissertation counters 
such notions, illuminating Lincoln’s profound understanding of the constitutional 
basis of the executive war power, and suggesting that he, above all others, can offer 
us much perspective in our own time.   
 Taken together, these three chapters offer insight into constitutional basis of 
the executive war power and how two Presidents constructed and employed it during 
crucial times.  It offers much perspective and provides constitutional lessons for our 
own time.  Yet this dissertation also hopes to shed light on the broader subject of 
statesmanship— particularly whether it can exist constitutionally within the United 
States.20  Thomas Pangle captures the difficulties that American Presidents have 
becoming statesman, writing, “We are forever demanding, on the one hand, that the 
president be a leader, with the sort of stature and dynamism of Pericles of Athens; and 
then, on the other hand, demanding that the president and his men remain strictly 
within the bounds of the rule of law established by the legislative branch in its 
ultimate supremacy.”21  Pangle illuminates the fundamental tension between excellent 
leadership in extraordinary times and the rule of law of the legislature but it 
unfortunately obscures the President’s independent duty to the Constitution, which 
this dissertation argues affords the executive the opportunity to excel and act with the 
                                                
20 Herbert Storing challenges the increasingly popular notion that “Statesmanship is almost 
un-American” in his “American Statesmanship: Old and New” in Toward a More Perfect 
Union: Writings of Herbert Storing, (ed.) Joseph M. Bessette (Washington, D.C.: American 
Enterprise Institute Press, 1995), 403.  For a broader discussion of the challenges to and 
criticism of democratic statesmanship, see Richard S. Ruderman, “Democracy and the 
Problem of Statesmanship,” The Review of Politics, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 759-
787 
21 Thomas L. Pangle, “Executive Energy and Popular Spirit in Lockean Constitutionalism,” 





stature and dynamism of Pericles while remaining wholly within the boundaries of 
constitutional rule of law.  It is in the realm of necessity in the defense of the nation 
where American statesmanship can flourish, when Presidents are duty-bound to meet 
the demands of the situation.  The Constitution cannot guarantee statesmanship from 
its Presidents; but it does provide them the opportunity and means to do so.  Whether 
they have met the task will be determined by the people, who have multiple 
constitutional means to judge and hold their leaders accountable.  
 Finally, although this dissertation focuses on the American Constitution and 
proposes a corrective remedy to the current scholarly debates over presidential war 
powers, it also seeks to contribute to understanding those perennial political 
questions, namely: to what ends do we order political society?  War and the prospect 
of it unfortunately pose a constant threat to political regimes, and founders must 
address how they will order their laws to meet such challenges.  More specifically, 
republican regimes must address how they will structure the executive to ensure that 
it has the requisite energy to meet those challenges without transforming the republic 
into a tyranny.  The Romans, for example, famously took refuge in the celebrated 
wartime executive institution of the dictator.  The Roman historian Livy tells us that, 
in trepidis rebus (fearful times) when normal measures would not suffice, the 
Romans would proclaim a dictatorship, entrusting in one individual for a fixed period 
of time the absolute power to resolve the crisis at hand.22  This institution served the 
Roman Republic well for some time; however, it eventually lost its liberty at the hand 
                                                
22 See, for example, Livy Ab Urbe Condita, Book 4, XVII in Livy with an English 
Translation by B.O. Foster, (New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons,, 1927) Volumes III and IV, 
313-314.  I use the translation offered by David J. Bederman, The Classical Foundations of 





of a dictator, a lesson certainly not unnoticed by the Framers.  At its core, therefore, 
this dissertation attempts to come to grips with how the Framers prepared for “fearful 
times” while mitigating the risk of losing their liberties; the answer lies in studying 
the constitutional basis of the executive war power.  Paraphrasing Machiavelli, this 
dissertation puts forth that the Office of the Presidency may be the cause of greatness 
of so great a republic. 
 
Chapter II:  The Constitution and the Special Role of the 
Presidency 
 
Current scholarly opinion generally accepts that the Presidency is out of step 
with the Constitution, particularly on matters pertaining to war and national defense.  
The Presidency is commonly described as a modern, imperial institution that has, at a 
minimum, taken on roles and responsibilities for which it was not intended, or worse, 
outright usurped the powers of Congress and Judiciary.  The Presidency, accordingly, 
has “hijacked” and “subverted” the Constitution, leaving Americans today with an 
unconstitutional and imperial executive institution at the forefront of its foreign and 
military policy that threatens to undermine the political order it is intended to serve.23     
Before accepting such opinions unchallenged, it is worth reflecting upon 
Alexis de Tocqueville’s assessment of the Presidency.  Tocqueville concludes that the 
U.S. Constitution supplies a strong executive but that it appeared weak due to the lack 
of a security threat at the time. Comparing the Office of the Presidency to the King of 
                                                
23 Peter Irons, War Powers:  How the Imperial Presidency Hijacked the Constitution  (New 
York:  Metropolitan Books, 2005).  Also see Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.’s War and the 





France, Tocqueville implies that it is the law—or more precisely the Constitution—
that grants such vast power to the Presidency, whereas in France it is the constant 
threat of invasion by hostile neighbors that caused that nation to rely more heavily on 
its executive in times of danger.  He writes: 
 
The President of the United States possesses almost 
royal prerogatives, which he has no occasion to make 
use of, and the rights which, up to now, he can use are 
very circumscribed:  the laws permit him to be strong, 
circumstances keep him weak.24 
 
Two issues central to Tocqueville’s analysis are:  law and circumstance.  
Framed around these two themes, the present discussion explores the U.S. 
Constitution as fundamental law during such circumstances as war and national 
emergency when the survival of the nation is at stake.  What does the Constitution say 
about war and emergency, and specifically what role does it assign the Presidency in 
matters of national defense?  More importantly, how did the American Founders look 
at the rule of law and the circumstances of national danger when designing, 
developing, and implementing the U.S. Constitution?  This dissertation argues that 
war and national security were prominent themes underlying the design of the 
Constitution.  After all, why did the Constitutional Convention of the summer of 1787 
convene?  The delegates to the convention met with the explicit purpose of 
addressing the “defects” of the Articles of Confederation, and to “render the federal 
constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government & the preservation of the 
                                                
24 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba 





Union.”25  They sought to establish the Constitution, as the fundamental law, 
adequately equipped with all of the necessary powers to endure through the 
challenging circumstances all governments face.    
War, internal and external, is but one circumstance that governments face, but 
it perhaps is the most dangerous since it can pose an existential threat to the political 
order.  A constitution designed to endure ought to contain the requisite means to meet 
such dangers; those unprepared or ill equipped for such challenges are perhaps not 
long for this world.  This chapter argues that the Framers explicitly addressed the 
challenges of war and puts forth straightforward but radical principle for 
Constitutional interpretation:  The principal purpose of the U.S. Constitution is to 
provide for the safety and defense of the nation and that all powers exercised to that 
end are, by necessity, legitimate and Constitutional.  This principle serves as the 
primary lens through which we should view the exercise of power and interpret its 
Constitutionality.26  
                                                
25 Resolution of Congress, 21 February 1787, in Max Farrand (ed.) The Records of the 
Federal Convention of 1787 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911), Vol 3, 13-14.  
Hereafter cited as Farrand’s Records with volume and page number.  
26 Herbert Storing argues forcefully that the “Constitution must be read—was meant to be 
read—in light of necessity.  The Constitution is law that opens up to the realm of necessity—
and returns to the realm of law.  The Constitution is meant to be commodious and elastic 
enough to met the demands of necessity and yet retain its character as law.”  This passage 
helps form the foundation of the issues explored in this dissertation.  See  Herbert J. Storing, 
Toward a More Perfect Union: Writings of Herbert J. Storing, edited by Joseph Bessette 
(Washington, DC:  The American Enterprise Institute Press, 1995). The most extensive and 
persuasive argument for reading the Constitution in this way is Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
“Symposium: The Changing Laws of War: Do We Need a New Legal Regime After 
September 11?: The Constitution of Necessity,” Notre Dame Law Review Vol 79 (July 2004), 
1257-1298.  I acknowledge my significant debt to Mr. Paulsen’s insightful work, which has 
inspired many of the ideas in this dissertation.  I also am grateful for his willingness to 
answer my questions over the past couple years through email correspondence. I also 
acknowledge the excellent critique of Mr. Paulsen work offered by Saikrishna Prakash in the 





Unlike the predominant scholarly discussions of “war power” that focus 
narrowly on disputes between Presidency and Congress over the initiation of military 
hostilities,27 this dissertation offers a broader, more fundamental definition of the war 
power as all necessary measures taken in pursuit of the Constitution’s ultimate goal of 
self-preservation and national security.  This constitutional basis of the war power 
provides perspective for understanding the Presidency’s roles and responsibilities 
with respect to war and national defense.  To this end, this dissertation argues a 
second subordinate principle, which is no less radical or dangerous, but equally 
significant: the Constitution assigns to the Office of the Presidency the primary 
responsibility for preserving and protecting the Constitution, and the ultimate safety 
of the political order.  Measures the President takes towards this end, therefore, ought 
to be understood as legitimate and constitutional.   
Such interpretative principles could prove dangerous since it provides the 
national government almost unlimited power in pursuit of security and holds the 
executive as the institution primarily (but not exclusively) responsible for determining 
the extent of exercising that power.  It proves radical because it challenges the basic 
tenets of constitutionalism, which argue that constitutions serve primarily to 
                                                                                                                                      
New Legal Regime After September 11?: The Constitution as Suicide Pact,” Notre Dame 
Law Review Vol 79 (July 2004), 1299.  
27 Edward Corwin’s famous suggestion that the Constitution invites the Presidency and 
Congress to struggle over foreign affairs has influenced much of the analysis of powers in 
times of war. See Corwin, The President: Office and Powers: History and Analysis of 
Practice and Opinion (New York:  New York University Press, 1940), 200.  This is 
especially true of the Imperial Presidency scholars who fear that the Presidency is winning 
that struggle to the point of presenting a threat to the Constitution.  Yet even proponents of 
Presidential power tend to frame issues in this way.  See, for example, John Yoo, The Powers 
of War and Peace:  The Constitution and Foreign Affairs After 9/11 (Chicago: The 





circumscribe and delineate government power.   However, it is imperative that these 
principles not be understood as “anything goes,” and that they are to be understood 
along with a third corollary principle: Although the Presidency has the primary 
responsibility to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution, and can wield all 
necessary power to meet that objective, it has a due dependence on the people, who 
have multiple constitutional means to judge the constitutionality of his (or her) 
behavior and to hold him (or her) accountable.  The President, therefore, must abide 
by the constitutional institutions explicitly established to hold it accountable (e.g., 
periodic elections).  In short, although the President may wield enormous power in 
defense of the nation, it cannot be unlimited, for basic republican institutions of 
accountability, namely national elections, must be maintained.   
To articulate these fundamental interpretive principles, this chapter focuses 
primarily on the Constitution’s text and relies heavily upon The Federalist, the series 
of essays written by Publius—the collective pseudonym of Alexander Hamilton, John 
Jay, and James Madison—that offers the most cogent explanation of the Constitution 
and the underlying principles for comprehending it.  The initial section discusses why 
the Constitution should be used as a guide, specifically examining why a written 
constitution occupies a special place in the American political order.  This section 
also briefly explains why this chapter uses Publius as a single voice as opposed to an 
edited volume by three authors with very different ideas.  Treating The Federalist as a 
coherent explanation of the Constitution and its underlying principles presents a 
rather unusual approach, since many scholars tend to read into The Federalist the 





does not necessarily endorse a “pro-Hamiltonian” or “pro-Madisonian” view of the 
Constitution, instead it tries to understand the Constitution as it was originally 
explained by Publius to the people who took part in ordaining and establishing it.   
After addressing the sources and methods questions, this section aims to 
explain briefly “to what end” the Constitution was ordained and established, focusing 
specifically on the primary concerns of safety and security.  A tranquil and secure 
political order provides the best means for its citizens to enjoy the “blessings of 
liberty.”  This chapter, as such, rejects the frequent juxtaposition of security and 
liberty, explaining instead how the Framers viewed the former as a means to the 
latter.  This is an important distinction, for when we understand the Framers’ more 
nuanced view that security and liberty are intertwined and not necessarily competing 
goals, we recognize that government power to achieve security actually helps 
maintain a free political order over the long run.  This section further suggests that it 
is imperative to understand the Constitution in light of Publius’s maxim, which he 
emphasizes throughout The Federalist, that “[a] government ought to contain in itself 
every power requisite to the full accomplishment of the object committed to its care” 
(Federalist 31).28  Since the nation’s defense is the object for which the national 
                                                
28 All citations of The Federalist are from The Federalist Papers edited by Clinton Rossiter 
with Introduction and Notes by Charles R. Kesler, (New York:  Signet Classics, 2003).  What 
is commonly known as The Federalist Papers was originally published as The Federalist, a 
collection of essays appearing in the New York press beginning in October 1787.  Alexander 
Hamilton, one of the co-authors, published them in two volumes in March and May 1788.  
Addressed to the Citizens of New York, the essays intended to influence the New York state 
convention on the ratification of the proposed U.S. Constitution.  Secondly, the essays are co-
authored by three individuals, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay under the 
pseudonym Publius, for Publius Valerius Publicola who was a founder of the Roman 
Republic, who retired from public service but later returned to save it in the midst of a crisis.  





government is responsible, the Constitution contains every power necessary to ensure 
its security.   
The subsequent section explores the powers and special duty that the 
Constitution assigns to the Office of the Presidency to “preserve, protect, and defend” 
the constitutional order.  Organized around energy and responsibility, the key 
“ingredients” of executive power, this chapter shows the constitutional basis of the 
executive war power.   Though the President is expected to wield extraordinary power 
in defense of the nation, the Constitution structures the office in such a way to remain 
safely republican with a due dependence on the people to whom the Constitution 
ultimately belongs.  To help clarify and put these findings in their scholarly context, 
the chapter concludes with a brief comparison of its findings with alternative 
perspectives on the basis of the executive war power.   
That to Which All Parts Aim:  The Overriding Purpose of the Constitution 
At the risk of stating the obvious, any inquiry into the constitutional basis of a 
particular issue should begin with an examination of the Constitution itself with 
assistance from the writings of those who developed and explained it publicly (e.g., 
Publius’s The Federalist).  Yet relying upon the Constitution’s text is not common 
practice among those who expound upon American political and legal issues as is 
evident in the judicial case study method that dominates contemporary law school 
curricula and the subfield of public law within political science departments.  
Students and scholars in these fields usually try to discern the meaning of the 





of interpreters: the courts.29  Others more flagrantly ignore the Constitution or 
consider it a living document that changes with new developments in society and 
interpretive methodologies.30  If one accepts the Constitution as a living document 
that evolves with the “progress” of political thought, one must conclude that it offers 
no fixed standard of judgment and therefore, is not an instrument or symbol that 
expresses the principles and purpose of the United States but one that can be bent to 
reflect fashionable political discourse. 
Such views are problematic since the genius of the American experiment in 
self-government, in part, rests upon a written document intended to be read and 
interpreted in service of those who adopted it as well as future generations.31  As 
such, the Constitution serves two primary purposes.  First, it is concerned with 
organizational and procedural issues such as the size and composition of the 
legislature, modes of election, basic requirements for candidacy for office, and the 
process of impeachment.  In this way, the Constitution is positive law, describing how 
the basic functions of government are established and how it should operate.  Second, 
                                                
29 See the remarks made by Akhil Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography. (New York:  
Random House, 2006), xi.  Commenting on the lack of attention given to the Constitution’s 
text, Professor Amar shares the anecdote that it has become a common joke among law 
faculty not to assign the Constitution for it may only serve to confuse the students.  For 
another excellent, not to mention witty, critique of the study of law today see Michael Stokes 
Paulsen’s “How to Interpret the Constitution (and How Not To)” Yale Law Journal, Vol: 115 
(2006), 2037. 
30 See, for example, Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government: A Study in American 
Politics (New York: Meridian Books,  1956), which is examined in a bit more detail in the 
conclusion of this dissertation. 
31 See Herman Belz’s discussion of “written constitutionalism as the American Project” in 
Herman Belz, A Living Constitution or Fundamental Law?:  American Constitutionalism in 
Historical Perspective (Lanham, MD:  Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), chapter 
1. Also see Frederich A. von Hayek’s discussion of the written constitution as the “American 
contribution” to constitutionalism in The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago:  The University of 





Constitution provides the United States with political purpose, defining to what ends 
the political order has been ordained and established.  Hence it has a higher, more 
normative purpose.32   
Though many discussions center around the former, to understand the 
Constitution and use it to guide for understanding the President’s exercise of power in 
times of war, inter alia, we must explore the latter as well.  Even the organizational 
and procedural issues, important as they are, only can be properly understood in the 
context of the broader, more fundamental purpose of the Constitution.  In this light, 
for instance, the common approach to the war powers debate—which focuses 
narrowly on Presidential-Congressional disputes over the initiation of military 
hostilities—misses the proverbial “forest for the trees,” focusing on organizational 
and procedural issues and not the overarching purpose toward which those particular 
powers are exercised.  Thus, this approach fails to recognize that the President’s 
actions in times of war ought to be judged against whether they are conducted in 
pursuit of the ends of the Constitution—namely the preservation and protection of the 
political order—not simply in relation to Congress.33   It is imperative, therefore, that 
the ends of the Constitution be understood so that we can appropriately understand, 
                                                
32 Herman Belz, A Living Constitution or Fundamental Law?, 3-4.  Martin Diamond provides 
a similar take on this issue, “The principles and arrangements are so designed as to be capable 
of guiding conduct in varying circumstances.”  He goes on to discuss how each decade brings 
about new problems that requiring adaptation (“new practices and new judicial 
interpretations”) of the Constitution to deal with them.  He then says, “But the Constitution 
remains the source of fundamentals from which these practices and interpretations are 
derived.  Thus it is adaptable but firm in its essential character.”  Martin Diamond, The 
Founding of the Democratic Republic (Itasca, IL: F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1981), 103.  
33 Harvey Mansfield emphasizes this point, “The executive is limited only by the end for 






adjudicate, and prioritize the means for serving those ends. As Publius informs us, the 
methods of Constitutional construction should be “dictated by plain reason as well as 
founded on legal axioms,” that the parts ought to be understood as serving some end, 
and when it conflicts with another part in achieving the ends of government, “the 
lesser should give way to the more important part” (Federalist 40).  After a few 
remarks on this dissertation’s use of The Federalist, the remainder of this section 
explores in greater detail the explicit purposes of the Constitution and the implicit 
principles for comprehending the means to pursue them.    
 
A Note on Publius’s Constitution 
Treating The Federalist as a coherent set of essays written by a single voice 
explicitly intending to expound upon the Constitution and its underlying republican 
principles does not reflect the common approach to this text.  Rather, it usually is 
viewed as the conglomeration of disparate and competing ideas of three different 
authors.   As a result, many readers tend to view the essays and ideas as either 
“Hamilton’s” or “Madison’s” (to say nothing of Jay’s contributions) and not those of 
pseudonymous Publius, who represents the common constitutional frame of mind of 
all three authors.   
When Douglas Adair authoritatively established the authorship of the 85 
essays that compose The Federalist, he also instigated a debate over Publius’s “split 
personality,” highlighting the tensions and competing ideas.  He contended that: the 
essays were either a “pure Hamilton” or “pure Madison” persuasion; collaboration 





would regret their contributions to The Federalist.34  To Adair, moreover, The 
Federalist does not offer an explanation of the Constitution but a piece of propaganda 
to force its ratification.  Expanding upon “split personality” theme, Alpheus Mason 
highlights Hamilton and Madison’s “diverging political creeds” and “sharp 
theoretical split,” contrasting the former’s “bold nationalist stance” with the latter’s 
“balanced purpose” and goes so far as to accuse the Hamilton of essentially not 
understanding Madison.35  To Adair, Mason, and other proponents of Publius’s split 
personality thesis, The Federalist does not offer a coherent, unified authority on the 
principles of the Constitution.  
George Carey, however, persuasively countered the “split personality” thesis 
put forth by Adair and Mason, effectively displaying that the differences between 
Hamilton and Madison, specifically, are “miniscule” and that even on the most 
controversial items, such as Hamilton’s suggestion of nearly unlimited financial and 
military power for the national government, Madison concurred in several areas.36  
David Epstein, in his marvelous interpretation of The Federalist, also demonstrates 
the significant similarities of the ideas underpinning the essays, and cautions that 
“reports of inconsistency have been greatly exaggerated.”37  Epstein and Carey’s 
worthy attempt to counter the split personality thesis, however, has not proven the 
                                                
34 Douglas Adair, “The Authorship of the Dispute Federalist Papers,” in Fame and the 
Founding Fathers:  Essays by Douglas Adair, edited by Trevor Colburn with a personal 
memoir by Caroline Robbins and a Bibliographical Essay by Robert E. Shalhope, 
(Indianapolis, IN:  Liberty Fund, 1998), 37-105. 
35 Alpheus Thomas Moore, “The Federalist—A Split Personality,” The American Historical 
Review Vol. 57, No. 3 (April 1952), 625-643; see specifically 627-628 and 642. 
36 George W. Carey, “Publius: A Split Personality?,” The Review of Politics Vol 46, No.1 
(Jan 1984), 5-22. 
37 David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist (Chicago:  The University of 





final word as many scholars continue refer to the individual essay by either Hamilton, 
Madison, or Jay rather than Publius.  That Hamilton and Madison would later 
vehemently disagree and publicly argue over prominent issues (e.g., the establishment 
of the National Bank, Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation of 1793) helps explain, 
in part, the endurance of the “split personality” of Publius thesis. The positions of 
Hamilton and Madison (often joined by Jefferson) in these later debates did reflect 
the deepening divisions within the American polity over the proper role of the new 
national government and its institutions and how it would work in practice.  However, 
hindsight is 20/20, and we ought to be cautious not to read later disagreements 
between Hamilton and Madison into the text of The Federalist for that would reflect a 
sense of conflict and competition among the collaborators that was neither present nor 
intended.  Instead, we ought to try to understand The Federalist as it was intended to 
be understood: the work of a single anonymous voice, advocating for the ratification 
of the Constitution by appealing to reason and experience to explain its purpose, 
meaning, and underlying principles in extensive detail.  They wrote anonymously to 
focus readers on the arguments advanced and not on the reputation and political 
persuasion of individual authors. 
Publius, by no means, represents the only or even the final word on the 
Constitution; however, it does reflect arguably the most forceful of our foundational 
documents aside from the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence 
themselves.  None other than Jefferson, who would later develop a deep suspicion 
and animosity toward Alexander Hamilton, commented that The Federalist represent 





More importantly, The Federalist ought to be understood, again as it was intended, as 
a public commentary to explain the merits on the proposed Constitution.  It serves as 
a useful reference for the Founding generation’s posterity to gain greater insight into 
the Constitution’s purpose and meaning.  Treating The Federalist as a single voice, 
however, does have implications for understanding and interpreting the Constitution.  
Notably, it does not easily lend to categorization as a purely “Hamiltonian” or 
“Madisonian” interpretation of the Constitution.  Such debates reflect an important 
part of our constitutional discourse but focus on them deviates from this chapter’s 
attempt to start with a tabula rasa of sorts to present the constitutional basis of the 
executive war power as it was understood when it was initially established and 
ordained.  
 
The Explicit Purpose of the Constitution 
Commenting on the proposed Constitution, James Monroe insightfully 
identified the Preamble as the principal basis for interpreting the purpose and 
intentions of the Constitution.  He explains,  “The introduction, like a preamble to a 
law, is the Key of the Constitution.  Whenever federal power is exercised, contrary to 
the spirit breathed by this introduction, it will be unconstitutionally exercised, and 
ought to be resisted by the people.”38  Opponents of the Constitution, too, looked to 
the Preamble as a means to comprehend its overarching purpose.  Arguably the most 
serious and persuasive Anti-Federalist writer, Brutus, suggests:  “To discover the 
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spirit of the constitution, it is of the first importance to attend to the principal ends 
and designs it has in view.  These are expressed in the preamble.”39 
In accepting the merits of these observers, examining the Preamble does offer 
a means to unlock the stated meaning and purpose of the Constitution and use it as an 
overriding principle for interpreting the Constitutional basis of the executive power in 
times of war.40  However, neither the Preamble, nor the Constitution more broadly, 
can be properly understood when divorced from the other primary Founding 
document, the Declaration of Independence.  The Preamble opens with the famous 
“We the People” reflecting that the new government will derive its “just powers” 
from the “consent of the governed.” It also demonstrates the explicit republican 
principle that a free and equal people are sovereign and do ordain and establish the 
Constitution as a compact that binds them together to more ably preserve and protect 
their natural rights as outlined in the Declaration of Independence.41 The Constitution 
intends to carry into effect the Declaration of Independence’s bold statement that “it 
is the right of the people…to institute new Government, laying its foundations on 
such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most 
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”  Safety and happiness are equally 
important goals that the Constitution aims to secure.  They are not competing goals 
                                                
39 Brutus XII in Herbert J. Storing (ed), The Complete Anti-Federalist. (The University of 
Chicago Press:  Chicago, 1981) 2.9.150. 
40 Paulsen, “The Constitution of Necessity,” 1259. 
41 For an articulation of the significance between a Constitution ordained and established by 
the people for their “original” natural rights, see speech by James Wilson during the 
Pennsylvania ratification debate, in Jonathan Elliot (ed.), The Debates in the Several State 
Conventions, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as Recommended by the General 
Convention at Philadelphia, in 1787 (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott and Co, 1901), Vol. II, 





but intertwined: a free people cannot have the opportunity to achieve their happiness 
if they are not safe.  A free people, moreover, will not remain free if they are safe but 
unable to pursue their happiness.  
Embodying the Declaration’s language of safety and happiness, the 
Constitution expressly aims at attaining six principal objectives that are 
interdependent and ordered logically.  The bookend objectives demonstrate an 
explicit break with the past for the purpose of creating and maintaining a political 
order for the future.  The Constitution aims to be “more perfect” than its predecessor 
Articles of Confederation which, after just a mere decade, could not be maintained.  
The fact that the Articles’ Framers, within a decade, had to revisit the basic principles 
of government and completely restructure its framework suggests that the Articles, 
needless to say, were wanting and not enduring.  Therefore, the Constitution, in 
forming a “more perfect Union” must be understood to be designed from the outset, 
as an enduring framework of government.  The Constitution will be considered a 
failure, like the government under the Articles, if it faces a situation for which it is ill 
equipped to handle or survive intact. 
 A “more perfect union” can more easily attain the other goals, which are 
necessary to perpetuate a free political order for future generations.42  The 
Constitution does not, as recent scholars tend to do, juxtapose common defense and 
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problems of the rather short-lived Articles: “The causes which produced the Constitution 
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community, neglect of the public welfare, and danger to liberties.” Gerry’s statement 





domestic tranquility with establishing justice and securing liberty.43  That is, there is 
no choice between “security” on the one hand and “justice,” “general welfare,” and 
“liberty” on the other.  The Preamble shows that these objectives are intertwined and 
the Framers understood that achieving the former principles are a means to attaining 
the latter.  A government incapable of defending itself or unable to maintain a civil 
and tranquil polity ceases at some point to be a government.  Furthermore, such a 
government could not permit the establishment of justice or promote welfare 
generally, let alone secure liberty for future generations.  Therefore, the two 
objectives most explicitly related to the principles of self-preservation—to “insure 
domestic Tranquility” and “provide for the common defence”—are listed centrally as 
third and fourth, respectively, forming a core around which the other goals can be 
achieved.  Publius helps us understand their centrality in interpreting the purpose of 
the Constitution when he writes, “Among the many objects to which a wise and free 
people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety 
seems to be the first.” (Federalist 3)  The key for the Framers of the U.S. Constitution 
was to provide for this safety in a way that permitted the people to live in a free 
political order.  Only after adequately providing for the defense of all and maintaining 
domestic tranquility could the Constitution be said to be a “more perfect Union” that 
could endure and secure liberty for “posterity.”     
                                                
43 It is quite popular for scholars to discuss the zero-sum nature of the “security-liberty 
balance” in that measures taken to secure more of one will automatically resort to a decrease 
in the other.  See Richard A. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact.  The Framers, though recognizing 
that some security measures could have some impact on the peoples’ liberties, did not view 





 The Constitution has roots in the natural law reasoning of modern political 
philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, who argued that the principal 
purpose of men instituting government was self-preservation.  Locke went beyond 
Hobbes’s rather bleak defense of absolutism for the mere sake of survival by 
suggesting the ends of government should be the preservation of life, liberty, and 
property.  Locke called for a more comfortable self-preservation (but self-
preservation nonetheless) and it was upon a similar foundation that the American 
Framers developed a political order that would provide for the basic security of its 
members and enable them to more safely experience the private blessings of liberty.  
Put differently, the Framers embraced the “new science of politics” developed in the 
centuries leading up the American Founding, and created a government more capable 
of allowing individuals to live a safe and happy existence.  The government they 
designed did not intend, as ancient regimes did, to prescribe the political way of life 
for its citizens collectively to achieve higher, more noble goals; rather, they sought a 
stable government capable of providing for the safety of the citizens so that they 
could privately as individuals achieve their own happiness.44 A threat to the safety of 
the Union—whether stemming from external or internal sources—would no less 
threaten the government’s ability to establish justice, promote the general welfare, or 
secure the blessings of liberty.   
The intent of the Constitution, in sum, is to provide for safety in a manner that 
enables citizens to effectively enjoy their natural rights as a free people.  Security is a 
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the American Constitution, I am indebted to Martin Diamond’s essay “The Separation of 
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means to achieving liberty; they are not incompatible or competing goals.  The latter 
cannot be secured without the former.  One notable author captured this fundamental 
sentiment:  “There is no quarrel between government and liberty; the former is the 
shield and protector of the latter.  The war is between government and licentiousness, 
faction, turbulence, and other violations of the rules of society, to preserve liberty.”45  
The Constitution must be understood as designed explicitly and principally to provide 
for the security of its citizens; it also must be understood as intending to endure, no 
matter the circumstances it faces.  The Constitution, hence, ought to be understood as 
containing all the requisite powers necessary to ensure its survival and that it can 
provide for future generations what it did for those who founded it.  When compared 
to the Articles, the new Constitution created “a national government more wisely 
framed” to provide “ample security” a people “enamored with liberty” and dedicated 
to remaining free and united. 
 
Implicit Principles  
Why is this Union more perfect and more likely to secure the blessings of 
Liberty for ourselves and our posterity?  Why is it more capable of protecting and 
defending against external and internal threats and permitting citizens to pursue their 
happiness securely?  After all, Publius even suggests at one point that the aims of the 
Constitution do not appear to be all that different from those of the Articles. The key 
difference, as Publius (and other proponents of the Constitution) repeatedly 
emphasized, rests upon the underlying principle upon which the Constitution was 
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explicitly created:  It must be understood as a self-containing framework in that the 
government it establishes contains all of the necessary powers to achieve its 
expressed purpose.  Comparing it to the maxims in geometry, Publius’s articulates 
this universal principle of the science of “ethics and politics” that:   
 
[T]here cannot be effect without a cause; that the means 
ought to be proportioned to the end; that every power 
ought to be commensurate with its object; that there 
ought to be no limitation of a power destined to effect a 
purpose which is itself incapable of limitation 
(Federalist 31). 
 
The three “ought” clauses appear to follow, or are subordinate to, the initial clause on 
causation to which Publius deductively concludes that if the government is charged 
with some purpose (e.g., provide for the common defence and insure domestic 
tranquility) it must have the power to achieve it; if that purpose cannot be defined or 
understood in advance, the power to achieve it cannot be circumscribed and must 
exist ad infinitum.  In appealing to geometry, and the physical laws of cause and 
effect, Publius offers a natural foundation for interpreting the Constitution.  
Governments not adequately empowered and structured to achieve the ends for which 
they were formed (e.g., the Articles of Confederation) are, in many ways, defying 
nature and cannot endure.  Government must be understood to reflect nature, and 
since survival is a primitive natural object, the political order ought to be understood 
to contain all means necessary for its survival.   
Though the Preamble states the purposes for which the Constitution was 
ordained and established, the imperative interpretive principle is based upon 





its purposes.  The Constitution, as Publius emphasizes again, “rests upon axioms as 
simple as they are universal; the means ought to be proportioned to the end; the 
persons, from whose agency the attainment of any end is expected, ought to possess 
the means by which it is to be attained” (Federalist 23).  This universal principle, 
though self-evident and simple, can be obscured and is worth uncovering since it can 
help us recognize the legitimate exercise of power in pursuit of the objectives 
discussed above.  
The government under the Articles of Confederation was not wisely 
constructed and did not envision the manifold challenges that governments face.  As 
Publius says, they were formed in haste at a time when the peoples’ “habitation were 
in flames” and “citizens were bleeding” and the necessity of the situation forced them 
to create a government, even if it would not endure much past the crisis at hand 
(Federalist 2). They were, in the words of Federalist 1, a product of “accident and 
force” not of “reflection and choice.”  Had they been the latter, they would have been 
established not as a league or alliance to the immediate challenges of the War for 
Independence but would have, like the Constitution, established a unified political 
order with a stronger national government comprising all necessary means to endure 
in perpetuity. With the War for Independence over, the “mild season of peace” 
provided the Framers a special opportunity to address whether good government 
could be established from “reflection and choice” or whether societies of men “are 





(Federalist 1).46  Good government, properly organized and structured, and 
containing all the necessary powers to meet the ends for which it was ordained and 
established was what they sought to create without jeopardizing the political order. 
What role would war, or accident and force more broadly, play in the future of 
the United States?  Was the U.S. Constitution created with an eye towards war and 
national security?  Publius appears to have thought so, or at least we can conclude 
that from the prominent place that war occupies in his essays.  Although much is 
made of Publius’s later essays (e.g., Federalist 10 and 51) for articulating the 
fundamental principles of the American regime—and republican government more 
broadly—Publius’s initial essays represent the most cogent and forceful arguments 
regarding the necessity of adopting the proposed Constitution and securing the Union.  
Despite his suggestion that the Constitution represents a product of “reflection and 
choice,” Publius does not neglect the obvious and potentially perilous role that 
“accident and force” will play in shaping the future of the nation.   He focuses several 
of his first essays on a broad overview of threats to the preservation of the nation’s 
security, specifically the “dangers from foreign arms and influence, as from dangers 
of the like kind arising from domestic causes” (Federalist 3).  By placing the 
                                                
46 The Federalist is arranged around two overarching themes, which we know, above all, 
from how they were collected and published in two volumes shortly after they ran in the New 
York press and also because Publius provides an overview of what he wishes to tackle in the 
first essay.   Federalist 2-36 emphasize on the importance of government broadly, but 
specifically united government addressing the following “particulars”: The Utility of Union 
to your political prosperity (1-14); the insufficiency of the present Confederation to preserve 
that Union (15-22); The necessity of a government at least equally energetic with the one 
proposed, to the attainment of this object (23-36).  Federalist 37-85 focus on the Merits of the 
proposed Constitution addressing the “particulars”: The conformity of the proposed 
Constitution to the true principles of republican government; Its analogy to your own state 
constitution; and lastly, The additional security which its adoption will afford to the 





discussion of war in the opening essays, Publius indicates that they contain some of 
the most direct and serious issues, and present the most obvious and forceful reasons 
for adopting the Constitution.  After all, he was trying to persuade the people of New 
York—particularly the “fence-sitters”—in the vote over the Constitution, and he had 
a closing window of opportunity to convey his message to them.  If his arguments did 
not resonate and were found to be unpersuasive, his attractiveness would have waned.  
He, thus, had to put his make his strongest case first and, in doing so, he describes a 
rather bleak and pessimistic view of international politics as well of the dangerous 
possibility of insurrection and internecine warfare should the Constitution not be 
adopted to solidify the Union of states under a strong national government.  
After the introductory essay, Federalist 2-8 specifically focus on the various 
causes of war, the susceptibility of the disunited states to foreign influence, and the 
prospects of war among blocs of disunited states.  Appealing to instinctual fears of 
anarchy and danger as well as the dreaded experience under the weak Articles, 
Publius outlines the many potential characteristics and possibility for war should the 
people refuse the new Constitution.  Publius acknowledges the difficulties of trying to 
define the potential contingencies the nation will face when he writes that safety 
“doubtless has relation to a great variety of circumstances and considerations,” 
affording “great latitude” to those trying to “define it precisely and comprehensively” 
(Federalist 3).   War, Publius quickly identifies, does not simply result from a 





ambitious, and rapacious” (Federalist 6).47  The likelihood of another country 
invading or directing violence toward the United States, moreover, does not result 
from the character of the government.  After all, Publius suggests that republican 
governments, particularly commercial republics like the various states, are no less 
war prone than monarchs:  “Sparta, Athens, Rome and Carthage are all republics; two 
of them, Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind.  Yet were they as often 
engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighboring monarchies of the same 
time” (Federalist 6).  Yet it is not just external invasion that threatens the new nation.  
He focuses on the problems stemming from faction—which he roots in the nature of 
man and is more prone to occur with a weakened central government—that could 
cause internal friction and a general outbreak of violence.  
Publius’s discussion of the various underlying causes of war and the manifold 
forms of violence facing the new nation are not unique, nor does it necessarily help us 
understand the constitutional allocation of powers for war and national defense.  
Therefore, it is his articulation of the constitutional implications of these challenges 
that matter most. Throughout his first volume, which focuses on the necessity of the 
Union, he repeatedly emphasizes that since the possibility of war and violence, 
resulting either from internal convulsions or foreign invaders, cannot be foretold, the 
                                                
47 See also John Marshall’s discussion of the problem of war and the Constitutional powers 
necessary to prepare for it.  Appealing to experience and history, and speaking specifically of 
the power of taxation, Marshall says, “It is, then, necessary to give the government that 
power, in time of peace, which the necessity of war will render indispensable, or else we shall 
be attacked unprepared.  The experience of the world, a knowledge of human nature, and our 
own particular experience, will confirm this truth.”  Interestingly, Marshall goes on to argue 
that the Constitution must account for the possibility of war when securing powers otherwise 
it will be forced to take refuge in dangerous devices such as the dictatorship, which is a 
similar argument that Publius makes in Federalist 70.  Marshall’s argument found in Elliot’s 





government, if it is to endure, cannot be fettered by any “Constitutional shackles” that 
would impede its ability to thwart these attacks and adequately defend the 
community.  
This underlying principle for understanding the relationship between ends and 
means is central for Constitutional interpretation and understanding the constitutional 
basis of power wielded in pursuit of the nation’s safety.  In Federalist 23, Publius 
willingly entertains whether citizens should desire that the new government be 
responsible for their common defense.  (However, this is a bit tongue-in-cheek, since 
the very purpose of the Constitutional Convention was to create a national 
government more capable of ensuring the safety of the nation.)  He suggests that 
people may reject the Constitution if they do not wish for the new government to 
serve that purpose, as foolish as that may be.  However, what Publius clearly wants 
the people to understand is that once the new Constitution is accepted, it must be 
understood to contain all the powers necessary to achieve those ends.  He writes:  “the 
moment it is decided in the affirmative, it will follow that the government ought to be 
clothed with all the powers requisite to complete execution of its trust.”  This may 
seem like a radical proposition, but as Publius suggests: “it must be admitted to be 
necessary consequence that there can be no limitation of that authority which is to 
provide for the defense and protection of the community in any matter to its 
efficacy—that is, in any matter essential to the formation, direction, or support of the 
NATIONAL FORCES.”48  Publius’s word choice interestingly highlights that this 
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principle for understanding the Constitution may be politically difficult to swallow 
given the potential implications and the traditional notion that constitutions seek to 
limit power.  For Publius suggests power can be exercised without limit in pursuit of 
an overriding constitutional purpose.   
Despite his extensive use of historical examples, Publius warns not to use 
history exclusively as our guide, since the challenges to the nation’s security are 
unpredictable and without limit.  History (the “tried” course of human affairs) along 
with man’s nature does illustrate, however, that war is a prominent feature of politics 
and the human condition.  Founders who fail to recognize this are creating a 
government built upon fallacies, and are ultimately doomed to failure.  Since the 
Constitution is explicitly designed to endure, Publius argues that we must look into 
the future and not tie the powers and organization of the government to immediate 
security demands.  The Constitution cannot prudently prescribe ways to handle future 
threats.  The powers to defend the nation, therefore, must be considered to exist 
without limit under the Constitution.49 This is a radical and dangerous proposition—
not to mention paradoxical—for it suggests that the Constitution is not an instrument 
to limit power but one that permits power to exist without limit.  The Constitution 
                                                
49 Though Publius offers the most coherent and persuasive explanation of these principles, he 
was by no means alone.  See, for example, the statement by James Iredell at the North 
Carolina Constitutional Convention, when he states, “The powers of government ought to be 
competent to the public safety.  This, indeed, is the primary object of all governments.  It is 
the duty of gentlemen who form a constitution to take care that no power should be wanting 
which the safety of the community requires.  The exigencies of the country must be provided 
for, not only in respect to common and usual cases, but for occasions which do not frequently 
occur.  If such a provision is not made, critical occasions may arise, when there must be 
either a usurpation of power, or the public safety eminently endangered…”  Elliot’s Debates, 





articulates the purpose for which the government exists and is to be understood as 
containing all powers requisite to achieve those ends.   
When one recognizes that founders cannot predict all the contingencies that 
their political orders could face, one must accept that power cannot be circumscribed.  
Publius elaborates that the threats to the nation cannot be foretold, so the 
government’s capacity to meet them cannot be outlined in advance.  According to 
Federalist 34,  
 
Constitutions of civil government are not to be framed 
upon a calculation of existing exigencies, but upon a 
combination of these with the probable exigencies of 
ages, according to the natural and tried course of human 
affairs.  Nothing, therefore, can be more fallacious than 
to infer the extent of any power proper to be lodged in 
the national government from an estimate of its 
immediate necessities.  There ought to be a 
CAPACITY to provide for future contingencies as they 
may happen; and as these are illimitable in their nature, 
so it impossible safely to limit that capacity. 
 
The extensive powers of the national government emerged as a focal point of 
criticism and warning for the Constitution’s opponents.  As demonstrated above, 
Publius, however, did not shrink from Anti-Federalist challenges that too much power 
to the national government risked abuse and despotism.50  Publius argues that it is 
against reason for a people to place their security in the hands of the government but 
not trust it with the power necessary to meet that object.  Publius’s discussion of the 
necessity of the government to contain all the powers necessary to preserve the safety 
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The Complete Anti-Federalist):  Luther Martin (2.4), Cato V (2.6), Centinel (2.7), 





of the people Publius explains:  “For the absurdity must continually stare us in the 
face of confiding to a government the direction of the most essential national 
interests, without daring to trust it to the authorities which are indispensable to their 
proper and efficient management” (Federalist 23).  Publius’s argument, in effect, 
forced opponents of the Constitution into the defenseless position that the best way to 
prevent power from being abused is to not provide the power in the first place—even 
if that power was to do good.  The implicit question to the Anti-Federalists emerges:  
Why then have a government if you are not going to enable it to do anything on your 
behalf?51  Anti-Federalists simply could not meet Publius’s simple but powerful logic 
and found themselves unsure of how to break from the problems of the Articles.   
 Anti-Federalists had cautioned that power should be cautiously given to the 
government, as it was easier to grant power later than to take it away.52  However, 
Publius suggested that it would take too long for such powers to be granted and 
warned that nation would have to suffer an invasion before it could even begin to 
deliberate how to thwart such an attack.  Furthermore, Publius takes the argument a 
step further, suggesting that the government without adequate powers would not only 
be unable to provide for the nation’s security immediately but also could, over time, 
undermine the Constitution.  A weak constitution results only in “dissolution for want 
of proper powers” or worse, in the “usurpation of powers requisite for the public 
safety” (Federalist 20).  He continues that tyrants usually emerge in weak and 
defective constitutions that are not properly equipped to meet “critical emergencies” 
and “pressing exigencies” since once usurpation begins, it never seems to find a 
                                                
51 Ibid.  Vol I, 28-29.   





“salutary point” and continue to the dangerous extreme of tyranny.  Publius further 
warns in Federalist 25,  
 
[N]ations pay little regard to rules and maxims 
calculated in their very nature to run counter to the 
necessities of society.  Wise politicians will be cautious 
about fettering the government with restrictions that 
cannot be observed because they know that every 
breach of the fundamental laws, though dictated by 
necessity, impairs that sacred reverence which ought to 
be maintained in the breast of rulers towards the 
constitution of a country, and forms a precedent for 
other breaches where the same plea of necessity does 
not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable. 
  
Publius again articulates that the new Constitution is designed to endure and that it 
will continue because it reflects nature, specifically the natural impulse to self-
preservation.  Any attempts to circumscribe the Constitution or to limit its power to 
defend itself would not only be unwise, but could result in the gradual destruction of 
the political order.  This statement also cuts against arguments that suggest the 
Constitution seeks to limit and restrict power for fear of its abuse.  It is the want of 
power, not a fear of it, that most concerns Publius (e.g., Federalist 20).  
 
The Special Role of the Presidency 
Recognizing that the Constitution contains all the necessary powers to achieve 
its explicit purpose of providing for the safety of the people to whom it belongs, we 
now turn to the second question:  What role does the Constitution assign the 
Presidency in securing the political order?  All of the government’s branches certainly 





officer, that has the special duty and solemn duty to preserve, protect, and defend the 
Constitution.  The Presidency, imbued with executive energy, serves a necessary 
function in ensuring that the purposes of the Constitution are met. To suggest that the 
Constitution enables one person to wield extraordinary powers in its defense is 
paradoxical, however.  After all, the original founding document, the Declaration of 
Independence, inveighs against the British King’s history of abuse of power, which is 
a “history of repeated injuries and usurpations”—the Declaration lists 27 “facts” that 
specify the King’s abuse of power—with the direct object to establish an absolute 
tyranny.   Yet, in the course of deliberating and reflecting upon the principles of 
government (and the experience under the weakened executive of the Articles), the 
Framers understood that a strong, independent, and energetic executive is central to 
ensuring the stability and long-term survival of the political order.   They recognized 
that it was more dangerous to have a weakened executive, particularly at the expense 
of an omnipotent legislature.  They therefore sought to unleash executive power but 
did so in a way to ensure it remained legitimate and responsible in a republican 
manner.  The Presidency as the Constitution’s executive, Publius helps us understand, 
represents an innovation in government, by reconciling the energy necessary for 
matters of national security with safety mechanisms necessary to remain entirely 
republican.   
Again, we should turn first to the Constitution to begin understanding the role 
it assigns to the Presidency in times of war.  Two aspects of the Constitution’s Article 
II are rather striking: the opening vesting clause and the Oath of Office.  Unlike 





granted,” Article II does not contain the restrictive provision suggesting that the 
President has powers beyond those listed in Article; thus the powers listed are to be 
considered more exemplary than enumerated.  The Presidential Oath, moreover, is 
rather unique to include specific and personal language by which the President must 
swear.  The Oath by itself does not grant the President powers, but does bind him to 
exercise the reservoir of undefined executive powers vested in him to “preserve, 
protect, and defend” the Constitution.  The Oath affirms that the Presidency is 
dependent not on the legislature but on the people to preserve the political order that 
they established and ordained.    
Though Article II does not precisely define executive power, an examination 
of its language, combined with Publius’s discussion that emphasizes that the 
executive was explicitly designed to be “energetic,” we gain insight into the “real 
character” and role of the Presidency within the Constitutional order. It is clear that 
the Presidency has a unique role in preserving the security of the nation, which has 
enormous implications for our understanding of the war power.  When understood in 
this light, the discussion no longer focuses on the balance of relative authorities 
between the Congress and the President over matters pertaining to war, but rather on 
the President being the principal agent upon which the Constitution relies to preserve, 
protect, and defend it.  The Presidency has a vast reservoir of loosely defined powers 
and authorities by which it can act to ensure the nation’s security.  This is a dangerous 
and unpopular proposition, but it was the aim of the Framers to build a framework of 
government that would, as best as possible, enable this energetic executive to wield 





constitutional order.  In short, the Presidency ought to be understood by the following 
characteristics: 1) vested with competent powers; 2) duty-bound to defend the 
political order; and 3) dependent upon the people to remain wholly republican.  The 
following section explores these three traits, organizing them around the key 
executive ingredients of:   Energy, Responsibility, and Safety.53  
 
Energy in the Executive 
Publius dedicates many of the initial Federalist essays to explaining why the 
Constitution, if it is to be a “more perfect Union” capable of enduring, must be 
understood to contain all of the powers requisite for self-preservation.  He waits until 
later to explain the unique role of the Presidency in ensuring the preservation of that 
constitutional order.  In the latter part of the Federalist, Publius addresses each of the 
three branches in turn, dedicating Federalist 52-66 to the Congress (62-66 specifically 
address the Senate); Federalist 67-77 address the Executive Department; and 
Federalist 78-83 discuss the Judiciary, “the weakest of the three departments of 
power.”  The 11 essays dedicated to the Executive are distinguished, most notably, by 
                                                
53George Washington lamented the lack of “energy” in the Confederation and singled it out as 
a cause for the struggles of the War for Independence.  He writes, “I could demonstrate to 
every mind open to conviction, that in less time and with much less expence than has been 
incurred, the War might have been brought to the same happy conclusion, if the resources of 
the Continent could have been properly drawn forth, that the distresses and disappointments 
which have very often occurred, have in too many instances, resulted more from a want of 
energy, in the Continental Government, than a deficiency of means in the particular States.”  
See George Washington, Circular to the States, 14 June 1783 in Colleen A. Sheehan and 
Gary L. McDowell (eds.) Friends of the Constitution:  Writings of the “Other” Federalists 
1787-1788 (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Press, 1998), 12-22 (Emphasis Mine.)  For 
Washington’s take on the need for “more responsibility” particularly in the executive see, 
George Washington to James Duane:  “There are two things indispensably necessary to the 
well being and good Government of our public Affairs…greater powers to Congress, and 






the forceful and bold language Publius uses to explain and defend the Presidency’s 
“real character.”  
In discussing the character of the Executive Department, Publius does not shy 
away from its great power and responsibility, not to mention the unique role, that it 
will play in the nation’s affairs.  Publius has to overcome the biases against an 
energetic executive and ensure that people recognize that it is not only consistent with 
republican government, but necessary its survival.  One way or the other, the Union 
would have an energetic executive if it were to survive.  Why not constitutionalize it 
and try to control it as best as possible?  As Harvey Flaumenhaft captures the 
challenges:  
 
In rejecting the hereditary principle in government, a 
British inheritance from less enlightened times, 
Americans had not cast off their unenlightened 
parochial prejudice against executive energy.  But the 
necessity of executive energy was rooted in the nature 
of things:  in some way or other it would return; and if 
refused stately republican admission, it would break 
violently through the front door—or enter by stealth 
through the back.54 
 
Publius’s objective, therefore, is to explain how an energetic executive, vested 
with extensive powers and given great responsibility for the preservation of the 
political order, has been safely reconciled within the proposed republican form of 
government.  He has to offer a forceful defense of the Presidency, for it is a novel 
approach to having a strong executive within republican government, and it is easily 
misunderstood, misrepresented, and misconstrued.  The Framers, according to 
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Publius, deliberated more on the proper role of the executive within the Constitution; 
unfortunately, the Presidency is also the most poorly understood component.55  
Therefore, he must counter the “idea, which is not without its advocates, that a 
vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government.”  
Publius recognizes that executive energy presupposes that the President would be 
able to wield powers dangerous to the community.  After all, an executive must have 
dangerous powers for the community depends upon him to endanger its enemies, 
when necessary.56  Executive power is feared because of the harm it can do those who 
threaten the nation.  Therefore, Publius must explain how the Constitution can safely 
enable an energetic executive with such dangerous powers without threatening the 
political order.  
The genius of the American experiment in government is that it turned on its 
head the proposition that executive power is dangerous to republican government and 
instead set out to demonstrate that executive power, in fact, is critical to its safety and 
survival.57  At the center of the American experiment is the hypothesis that, “Energy 
in the executive is the leading character in the definition of good government” 
                                                
55 “There is hardly any part of the system which could have been attended with greater 
difficulty in the arrangement of it than this; and there is, perhaps, none which has been 
inveighed against with less candor or criticized with less judgment” (Federalist 67). 
56 David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist, 45.  Also see Edward Rutledge of 
South Carolina who argued that “The very idea of power included a possibility of doing 
harm; and if the gentlemen would show the power could do no harm, he would at once 
discover it to be a power that could do no good.”  Elliot’s Debates, Vol. IV, 276. 
57 As Harvey C. Mansfield writes, “The Federalist, then, constitutionalizes the republican 
tradition.  By finding a place for the necessities of government within the framework of 
government itself, the Constitution corrects the foolish optimism of republicanism which 
thinks, in essence, that men can live by the laws they choose and never have to bow to the 
necessities they do not choose, or learn from their experience of them.”  Mansfield, Taming 





(Federalist 70).  The reason why executive energy is important is that it is the central 
component for protecting and ensuring the safety of the republic.   As Publius writes,  
 
It is essential to the protection of the community against 
foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady 
administration of the laws; to the protection of property 
against those irregular and high-handed combinations 
which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of 
justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises 
and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. 
(Federalist 70).     
 
 In examining this statement further, we recognize that executive energy, 
according to Publius, is “essential” to many of the themes of the Constitution’s 
Preamble, specifically, common defense, domestic tranquility through the steady 
administration of the laws, ensuring justice, and securing liberty.  The energetic 
executive, thereby, is central to ensuring that the means are aimed toward achieving 
the ends of government.  The President has responsibility for directing the common 
strength of the community in times of danger, and Publius clearly argues that this is 
well within the executive purview.58 Energy in the executive, Publius succinctly 
suggests, is the “bulwark of the national security” (Federalist 70).    
Publius suggests that the “ingredients which constitute executive energy are 
unity, duration, and adequate provision for its support; and competent powers.”  
These ingredients correspond to the description of the Presidency as outlined in 
Article II of the U.S. Constitution.  The executive power is vested in one person in the 
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those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.  The direction of war 
implies the direction of the common strength; and the power of directing and employing the 






Presidency who is to be elected for a four-year period without limitation. Section 3 of 
Article II discusses the relationship the Presidency has with other branches, 
specifically when he may “convene” the Congress in “extraordinary Occasions” and 
“recommend to their Considerations such Measures as he shall judge necessary and 
expedient.”  The Congress, therefore, is to provide support to the President when 
asked, and in many ways serve as an advisory council, particularly on extraordinary 
occasions such as war and emergency. The previous section of Article II discusses 
competent powers explicitly belonging to the Presidency, specifically the 
Commander-in-Chief, Treaty powers, and those of the appointment of officers.  
Although the commander-in-chief powers are the most heavily contested by those 
discussing constitutional war powers, Publius hardly addresses it, suggesting “the 
propriety of this provision is so evident in itself.”   The President, thus, has all of the 
powers necessary and support from the other branches to execute his duties for a four-
year period, at which point he will be subject to the people to determine whether he 
should continue to serve.    
  
 
Responsibility and the Presidential Oath 
Though the vesting clause suggest that the Presidency has some broad grant of 
executive power, and Publius helps us recognize that the executive is to be 
understood as a strong and independent office, replete with the requisite ingredients 
for energy, it is the unique language of the Presidential Oath of Office that helps us 





President has the principal responsibility of executing the laws, which include laws 
passed by the Congress but also executing the Constitution, as the supreme Law of 
the United States.59  The Constitution establishes the expressed purpose of the 
political order and the President has the responsibility to act towards attaining these 
ends.  Much attention has focused on the extent of the powers granted to the President 
in the vesting clause.  However, it is the Presidential Oath that provides the 
overarching interpretive principle for understanding the extent of Presidential power.  
The Oath is not an explicit grant of power; rather it informs and provides the 
overarching justification for exercise of the President’s powers. The Oath reflects 
Publius’s underlying axiom:  means to the ends.  It provides the connective tissue 
between the ends of the Constitution and the means by which it will ultimately be 
“preserved, protected, and defended.”    
Presidents Washington and Lincoln, as will be discussed in subsequent 
chapters, made much of the “solemn Oath” in justifying their exercise of wartime 
powers.  Article II’s Oath can be loosely traced, at least, to the English Coronation 
Act of 1688, which prescribed the religious ceremony and oath that the monarch must 
                                                
59 Article II, Section 3 states that the President has the responsibility “to take care that the 
laws are faithfully executed.”  This is an important statement, particularly since it comes in 
the section discussing the President’s relations with the other branches of government.  
Similar to the Oath, this clause shows that the President is duty-bound to ensure the faithful 
executive of the laws, as duty not qualified by the condition of war or peace.  Hence the 
President has the duty to faithfully execute the laws in extraordinary times as he does in 
ordinary times.  However, this clause, too, is subordinate to the broader principle for 
Constitutional interpretation found in the President’s Oath to “preserve, protect, and defend 
the Constitution,” which permits Presidential discretion to achieve the purposes for which the 





take before being crowned.60  Oaths for various government officials and citizens, 
moreover, were relatively common in all of the State Constitutions at the times.61   
Many of these were loyalty oaths.  The Presidential Oath, as written in the 
Constitution, stands out for its bold and personal language as well as the significant 
duties that it imposes upon the principal executive officer.  Somewhat surprisingly, 
the Presidential Oath has not received as much scholarly attention as its direct, 
unique, and personal language might suggest.  After all, why would the Framers, in 
all their discussions and machination at the Constitutional Convention explicitly 
express an oath that suggests such far-reaching responsibilities and duties?  Edward 
Corwin, for instance, raises the issue of the Oath, and asks appropriate questions 
regarding the Oath’s relationship with Presidential powers; however, he stops short of 
analyzing its full implications.62  He acknowledges that the Oath received little 
discussion, at least according to Madison’s notes, at the Convention and that it 
                                                
60 Amar, 177-179.  In addition to discussing the personal nature of the Presidential Oath and 
its significance for our understanding of the special duty of the President, he also emphasizes 
that the Constitution’s Oath, by departing from the religious symbolism of the British 
Coronation Oath, represents a significant symbol of America’s religious freedom and 
tolerance.   
61 The Constitution of the State of Georgia, February 5, 1777 contains language in an Oath for 
the governor that is similar to that used in the U.S. Constitution.  Most of the other state 
constitutions at the time had more general language in their oaths, oaths of loyalty, and the 
same oaths for multiple officers (not a unique one for the executive).    
62 Corwin, The President:  Office and Powers, 148-150.  Matthew A. Pauley focuses on the 
issues that Corwin raises with respect to the Presidential Oath.  Yet he too leaves several 
questions unanswered.  Moreover, he makes other rather odd claims such as the constitutional 
oath made President Lincoln, for example, do things that are blatantly unconstitutional.  
Matthew A. Pauley, I Do Solemnly Swear: The President’s Constitutional Oath (New York:  
University Press of America, 1999).  See Chapter IV of this dissertation for the centrality of 
the Presidential Oath in understanding Lincoln’s constitutionalism. Pauley does, however, 





garnered little attention during the ratification debates. 63  Yet, he does not explore the 
questions begging to be addressed:  Why does Constitution contain the Oath and why 
is it worded as it is?  George Anastaplo suggests that in specifying the language of the 
Presidential Oath, the Constitution seeks to “strictly define” the President’s role and 
circumscribe his powers when compared with other officers.  Yet, in his otherwise 
erudite examination of the U.S. Constitution, Anastaplo also leaves an essential 
question about the Presidential Oath unanswered:   
Notice that he is not personally pledged to serve the 
people or the Country or even the good or the just, but 
rather the Constitution, which would seem to 
discourage the invocation by any President, except 
perhaps in the most catastrophic circumstances, of 
supposed prerogatives rooted in the people or in the 
Country at large or in any extra-constitutional 
standards.64 
 
What are these “catastrophic circumstances” that “perhaps” would allow the President 
to call upon “supposed prerogatives” rooted in the people or in the Country?  
Anastaplo appears to leave a crack in the door for the legitimate and constitutional 
exercise of extraordinary powers by the President in times of war and danger.   In an 
excellent article on the 1973 War Powers Resolution, Robert Scigliano almost 
                                                
63 In his voluminous commentary of the U.S. Constitution, Justice Joseph Story wrote briefly 
on the Presidential Oath, “There is little need of commentary upon this clause. No man can 
well doubt the propriety of placing a president of the United States under the most solemn 
obligations to preserve, protect, and defend the constitution. It is a suitable pledge of his 
fidelity and responsibility to his country; and creates upon his conscience a deep sense of 
duty, by an appeal at once in the presence of God and man to the most sacred and solemn 
sanctions, which can operate upon the human mind.”  Joseph Story, Commentaries on the 
Constitution of the United States (Boston:  Hilliard, Gray & Co., 1833), Section 1482. 
64 George Anastaplo, The Constitution of 1787: A Commentary (Baltimore:  The Johns 





offhandedly ends his discussion of the constitutional sources of presidential war 
powers with a paragraph worth quoting at length: 
 
When the president suspends or dispenses with the 
prescription of law in special situations, we may say 
that he exercises emergency power so long as we 
understand that the source of this power is not, strictly 
speaking, the Constitution or statutory law but the “law 
of necessity.”  We qualify this statement because the 
need for the president to act in emergencies seems also 
to be acknowledged by the Constitution in the oath 
which it requires him, and him alone, to take, to 
“preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the 
United States.”…  Easily overlooked in ordinary times, 
this provision suggests the crucial part which the 
energetic executive play in the American form of 
republican government.65 
 
Scigliano references how the “crucial part” the Oath plays connecting executive 
energy and the President’s special duty.  However, he also stops short of exploring 
the full meaning of the Oath and the significant implications it has for how we 
understand the President’s wartime powers. 
The question remains: why is a separate Presidential Oath included in Article 
II, and what significance ought we to place upon it?  Oaths of office or position were 
commonplace in many governments before the United States.  The British Monarch 
even took a prescribed oath at the Coronation, which was a religious ceremony that 
also made him the head of the Anglican Church as well.  Early state constitutions also 
included some form of oath for their governors and these likely served as a model 
during the Constitutional Convention.  But why does the President not simply take the 
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oath in Article VI to “support” the Constitution just as Senators, Congressman, 
members of the judiciary, and virtually all other government officers?  If this were the 
requirement, the President could be viewed as normal loyal political officer, carrying 
out the same duties of government that others have. The oath outlined in Article VI, 
however, represents more of a political loyalty test to the government, to ensure that 
those in its service support the Constitution as the supreme law of the land (as 
opposed to subordinate to individual state laws).  The Presidency, however, has its 
own special Oath, very personal to the President-to-be, to which he must swear before 
entering the office: 
 
Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall 
take the following Oath or Affirmation: - “I do 
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute 
the Office of the President of the United States, and will 
to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend 
the Constitution of the United States. 
 
The wording of the President’s Oath and its position within Article II provide 
some insight into the special responsibilities the Constitution assigns to the 
Presidency.  Whereas the oath of Article VI require political officers to “support” the 
Constitution, Article II’s Presidential Oath goes beyond support to include a solemn 
duty to “preserve, protect and defend” the Constitution.  The Framers explicitly 
placed a higher calling and greater responsibility upon the shoulders of the Presidency 
in the wording of the Presidential Oath. The President must do more than just support 
the Constitution and swear political allegiance; he (or she) must swear to exercise all 
of those powers vested by the Constitution to ensure its survival (“to the best of my 





mode of electing, requirements (citizenship, age, and residency), procedures for 
replacing, and compensation of the Presidency, the Presidential Oath Clause serves as 
a transition to Section 2’s outline of President’s general powers.  The Oath must be 
taken after all of the procedures and requirements (e.g., age, citizenship, mode of 
election) of Section 1 are met, and only then can the President begin to execute the 
Office by exercising its powers. The Oath is very personal, with the phrases “I do 
solemnly swear,” “I will faithfully execute,” and “best of my ability” and corresponds 
with the Preamble’s personal language “We the People” that established and ordained 
the Constitution.66  These are the only two places in the Constitution where personal 
pronouns are used.  Whereas the People are the only ones able to establish the 
constitutional order, they ask the President to swear to do everything he can to ensure 
that it survives.  
The Presidential Oath, thus, indicates that the Presidency has a special 
responsibility within the Constitutional order.67 Although others have responsibility to 
support the Constitution, preserving, protecting and defending the Constitutional 
order against threats ultimately falls to the Presidency.  Put differently, the 
Constitution’s survival ultimately rests with the President.  As Michael Stokes 
                                                
66 Amar, 177-178.  “In the center of an impersonal legal text setting forth general rules and 
principles lay a strikingly personal passage.” 
67 Responsibility is an appropriate characterization—Publius suggests a “due responsibility” 
is the key ingredient of ensuring the safe use of executive energy.  Interestingly enough, the 
root of the word “responsibility” is the Latin spondeo which means to take a solemn or 
religious oath. For an excellent discussion of “responsibility” and its meaning to the Framers, 





Paulsen rightfully argues that the Presidential Oath makes the President a “kind of 
special guardian—almost a ‘Lord Protector’—of the Constitution.” 68 
Understanding the Presidency as such has significant implications for the 
interpretation of war powers.  Though Congress may have the Constitutional power to 
“declare war,” the President has a higher purpose, assigned explicitly by the 
Constitution, to use whatever means at his disposal to ensure that the constitutional 
order remains intact.  Returning to our previous discussion of Publius’s notion of the 
“absurdity” of establishing ends without providing the adequate means to achieve it, 
it would be similarly absurd to conclude the Constitution assigns a special duty to the 
President without providing it the requisite powers to carry out that duty.  The 
President, therefore, is bound by “solemn Oath” to use whatever powers to ensure 
that the Constitution ultimately survives. To understand the President’s power as 
limited and restricted would be mistaken and inconsistent with the Constitution’s own 
language. The Constitution is an enduring document, contains all the necessary 
powers for its continuance, and ultimately expects the Presidency to ensure that its 
survival.    The interpretative principle of Presidential Oath suggests that the President 
may legitimately interpret and utilize any power granted by the Constitution to ensure 
its survival.  It is worth repeating that this is a potentially dangerous principle for 
Constitutional interpretation, but that danger does not imply that it incorrect.  
                                                
68 Paulsen, “The Constitution of Necessity,” 1261.  Paulsen’s insightful interpretation is 
worth quoting at length, “The duty is awesome and personal.  On its face, the clause appears 
to assign to the President a special, unique responsibility to the Constitution, certainly not one 
that is subordinate to the judgment of other actors in the constitutional system.  The 
Presidential Oath Clauses seems to suggest that the President (not the courts) is a kind of 
special guardian—almost a “Lord Protector”—of the Constitution.  Put less grandly, the 







Safety in the Republican Sense 
 How does the Constitution ensure that energy exerted by the President will not 
be abused?  The Presidential Oath is indeed solemn but it does not guarantee that the 
Presidential will not exercise power towards personal, illegitimate, or unconstitutional 
ends.   As mentioned previously, recent scholarly debate over war powers focuses the 
debates between Congress and the Executive, specifically, the split authority over the 
“sword and purse.”  The Framers certainly intended for the branches of government 
to check and balance each other.  However, the additional, and perhaps more 
fundamental, relationship that must be appreciated regards the people who established 
and ordained the Constitution and the role that the Constitution assigns the 
Presidency.  As such, the President has extensive powers, and the special 
responsibility, to ensure the survival of the political order.  The “safety in the republic 
sense” from an abuse or overexertion of executive energy that Publius articulates, in 
short, revolves principally around relationship between the President and the 
sovereign people.        
As Publius explains, the “structure and powers” of the executive department 
combine the ingredients for energy but also “combine the requisites to safety, in the 
republican sense”—and he specifically defines the latter as a due dependence upon 
the people, a due responsibility.  The Oath emphasizes the President’s special 
responsibility to the Constitution.  The due dependence upon the people stems 
primarily from the mode of the election of the President, the length of the term of 





Office of the President, not the person, or peoples who have served in it.  As Publius 
writes,    
[T]he election of the President once in four years by 
persons immediately chosen by the people for that 
purpose, and his being at all time liable to 
impeachment, trial, dismission from office, incapacity 
to serve in any other and to the forfeiture of life and 
estate by subsequent prosecution in the common course 
of the law. (Federalist 77) 
 
A unitary executive, who alone, is accountable for his actions, elected through 
a special mode every four years, and subject to impeachment and dismission from 
office at all times by the people’s representatives ensures a “due dependence” upon 
the people.  Publius goes to great lengths to show why a unitary executive is 
necessary for safety of the republic, cautioning that having more than one executive 
would reduce accountability as they could hide behind others.  A unitary executive 
essentially has “nowhere to hide” and stands alone front and center to be held 
accountable to the people.  Though we tend to take Presidential elections and the 
process of impeachment for granted, they are central to understanding how the 
Framers reconciled a strong, independent Presidency with great responsibility and 
powers, with a republican form of government.  Publius begins his discussion of the 
Executive Department with a description of the mode of election: “if the manner of it 
be not perfect, it is at least excellent” (Federalist 68).  The mode of election, in which 
the people of the several states elect fellow citizens for the “special purpose” of 
choosing the President, is fundamentally a republican act and reflects the “partly 
federal, partly national” character of the Constitution and the way in which it was 





election—similar to the personal language used in the Preamble and the Presidential 
Oath—shows the connection the Office of the Presidency has with the Constitution.  
Moreover, Publius shows us how the connection between the President’s great 
responsibility and an electoral process to hold him accountable when he writes, “It 
was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the person to 
whom so important a trust was to be confided” (Federalist 68).  
Furthermore, a four-year term combines the advantages of energy and safety, 
the right balance of time for the President to have enough time to plan and execute 
duties, but return to the people to judge what he has done and hold him accountable. 
That the Founders did not include in the original a 22nd-Amendment-like limitation on 
Presidential terms suggests that they were less fearful of continuous executive rule; 
after all, continuing to serve during “good behavior” represents a significant 
“improvement in modern government” (Federalist 78).  This is especially important 
during times of war, with all its variables, in which a President must develop a plan, 
resource it, and execute it against a potentially strong and dynamic foe.  Thus, four 
years enables the President to exert energy for several years but remain periodically 
accountable to the people, assuming he maintains good behavior, to ensure that he is 
carrying out the public good.   
 Publius further suggests that a four-year term provides a “firmness” to the 
Presidency, enabling him to stand against the “prevailing current” and “be in a 
situation to dare to act upon his own opinion with vigor and decision” (Federalist 71).  
The President, who has a special duty to execute efforts towards the public good, 





prevailing opinion—the “sudden breeze of passion” and “transient impulse”—of the 
community or legislature to achieve the “public good” (Federalist 71).  A period of 
four years often permits sufficient time for events to unfold, popular passions to cool, 
reason to prevail, and ultimately enable the people to make reasonable judgment 
regarding the President’s decisions during that period.  This is particularly true in 
times of war and crises, in which anger, passion, and fear are prevalent.  The 
President may, on occasion, have to undertake unpopular measures to try to prosecute 
a war that has caused suffering and frustration and appears unwinnable, for instance.  
However, knowing that his policies will be subjected to national scrutiny every four 
years, and that the people will hold him accountable, forces the President not to 
consider those choices lightly.  The structure of the elections forces Presidents to 
strive for the public good, and to weigh and consider their measures.  Imprudent or 
foolish choices will not be rewarded; those that prove to be in the public interest will 
be.   
 The constitutionally prescribed structure of regular, periodic national 
elections, which serves as a principal forcing function to help ensure Presidents 
behave properly, even in times of crisis; however, it is not the only means.  The 
people, through their representatives, have recourse to removing the President from 
office for “high crimes and misdemeanors.”  Therefore, when Presidents usurp 
Constitutional powers, the Legislature has a tool also for ensuring the preservation 
and protection of the Constitution.  After all, what higher crime could there be than 
violating the “sacred law of the land”?  Therefore, before scholars accuse Presidents 





fundamental questions about the measures that the Constitution contains to ensure 
“safety in the republican sense.”  The Presidents exercise of wartime power is 
ultimately held accountable by the people who either accept that the acts were 
legitimately conducted in defense of the political order, or choose to remove the 
President from office.   
The nature of the executive department—its structure, tenure, and mode of 
election—is central to ensuring that executive energy can be expended safely.  
However, we must return to a theme discussed previously, principally that the 
purpose of the Constitution was to unleash executive energy to ensure that the 
Constitution would endure.  Put differently, as Publius explains, the danger to 
republican government lay more in the potential for legislative usurpation, and the 
lack of energy in a legislative-dominant government not in the threat posed by a 
single executive.69  The former was of much greater concern; even more, the latter 
was seen as a check against the former.  It was imperative to have a strong, 
independent executive, with great responsibility and beholden to the people to ensure 
that power would be exercised to meet the ends of the government.  Hence, Publius 
dedicates devotes much more discussion to why more energy in the executive is 
necessary, and seems satisfied that its structure and organization will ensure that the 
executive department remain safely republican while exerting energy.  His intent, put 
differently, was to unfetter the executive not bound it and contain it.  Publius and 
other Founders had much more to fear from a weakened executive, shackled and 
confined institutionally, than a strong, independent executive capable of decisive 
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action and fending off the encroachments of the legislature. This has enormous 
implications for the debate over the war power, which again focuses primarily on the 
relations between Congress and the Presidency and the Constitution’s “invitation to 
struggle” to the branches of government.  The intent of the Framers, rather, is to 
provide the President—as a truly republican officer—with significant powers and 
equal responsibility, and to have him held accountable to the people to whom he must 
answer.  
That the Constitution seeks to liberate the executive from legislative 
dominance and views a vigilant and free people as the more effective and appropriate 
mechanism for ensuring that the Presidency exercises powers and duties safely for the 
public good does not imply that we should simply ignore relations between the 
Presidency and Congress or the Presidency and the Judiciary.   Each represent an 
equal and independent institution with its own constitutional powers and 
responsibilities.  Congress, for example, can use its legislative powers in 
contradiction to the Presidency.  And the Judiciary can certainly rule against the 
President.  The President, in its execution of the law, however, also has the 
interpretative responsibilities in how and with what force it will execute legislative 
statutes or judicial rulings.70  This has and will continue to bring the Presidency in 
conflict with the legislative and judicial branches and vice versa; in such cases, 
however, all three branches have the ability to articulate and explain the constitutional 
basis of their actions, and leave it to the sovereign people to decide.  This is the 
essence of republican government.  As two well-regarded legal scholars note: “Each 
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department (correctly) understands that its ultimate success may depend in large part 
on its ability to plausibly assert—and persuade the public of—its ‘core,’ 
preclusive.”71  This is part of that institutional deliberation that forms a core part of 
the separation-of-powers principle that underpins the Constitution.  Furthermore, such 
institutional deliberation, combined with periodic elections permits the republican 
accountability to remain in the hands of the sovereign people.  The President, first and 
foremost, is duty-bound to the Constitution and must continuously explain how his 
wartime exercise of power will help meet the preservation, protection, and defense of 
the Constitution.  It is by this standard that the President should articulate its wartime 
activities and also by which the people should judge his or her conduct.  As suggested 
above, the pursuit of this duty may require the President, in extreme times, to ignore 
or even violate a legislative statute or judicial ruling; however, this does not imply 
that the President has acted unconstitutionally.  For it is not subordinate to either of 
those branches; the constitutionality of its actions, as those of Congress and the 
Supreme Court, remain ultimately in the hands of the sovereign people. 
Alternatives to Self-Preservation 
 This chapter has put forth that the Constitution’s explicit purpose and implicit 
meaning center around the basic but essential concept of self-preservation and 
security of the political order.  Using the Constitution’s text as well as supporting 
writings such as The Federalist, this chapter also argues that the Constitution assigns 
the Presidency the special (but not exclusive) duty to ensure the safety of the political 
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order, and that it equips it with the requisite tools and necessary energy to carry out 
its solemn responsibilities.  The subsequent chapters will show how two of the 
greatest U.S. Presidents similar understood their duties and authority.  This chapter 
also, and perhaps most importantly, shows that the President does not operate without 
limit but that the Constitution structures the Office in such a way to ensure it remains 
accountable.  Such an explanation helps us understand Harvey Mansfield’s argument 
that the Framers’ “constitutionalized” the executive power,72 meaning that they 
explicitly designed it to be able to wield enormous and necessary power in defense of 
the political order but structured with the requisite mechanisms of accountability so 
that it would remain representative of the sovereign people.  
 Viewing the Constitution through the lens of self-preservation, and using it to 
determine the constitutionality of the President’s wartime actions, however, is not a 
generally accepted view of executive war power.  As admitted above, it is not simply 
an unconventional approach but even potentially a dangerous and radical proposition 
for constitutional interpretation.  To help clarify and distinguish the ideas put forth in 
this chapter, it concludes by briefly addressing the following related issues:  
prerogative power; constitutional self-preservation and the “spectre” of Carl Schmitt; 
and the separation of powers. 
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executive is truly an attempt to reconcile necessity with Republican and ultimately 
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The term prerogative has been widely used to describe executive power, 
particularly the conduct of activities that have not been explicitly legislated.  The term 
itself stems from the political philosopher John Locke’s basic definition of 
prerogative as “the power to act according to discretion, for the publick good, without 
the prescription of the Law, and sometimes even against it, is that which is called 
Prerogative.”73 Locke brilliantly captures the fundamental problem of reconciling 
written law and discretionary executive power necessary in times of emergency. Yet, 
Locke offers a more nuanced understanding of prerogative as he defines it at least 
five different times, grounding it in nature—beginning with his discussion of parental 
power—but also describes it as arbitrary and that it “never be questioned” under his 
discussion of tyranny. 74    
In recent years, the term prerogative has gained significant currency in 
discussions regarding executive power, particularly the exercise of extraordinary 
power in times of crises, to the point where executive prerogative and executive 
                                                
73 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, edited with an introduction and notes by Peter 
Laslett,  (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
74 Locke describes prerogative at some length in Chapter XIV of the Second Treatise, but he 
also discusses it in at least four other chapters: VI: Of Paternal Power; VIII: Of the Beginning 
of Political Societies; XIII: Of the Subordination of the Powers of the Commonwealth; and 
XVIII: Of Tyranny.  Though Locke discusses prerogative as executive discretionary power to 
do “good, not harm” when the legislature is not in session or when there is no written law to 
prescribe what measure to take, his discussion of prerogative has a bit more nuance. Locke is 
not merely describing executive discretionary power in lieu of written law but the exercise of 
power in the execution of the law of nature: self-preservation.  This thought is developed in 
more detail in the examination of Lincoln in Chapter IV.  For more on this deeper and more 
nuanced understanding of Locke’s influence on the American Founders, see David Weaver, 
“Leadership, Locke, and The Federalist,” American Journal of Political Science Vol 41, No 2 
(April 1997),  420-446.  For an overview of Locke’s different uses of prerogative see, 
Thomas S. Langston and Michael E. Lind, “John Locke and the Limits of Presidential 





power have become indistinguishable.  Scholars who use the term prerogative, 
particularly with respect to emergency or war powers, to describe executive power 
confront one key challenge:  the Framers never used the Lockean prerogative to 
describe presidential power.75  As Martin Diamond reminds us about the Presidency, 
“although a very powerful office, the executive still lacks one supremely dangerous 
ingredient—the prerogative.”76  As Robert Scigliano informs us, the use of the 
Lockean prerogative as a way to describe extraordinary presidential power did not 
emerge until Edward Corwin in his landmark The President: Office and Powers first 
published in 1940.  Since then, “it has been customary for scholars on the presidency 
to make that connection [between Locke’s discussion of prerogative and the 
presidency.]”  Corwin accordingly “set an example” that continues influence the 
presidency literature today by “regarding prerogative (most of the time, at least) as 
identical to executive power.”77  Richard Pious represents this line of reasoning most 
clearly, arguing that prerogative power results from President’s claiming 
constitutional authority to make important decisions.  Pious expresses concern that 
President’s claims constitutional authority to exert their decision-making role rather 
than more “routine methods of influence and persuasion.”78  What appears to concern 
Pious most is that the President looks to the Constitution as the basis for 
                                                
75 See, for example, Jack Rakove, “Taking the Prerogative out of the Presidency: An 
Originalist Perspective,” Presidential Studies Quarterly Vol: 37, No. 1 (2007) 85-100. 
76 Martin Diamond, The Founding of the Democratic Republic, 88. Diamond goes on to 
describe that the prerogative was the “British king’s area of personal and independent 
authority…[and] always a threat in the background to constitutional government.”  He 
concludes that the President’s powers derive from the Constitution and not any other source. 
77 Robert Scigliano, “The President’s ‘Prerogative Power,’” in Inventing the American 
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understanding its duties and authorities rather than the more informal, “Neustadtian” 
bargaining and influence, which, in theory at least, has no boundaries.79 
To recognize prerogative as an alternative, or even similar to, the argument 
put forth in this chapter depends upon how one defines the term.  If prerogative is, as 
Pious and many other presidential scholars use the term, simply synonymous with 
executive power, then the term lacks any analytical precision to be useful.  Put 
differently, if prerogative simply means executive power, then, of course, the 
executive has prerogative power by definition. If by prerogative, however, we 
understand it as Locke presented it, at least in one place in his Second Treatise, as the 
power to without or even against the law for the public good, it becomes more useful.    
The challenge of understanding the Presidency’s connection with the Lockean 
prerogative emerges most prominently when scholars conflate it to mean both 
“extralegal” and “extraconstitutional” powers.  These terms ought to be distinguished 
for they have enormous implications for our understanding of the fundamental 
principle underlying the Constitution and the basis of the executive war power.  As 
this chapter has shown, the President is duty-bound to preserve, protect, and defend 
the Constitution, and actions taken towards those ends are fully consistent with the 
Constitution.  They should not be understood as “extraconstitutional” or as going 
above, beyond, or in addition to the President’s constitutional power.  However, the 
President may at times take actions that conflict with or go beyond legislative statutes 
if those actions are necessary to the fulfillment of its duties.  In such cases, the 
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Presidency may be said to exercise “extralegal”—but not “extraconstitutional”—
powers.  
 The other key distinction between Locke’s use of the prerogative and the 
arguments of constitutional self-preservation and presidential duty put forth is in this 
chapter centers upon this issue of accountability. Locke suggests that the prerogative 
should “never be questioned” and that the people’s only recourse is an “appeal to 
heaven.”  As this chapter has argued, however, the President has the duty to wield 
extraordinary power in times of danger but the Framers went to great lengths to make 
the exercise of presidential power “safe in the republican sense.”  The President, after 
all, ultimately stands before the judgment of the people.80  The President, in other 
words, must constantly “appeal to the people,” who have multiple constitutional 
means of accountability, including voting the President out of office.  Therefore, 
unlike Locke’s prerogative, the people may question the President’s exercise of 
power; it is the people, not “heaven” who question, and ultimately determine, whether 
the Presidency acted for the “publick good” in the exercise of its power.   
 
Constitutional Self-Preservation and the Spectre of Carl Schmitt81 
That the President may wield enormous powers constitutionally to meet the 
needs of an emergency situation could be subject to the criticism that it poses to great 
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“The President is basically a democratic elective office; the people can vote a dangerous 
President out of office…Presidential power, like all political power under the Constitution, 
results primarily from winning majorities in free, popular elections.”  Diamond, The 
Founding of the Democratic Republic, 88. 
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a risk of transforming the constitutional order into a tyranny.  It raises the prospect 
that John Milton captures in Paradise Lost: “So spake the Fiend, and with necessity, 
The tyrant’s plea, excused his devilish deeds.”  Accordingly, the question could be 
posed: Are President’s appeal to the Constitution to wield the power, however 
extraordinary it may be, to meet the necessity of the situation merely to veil 
tyrannical acts and excuse wrongs inflicted?  Concern with necessity as the tyrant’s 
plea provides the backdrop of several key criticisms of the arguments put forward in 
this dissertation and others sympathetic to it. 
In a lecture before the University of Georgia Law School, the renowned legal 
scholar Sanford Levinson raised several key questions regarding presidential 
emergency powers, and the potential threat it poses to the constitutional order.82  
Levinson, who admits that his comments were motivated, in part, by his partisanship 
and dislike of the George W. Bush Administration and the path to a more 
“authoritarian mode of governance” that he feels he was blazing. His admitted 
partisanship aside, Levinson outlines the fundamental problem of constitutionalism as 
limited government with defined powers and the prospect of needing seemingly 
unlimited powers to meet the demands of an emergency when he writes:  
A basic question is precisely the extent to which a well-
designed constitution should, on the one hand, be 
“rigid,” pretending to an impermeability to change and 
“adaptation” even in time of perceived emergency; or, 
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School, which became the basis for a Georgia Law Review Symposium on “Emergency 
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on the contrary, be flexible enough even to ‘suspend’ 
the normal operations of the constitutional order when 
such emergencies present themselves.83   
 
Levinson then contends that the United States Constitution represents the former.  
Conclusions such as Levinson can only be made by taking a clause-specific approach 
to constitutional interpretation, focusing on the forms and procedures while ignoring 
the higher, more normative purposes towards which the Constitution aims.  The 
President, after all, is charged with faithfully executive the law, and what is the 
Constitution but the highest law of the land?  Referencing Tocqueville’s quote used to 
open this chapter, should we not use “law” and “circumstance” to better understand 
the President’s exercise of power?  Implicitly then, the President’s constitutional 
duties to preserve, protect, and defend it require the different application of power 
depending on the circumstance.  The President, ultimately, has discretion to 
determine how best to meet its duties, but must be able to explain it in constitutional 
terms to the sovereign people, who ultimately hold him accountable. Levinson and 
others downplay that self-preservation and the President’s duty to it serves “meta rule 
of constitutional interpretation”84 and does not acknowledge that we ought to interpret 
the rules and procedures of the Constitution in light of the explicit purposes for which 
is designed.  
Levinson, furthermore, argues that the Bush Administration employed a “a 
near-dictatorial conception of president power,” and that it can best be understood as 
an extension of the political thought of Carl Schmitt, the Weimar-era political theorist 
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and jurist who supported the Nazi regime in Germany.  His fears of the Bush 
Administration expressed in his lecture opened up for other the possibility of Schmitt 
informing contemporary constitutional understanding.85  Schmitt, in criticizing 
modern liberalism as well as German parliamentarian system for its ability to act 
decisively in a crisis, wrote extensively about the concept of the dictator and the 
“state of the exception,” when the rule of law no longer operates.86  Schmitt’s perhaps 
most famous dictum, that the “sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”87  A 
Schmittian interpretation of the Presidency, therefore, implies that the President can 
suspend the Constitution and decide when to do so.  In commenting on Levinson’s 
speech, William Scheuerman helps clarify this notion: “In the spirit of Carl Schmitt, 
executive emergency power is conceived as a fundamentally normless realm in which 
the President exercises pure discretion to war off life-threatening existential threats to 
the political community.”88  
In employing Schmitt as the basis for understanding the exercise of executive 
wartime power in the United States, Levinson and others face a serious challenge in 
that the people are sovereign and possess multiple constitutional means by which to 
hold the President, and other elected officials, accountable.  This obvious response 
                                                
85 Mark Tushnet commends Levinson for having done “yeoman work in brining Schmitt’s 
perspective to the attention of constitutional theorists.”  See Tushnet, “Comment:  
Meditations on Carl Schmitt,” 877. 
86 Ibid. 877-878. 
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appears to have escaped Professor Levinson and others who expound upon the 
dangers of presidential power in times of crises.  This is not to say that elections, and 
other republican institutions of accountability, can ensure that the President does not 
commit an unconstitutional act; it does, however, provide the mechanism to mitigate 
it or at least hold it accountable.  The President, moreover, does not act in a 
“normless” environment in an emergency situation, and the Constitution is not set 
aside.  Quite the opposite for the President must constantly appeal to the Constitution 
to justify his (or her) actions in an emergency to remain accountable to the people and 
their representatives.    
The President’s power, at times, can be accurately described as extraordinary 
and discretionary but sovereignty ultimately remains with the people, who, as 
discussed in this chapter, from time to time, judge the behavior of their leaders.  For 
all of Levinson’s fears of the Bush Administration and the “war on terror,” elections 
were held in 2004 and 2008 with the latter resulting in a complete change in the party 
leadership, and at no point did any serious discussion of canceling or postponing the 
election occur.  Similarly, elections have taken place in the midst of many crises, 
including 1800, 1864, or 1944 to name but a few.  As Chapter IV will discuss in more 
detail, Lincoln’s constitutionalism stems as much from what he did not do, 
specifically postpone elections, than from the actions he took. 
 
Executive War Power and the Separation of Powers 
 Levinson’s broader concern over the constitutionality of presidential power in 





prospect that presidents such as Lincoln or Franklin Roosevelt may have acted “quite 
cavalier at time with regard to legal norms that might have constrained their doing 
what they viewed as best for the country.” Avoiding this cognitive dissonance could 
cause us to “redefine the laws rather redefine the presidents.”89  Inherent in 
Levinson’s remark, however, is the predominant scholarly notion that judicial 
opinions (and by extension those who study them) maintain the authority to judge the 
constitutionality of particular acts, and to “say what the law is.”  
Judicial supremacy, or holding the judiciary superior in all matters of 
constitutional challenges, poses two key shortfalls: it ignores the merits of 
presidential contributions of constitutional interpretation and it implicitly (if not 
explicitly) violates the basic principles of separation of powers and republican 
government.  The Office of Presidency stands as one of three branches of the national 
government as outlined in the Constitution, and as such is vested with powers and 
conferred duties to which it must swear an oath to uphold.  In executing its powers 
and carrying out its duties, the Presidency, as an independent branch of government 
must have some interpretative responsibilities to determine to what extent, with what 
emphasis, and in what way the Constitution obliges it to execute its office.  This does 
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not mean that the Presidency ignores other branches or considers itself superior; 
rather, it represents but one of three branches, all of which have different duties and 
thus likely to have different constitutional perspectives on a particular matter.90  
Accordingly, as Jeffrey Tulis articulates so well,  
The President, Congress, and the Supreme Court are 
constituted not just by assigned power but rather by 
congeries of structures and powers.” Plurality or unity 
of office-holders, extent of the terms of office, modes 
of selection for office, as well as specified powers and 
duties combine to create a set of institution that behave 
and “think” quite differently from each other.  A crucial 
invention of the new American science of politics was 
to design institutions to represent differing desiderata of 
democratic governance rather than represent social 
orders or alternative regimes.91 
   
The President, therefore, interprets the Constitution from its vantage point, influenced 
by factors including its assigned duties and powers to the very nature of the Office 
itself.  In times of war, in particular, the President must articulate and explain the 
constitutionality of its actions, and leave it to the people to weigh and consider the 
circumstances and ultimately determine the constitutionality of the President’s 
activity.  As one scholar notes, “emergencies, then, are a function of circumstance 
rather than edict” and the circumstances shape the public’s perception of the 
President’s actions.92  
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The Courts and Congress may have a very different understanding of the 
constitutionality of the President’s actions, but that does not necessarily give them the 
last word.  This is not an attempt to downplay the importance of the Supreme Court; 
rather it is an argument for why the Presidency should have an equal voice in 
constitutional matters.  How President’s construct their wartime powers should 
occupy an equal place with Supreme Court opinions and Congressional statutes in 
shaping the debate on and understanding of the Constitution in times of war.  After 
all, the very nature of the office, a single person, nationally elected, with unique 
responsibility to “preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution” forces those elected 
to occupy the Office of the Presidency to carefully consider how they understand and 
articulate its powers and duties.  The next two chapters will focus on how two of 
America’s greatest presidents constructed the executive war power. Their 
constitutionalism, it can be said, was forged in the cauldron of war and crises, and 
perhaps offers us rare insight into how the Constitution enables a free society to 
maintain its fundamental constitutional character even in the most trying times.    





Chapter III:  Completing the Founding:  Washington, 
the Whiskey Rebellion, and the Constitutional 
Presidency  
 
Though President George Washington’s Administration played perhaps the 
most crucial role in the development of a strong and independent presidency, his 
particular views on presidential power, specifically its scope and extent in times of 
war, have been overlooked.   That is, despite the popular, near-mythical status that 
Washington occupies as the Founding Father of the United States and as the person 
most commonly associated with the creation and development of the Presidency, 
there is a corresponding dearth of scholarly attention paid to his political thought.  Its 
is surprising that someone so central to the Founding of the United States and its 
successful experiment in republican government has had such little direct attention 
paid to his interpretation of the principles underlying the American political order.  
More specifically, as the first person to occupy the Office of the Presidency, it is 
ironic that his construction of the executive power also has been given short shrift.  
Since no major war occurred during his Presidency, scholars have simply neglected to 
examine Washington’s words and deeds with an eye for what could be learned about 
the role of the presidency in times of danger.  Only a few scholars have directly 
addressed Washington’s political thought, and, as a result, the literature on 
Washington’s constitutionalism pales in comparison to that dedicated to some of 
those who followed him.93  Studies of his presidency, in fact, tend to focus more on 
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the political debates among his subordinates than on Washington’s articulation of any 
coherent constitutional thought about the Presidency.  As a result, Alexander 
Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson emerge as more influential to our understanding of 
executive power than the man who first occupied the office.94    
This dissertation seeks to build upon the relatively small but hopefully 
growing literature that argues that Washington not only possessed a firm grasp of the 
core principles underpinning the Constitution, but that he employed those principles 
to provide a clear and coherent understanding of the constitutional role of the 
Presidency.  Furthermore, although major war did not erupt during Washington’s 
term, it nearly did on several occasions, and his response to the threats against the 
new nation, and his constitutional justification for Presidential leadership and action 
                                                                                                                                      
power in times of war and rebellion.  The following chapter seeks to build upon and 
supplement Phelps’s work.  Glenn A. Phelps, George Washington & American 
Constitutionalism (Lawrence, KS:  University Press of Kansas, 1993).  Richard Loss also 
offers an excellent overview of Washington’s understanding of the Presidency, but he, like 
Phelps, does not focus on the President’s power in extraordinary times.  See Richard Loss, 
The Modern Theory of Presidential Power:  Alexander Hamilton and the Corwin Thesis 
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1990).  Jeffry Morrison offer a broader discussion of 
Washington’s underlying political philosophy, drawing attention to its roots in classical and 
modern republicanism as well as Christian thought.  See Jeffry H. Morrison, The Political 
Philosophy of George Washington (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2009).  Paul O. Carrese also offers an excellent general overview of Washington’s political 
thought in his “Liberty, Moderation, and Constitutionalism:  The Political Thought of George 
Washington,” in Bryan-Paul Frost and Jefferey Sikkenga (eds.), History of American 
Political Thought (Lanham, MD:  Lexington Books, 2003). 
94 See, for example, Raymond Tatalovich and Thomas S. Engeman, The Presidency and 
Political Science:  Two Hundred Years of Constitutional Debate (Baltimore, MD:  The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2003), 25-26. Tatalovich and Engeman suggest that the debate 
between Hamilton and Jefferson over executive power essentially was a carry over from that 
of Federalist and Anti-Federalists. Similarly, Edward Corwin cites Hamilton and Madison’s 
debate over the President’s power to issue a declaration of neutrality as signaling the “early 
differentiation of what might be termed the quasi-monarchical and the ultra-Whig 
conceptions of the Presidency.” See Edward S. Corwin, The President Office and Powers:  






offer much perspective on how to view the constitutionality of wartime deeds of those 
who have followed and will follow him in the Presidency.  This chapter specifically 
focuses on Washington’s response to the Whiskey Rebellion, which posed one of the 
most severe threats to the nation during this formidable period in the young nation’s 
history. My goal is to explore how he understood and articulated his powers and 
responsibilities of the President.  Washington, in short, put the Constitution into 
effect, and cogently and consistently articulated that it assigned the President the 
uniquely special role of providing for the preservation of the nation, and that as such, 
the President legitimately could employ any and all measures as necessary to defend 
the constitutional order.  Washington understood the executive to be strong, 
independent organ of government but ultimately accountable to the sovereign people 
who could inflict “Constitutional punishments” on him should he violate his sacred 
duty to their defense.  
The next section of this chapter reviews the predominant scholarly views on 
Washington as President, which for the most part, either blatantly overlook his 
contributions or consider his thoughts inferior to those of his subordinates.  It is 
followed by a section that examines the Whiskey Rebellion in some detail and 
attempts to understand the threat it posed to the constitutional order as Washington 
himself understood it.  Recognizing that Washington viewed the Whiskey Rebellion 
as a clear and present danger to the political order underpins this section’s discussion 
of Washington’s construction of the President’s powers and duties to respond to and 
use force against threats to the nation.  This chapter concludes with a brief discussion 





extension of the Framers’ understanding as described in Chapter II and a precursor to 
Lincoln’s construction of the executive war power seven decades later in the Civil 
War is discussed in Chapter IV.   
President Washington:  The Man Behind the Myth 
 In a speech before the New York Historical Society on the semicentennial of 
Washington’s Inauguration as first President of the United States, John Quincy 
Adams eloquently borrows from the poet Virgil to compare Washington to Aeneas, 
the legendary and divinely protected Trojan warrior who became the founder of 
ancient Rome. Asking his audience to indulge their imaginations and to see 
Washington much like the poet Virgil viewed Aeneas, Adams opens his speech: 
 
Would it be an unlicensed trespass of the imagination to 
conceive, that on the night preceding the day of which 
you now commemorate the fiftieth anniversary - on the 
night preceding that thirtieth of April, one thousand 
seven hundred and eighty-nine, when from the balcony 
of your city-hall, the chancellor of the state of New 
York, administered to George Washington the solemn 
oath, faithfully to execute the office of President of the 
United States, and to the best of his ability, to preserve, 
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States 
- that in the visions of the night, the guardian angel of 
the Father of our country had appeared before him, in 
the venerated form of his mother, and, to cheer and 
encourage him in the performance of the momentous 
and solemn duties that he was about to assume, had 
delivered to him a suit of celestial armor.95 
 
Adams’s vivid and powerful language portrays Washington as America’s Aeneas, the 
hero of the national epic, whose legacy will be venerated by future generations of the 
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great republic.  Though Adams’s opening portrayal continues by focusing on 
Washington’s virtuous character, he equally, if not more importantly, draws attention 
to Washington special relationship with the Constitution.  Washington’s celestial 
armor, which he received upon becoming President, Adams’s states, consisted of  
“the Constitution of the United States, a SHIELD embossed by heavenly hands, with 
the future history of his country.”  As such, Adams colorfully but correctly depicts the 
central importance of understanding President Washington’s special bond to the 
Constitution—a divinely protected warrior with his heavenly embossed shield—as 
the foundation for the future of free government in America.   
Adams’s poetic license aside, his characterization of the inextricable 
connection among Washington, the Presidency, and the Constitution, serves as the 
basis for this chapter’s discussion of Washington: as the Founding Father whose 
understanding and use of the Constitution in trying times helped construct the 
President’s powers and responsibilities to the people. Washington, to be sure, is 
widely and popularly viewed as the mythical hero of the American Revolution and 
Father of his Country, often portrayed as the Cincinnatus who led his country to 
victory but selflessly relinquished power when it was in his grasp to return to his 
farm.96  For the most part however, scholars have tended to overlook Washington’s 
intellectual contributions to the constitutional development of the Presidency and 
have neglected to view him as central to understanding the Presidency in our own 
time.  As one scholar notes, “For all the research and exposition and synthesis that 
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scholars have lavished on the eight formative years that George Washington occupied 
the chair of state, the figure of the first president is remarkably vague.”97  Put 
differently, for all the works praising and mythmaking about the special place 
Washington occupies in the American Founding, his constitutionalism and 
construction of the executive power are a relatively neglected area of study.  Worse, 
some scholars actually diminish his substantive role, citing his political thought as 
inferior to many of his contemporaries.  As a result, the scholarly literature on 
Washington might best be characterized as having a dualism or “split personality” 
portraying him at once as the heroic non-partisan unifier of the nation98 but also as a 
weak intellectual who did not contribute substantively to the development of the 
constitutional presidency. 
To demonstrate the central point that Washington’s political thought, or more 
specifically his construction of the executive power, has been underappreciated, we 
need look no further than the two most prominent books written by the 20th century’s 
doyens of presidential studies:  Edward Corwin’s The President:  Office and Powers 
and Richard Neustadt’s Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents.  Clearly a 
rare scholar who took the Constitution and its Framers seriously, Corwin does an 
excellent job highlighting how the broader powers of the Presidency were shaped, in 
part, by a general recognition that Washington would be the first to occupy it.  That 
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is, he claims that the Framers left key issues regarding the scope and extent of the 
President’s powers un- or underdefined in the Constitution since the man they all 
trusted so much would be its first holder.99  He also points out, without much analysis 
however, that Washington exploited some of the Constitution’s vagueness to carve 
out a “monopoly” for the President in foreign relations.100  As accurate as his 
conclusion might be, he makes it de facto, without offering an underlying 
examination of how Washington interpreted the Constitution to grant the presidency 
this leading role in foreign affairs.  For that, Corwin turns primarily to Hamilton, 
among others.   Most of Corwin references to Washington are to events that occurred 
during his Administration that present an opportunity to air the arguments of 
Hamilton on the one hand and Jefferson and Madison et alii on the other; Corwin 
found Hamilton to be the real champion of the presidency.101  Though Corwin’s 
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landmark work offers us much, it does not provide any systematic analysis of how the 
nation’s first president constructed the office and powers of the presidency or how 
Washington’s own thoughts may prove helpful to understanding subsequent 
presidents.  Corwin’s relative neglect of focus on Washington, and his more weighty 
discussions on the contributions of Hamilton, Jackson, Jefferson, Wilson, and FDR, 
leave one with the impression that Washington is a less significant contributor to the 
presidency, even if Corwin does not explicitly say so.  
Unlike Corwin, Neustadt pays little attention to the Constitution as a source of 
presidential power, and he paid even less attention to any insight Washington (or any 
other Founders) may contribute to the presidency.   Neustadt’s influential work offers 
but one passing reference to Washington, in which he discusses President 
Eisenhower’s desire to emulate the first President as a “good man above politics.”  
Discussing Eisenhower’s attempt to live up to Washington, Neustadt remarks:  “And 
he genuinely thought the Presidency was, or ought to be the source of unifying, 
moderating influence above the struggle, on the model of George Washington—the 
Washington, that is to say, of legend, not of life.”102  Neustadt’s brief reference to 
Washington as more legend than real life demonstrates his general disregard of 
Washington’s thinking but also hints at why generations of scholars who have 
followed him ignore Washington as well. Washington, according to Neustadt, offers 
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the image of a unifying and “above party” President who others have personally 
attempted to emulate; whether he was in real life or not (Neustadt seems to doubt it) 
really is immaterial. Washington’s words and deeds essentially play no role in 
Neustadt’s discussion of the presidency other than a historical figure whose legend 
could inspire later presidents.    
Appreciation of Washington’s constitutionalism and the significance of his 
contributions to our understanding of the powers and responsibilities of the 
presidency unfortunately have not progressed among presidential scholars since 
Corwin’s mid-20th century locus classicus.  This perhaps can be attributed, in part, to 
Neustadt’s scholarly legacy of ignoring the Constitution and the political thought of 
those who framed it.  The lack of progress also can be attributed to the persistent 
notion that Washington’s principal contribution was unifying the nation by serving as 
President and managing the partisan disputes of his subordinates, not in constructing 
the constitutional powers and responsibilities of the office. Again, that Washington 
was a national unifier and President dedicated to the nation more than any political 
party are not insignificant statements or problematic in and of themselves; rather that 
they remain the exclusive focus of what little scholarly attention Washington 
receives, and that they are highlighted at the expense of his greater substantive 
contributions to the development of the presidency present are objectionable.   
Two recent works demonstrate the lack of improvement since Corwin. Sidney 
Milkis and Michael Nelson write in their standard textbook The American 





indispensable source of unity and legitimacy for the newly formed government.”103  
After proceeding through a series of events and issues during that occurred on 
Washington’s watch, they continue that, “his extraordinary stature and popularity, 
combined with his commitment to a strong and independent legislature, restrained 
partisan strife for as long as he was President.  Moreover, Washington’s renunciation 
of party leadership left his successors a legacy of presidential impartiality that has 
never been eclipsed.”104  Milkis and Nelson capture the aforementioned themes about 
Washington, namely that he was essentially the only person who at the time of the 
Founding possessed the necessary trust and popularity to lead the new government 
and that he maintained a position above the party fray, who masterfully balanced the 
competing ideas of the emerging political parties within his own cabinet.  They 
mention the opinions of and conflicts between Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton, and 
Adams—and Washington’s management of these disputes—as important to the 
development of the Presidency. Yet, at no point do they wrestle with Washington’s 
constitutionalism or his understanding of the constitutional duties and powers of the 
Presidency.  Though they obliquely acknowledge that Washington’s Presidency 
established precedents for the Office and that he himself was devoted to the principle 
of separation of powers, they do not provide readers a sense what the Constitution 
meant to Washington, how he understood it, or what role he thought it assigns to the 
Presidency.  In other words, aside from being the right person at the right time to 
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occupy it, students are left pondering what Washington substantively contributed to 
the origins and development of the presidency.  
 Consistent with the above-described characterizations of Washington, 
presidential scholars Matthew Crenson and Benjamin Ginsberg contend that he “was 
the towering figure in the pantheon of revolutionary heroes, the most prominent in a 
reservoir of presidential eligibles.”105  They continue, “Because he was chosen by 
acclamation rather than nomination Washington was a president above faction.  He 
was the living embodiment of the new nation, the Father of His Country, whose very 
presence would reassure his people that they were one.  It was from this elevated 
status that Washington weathered the conflicts within his own cabinet, all the while 
denouncing the spirit of faction.”106  As a result, Crenson and Ginsberg label 
Washington’s the “visual Presidency,” suggesting thereby that it was the image of 
him as leader that brought the nation together at a critical time.  In doing so, however, 
Crenson and Ginsberg offer only faint praise, or worse, a thin cover to their criticism 
that Washington was essentially vacuous with no substantive contributions to the 
development of the Presidency or the Constitution.  They suggest Washington, “was 
not a man of many talents, and he was surrounded by fellow founders—Jefferson, 
Hamilton, [Benjamin] Franklin, and others—whose range of brilliance far exceeded 
his own.  Yet even before they invented the presidency these luminaries had chosen 
Washington to preside over them twice.”107 Surely this is evidence that Washington’s 
presence must have meant something to his peers, even though Crenson and Ginsberg 
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cannot find it in their analysis of him.  Note that it is “they”—Jefferson, Hamilton, 
and Franklin, among others—who invented the presidency, not Washington.  For 
Crenson and Ginsberg, Washington’s central place in the Founding and in the 
development of the presidency was neither his overarching political thought nor how 
he interpreted his constitutional powers and duties as President but what his popular 
image meant to the people writ large. While Milkis and Nelson simply ignore or 
downplay any of Washington’s substantive contributions, Crenson and Ginsberg 
blatantly exemplify the dualism of Washington scholarship portraying him at once as 
both an indispensable symbol for the nation’s Founding but substantively 
insignificant contributor in its political thought.  By Crenson and Ginsberg’s logic, 
Washington’s heroic image provided a façade under which the real intellectual 
constitutionalists could “invent” the presidency.  Washington, in short, was the tool 
with which superior intellects could create the Office of the Presidency.  
Diminishing Washington’s intellectual contributions to the constitutional 
presidency is not just the vice of political scientists, however.   The eminent historian 
Forrest McDonald remains the scholar who perhaps best articulates the dualistic 
approach to studying Washington, offering praise of him as the instrument of national 
unity but simultaneously diminishing his contributions to constitutional development.  
McDonald opens his book-length treatment of Washington’s Presidency by positing:  
 
The significance of George Washington to the 
presidency of the United States is somewhat different 
from what is commonly supposed.  He was 
indispensable to the American experiment in self-
government, and the success of his administration made 





actions and the quality of his leadership as president are 
appraised in the following pages, the reader may 
wonder just what made Washington himself so special.    
 
Washington, according to McDonald, was essential to the Founding of the United 
States, not because he did anything significant or special but because he served as a 
much-needed symbol at the right time. McDonald concludes his book emphasizing 
this point by exposing the long-held secret of Washington’s insignificance to the 
Presidency: 
 
We end, then, where we began.  George Washington 
was indispensable, but only for what he was, not for 
what he did.  He was the symbol of the presidency, the 
epitome of proprietary in government, the means by 
which Americans accommodated the change from 
monarchy to republicanism, and the instrument by 
which an inconsequential people took its first step 
toward becoming a great nation. 
 
No one who followed Washington in the presidency 
could escape the legends that surrounded his tenure in 
the office, but the more perceptive among them shared 
a secret:  Washington had done little in his own right, 
had often opposed the best measures of his 
subordinates, and had taken credit for achievements that 
he had no share in bringing about. 
 
They kept the secret to themselves. 108 
  
McDonald expresses the general attitude towards Washington, specifically 
that he was special but superficial, indispensable to the nation as the first President 
but insignificant to the development of the presidency.  Such assessments of 
Washington have enormous implications for the study of the Constitution and the 
American Presidency, principally that if one accepts these views, there is no real 
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reason to examine Washington to help shed light on this field.  In fact, McDonald 
takes one more step to suggest that the nation’s first President may have, in fact, 
stifled the development of the presidency and the American constitutional order by 
“opposing the best measures” of his subordinates.  Worse yet, since Washington “had 
taken credit for achievements that he had no share in bringing about,” our study of 
him may dupe us into learning the wrong constitutional lessons.  In other words, we 
have to see through Washington to acquire a sharper understanding of those who 
actually developed the Presidency.   
This dissertation seeks to counter this view of Washington and recognize him 
as serious interpreter of the Constitution, who is critical to the development of the 
presidency, particularly to defining its proper constitutional role in times of danger.  
As the first and most influential president, Washington permanently shaped the idea 
and practice of executive power in the United States, and he did so knowingly.  
Shortly after taking office as the first President of the United States, George 
Washington wrote that his political conduct must be “exceedingly circumspect.”  
Then referring to the Argus Panoptes (“all-seeing”) of Greek mythology, he explained 
that “the eyes of Argus are upon me.”109  Washington clearly recognized that the eyes 
of Argus were not only those of his contemporaries who would surely judge his 
conduct.  Those eyes also would include future Presidents who would seek to emulate 
him as well as future American citizens who would use his conduct as the standard of 
judgment for their own political leaders.  Finally, those eyes would include those 
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trying to determine whether and why the American experiment in self-government 
actually worked.  His conduct in office thus would serve the broader purpose of 
demonstrating how the U.S. Constitution successfully reconciles the need for 
executive power with the principles of republican government.  This chapter 
represents but one “eye” attempting to see Washington and his constitutionalism as he 
viewed it himself.   
 
Whiskey and the Constitution 
Paying the debts incurred during the struggle for independence posed one of 
the most essential tasks undertaken by the Washington Administration.  If unable to 
service its debts and develop a solid financial footing, the new nation would be 
unable to secure future funds, and would be viewed as a weak government incapable 
of harnessing the necessary resources to govern effectively.  President Washington 
charged his Secretary of Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, to develop a plan for 
ensuring the payment of the debt and for establishing the long-term fiscal stability of 
the new nation.  As part of Hamilton’s plans, the U.S. Congress passed an excise tax 
on alcohol in 1791, which was the first domestic tax issued.  The tax was denounced 
and opposed almost immediately by many, most notably by western farmers who 
profited from distilling their excess grain into alcohol for sale.  As a result, a group of 
farmers and local sympathizers in four western counties of Pennsylvania openly and 
violently resisted the new excise law, and posed the first violent attempt to undermine 





 Though the Whiskey Rebellion represented the most significant armed 
resistance to the United States between the signing of the Constitution and the 
outbreak of the Civil War, it has not received due attention.  Scholars tend to dismiss 
anachronistically the accounts of those who in 1794 and shortly thereafter considered 
the Whiskey Rebellion a grave threat to the survival of the new nation.110  After all, 
the insurrection fizzled and did not erupt into a civil war, due in no small part to the 
masterful handling of the situation by President Washington.   Violence fortunately 
was avoided; however, since it was not an especially bloody event in the end, scholars 
unfortunately have avoided studying it to gain greater understanding of the 
Constitution in times of dangers. In many ways, the Whiskey Rebellion—the threat it 
posed and the implications of it—has been eclipsed by the brutal and bloody 
American Civil War seventy years later.  As historian Thomas Slaughter remarks, 
“[t]he Civil War put a real damper on interest in the Whiskey Rebellion.”111  Since 
then, the earlier attempted insurgency in western Pennsylvania has been cited as a 
minor episode in the early republic and a quaint event, the study of which belongs to 
specialist historians. In short, it has been relegated secondary status in the study of the 
                                                
110 See James Kirby Martin’s “Introduction” to Steven R. Boyd (ed.), The Whiskey Rebellion:  
Past and Present Perspectives (Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press, 1985), 3.   
111 Slaughter elaborates that the Whiskey Rebellion “paled in comparison to the violent threat 
to the national union posed by the war between the states.  The lessons of the Civil War—
from either side—were even clearer, even more horrible, and even more conclusive than 
those of the earlier episode.  As a consequence, Whiskey Rebellion historiography entered in 
a long postwar hiatus that was in large part a reflection of an anachronistic conviction that the 
union was secure…[and the Rebellion] was not threatening to the nation’s survival.” See 
Slaughter, “The Friends of Liberty, the Friends of Order, and the Whiskey Rebellion:  A 





Constitution and the Presidency, and its many possible lessons for interpreting the 
Constitution in times of danger go largely ignored.112  
 Edward Corwin, for instance, reflects the predominant tendency of scholars to 
downplay the threat and significance of the Whiskey Rebellion, citing it as a case of 
“presidential power in the face of situations of violence less than ‘war.’”113  Corwin, 
writing nearly one-hundred fifty years after the event and thus knowing the outcome 
and undoubtedly influenced by intervening events, projects his own historical 
understanding onto the crisis and fails to understand the event as those who 
participated in it.  This has particular implications for trying to come to grips with 
President Washington’s words and deeds during the crisis, for he clearly viewed the 
insurrection as an existential threat to the new nation and its fragile constitutional 
order.  Even if the insurrection did not boil over into open warfare, Washington and 
his advisors feared that possibility and took corresponding actions to prevent it from 
doing so.  When we view the event through Washington’s mind, therefore, we can 
gain appreciation of how the first President interpreted the Constitution and the duties 
of the executive in times of grave national danger.  This insight provides us 
perspective for our own time, as we continue to wrestle with issues the constitutional 
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basis for executive war power.  
 While scholars like Corwin have downplayed the significance of the Whiskey 
Rebellion, others tend to characterize the insurrection as another episode in the rise of 
political parties and factionalism in the United States. The event, in sum, has been 
subsumed by the larger debates between the Federalist and Democratic-Republican 
political parties, and the respective disputes between Alexander Hamilton and 
Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and others.  Specifically, scholars highlight the 
undue influence of Alexander Hamilton in the Washington Administration, and 
suggest he exploited the Whiskey Rebellion to advance the Federalist agenda by 
denigrating political opponents who were sympathetic to the rebels.  This view stems 
primarily from the contemporary views of William Findley, a local Democrat-
Republican politician from western Pennsylvania at the time of the insurrection, who 
devised an account of the insurrection in 1796 to counter Hamilton’s 1794 report of 
the situation to Washington.114  Findley used his history as a platform from which to 
attack Hamilton and the Federalists and Findley’s argument has been favored by 
historians an anti-Hamiltonian predisposition in the literature.115  Jacob Cooke 
                                                
114 The three most-cited and influential contemporary accounts of the Whiskey Rebellion are 
Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, Report on the Western Country, (August 5, 
1794); William Findley, History of the Insurrection (1796); and Hugh Henry Brackenridge, 
Incidents of the Insurrection (1795).  Excerpts of the latter two and Hamilton’s report in its 
entirety are provided in Boyd (ed.), The Whiskey Rebellion. 
115 For Findley’s reasons for writing his treatise, one of which was to lay culpability on 
Hamilton, see Boyd’s brief introduction to excerpts from Findley’s account, in Boyd (ed.), 
The Whiskey Rebellion, 77.  Jacob Cooke, similar to Thomas Slaughter’s categorization, 
argues that the historiography on the United States generally has been bifurcated between the 
Jeffersonian and the Hamiltonian persuasions, which for the Whiskey Rebellion implies a 
split among those who are sympathetic to the insurrection and those supporters of the 
Washington Administration’s response.  Cooke suggests that the Jeffersonian perspective 
lasted for much of antebellum history, with Hamiltonian ascending in the post-Civil War 





accurately captures Findley’s partisan argument and the narrow focus of the scholarly 
literature, “Alexander Hamilton, eager to discredit his political opponents and anxious 
to show by a test of force that the federal government was truly supreme, maneuvered 
the West into armed opposition. How did he accomplish this Machiavellian feat?”116  
Forrest McDonald, perhaps not surprisingly, is the most prominent subscriber to this 
view, writing “it seems entirely probably that the provocation came from Alexander 
Hamilton, and that his motive was to discredit and crush his political enemies by 
identifying them with treason.”117  Historian Richard Kohn, on the other hand, has 
tried to correct this notion, arguing that study of the Whiskey Rebellion shows that 
President Washington “was far less a tool of Hamilton, and far more perceptive 
politically, than historians have thought.”118  Kohn notably captures the internal 
deliberation and decision-making process of the Washington Administration in their 
effort to suppress the rebellion.  Yet, Kohn’s discussion focuses more on the debates 
over the “tactics” of how to suppress the rebellion and does not address the more 
strategic issues of how Washington viewed his constitutional powers and duties to 
take action against the rebellion.  His analysis, quite deliberately, overlooks the 
proverbial forest by focusing on the trees.  
  As this section demonstrates, the Whiskey Rebellion represents a significant 
constitutional event, replete with the central questions of constitutional necessity and 
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self-preservation and executive power, duty, and responsibility.  When viewed as 
such, the Whiskey Rebellion, and Washington’s response to it, offers many insights 
into the scope, extent, and basis of the President’s power in times of war.  Even 
though Washington’s handling of the situation prevented a full-blown war from 
occurring, his words and deeds demonstrate the constitutional powers, duties, and 
responsibility of the President in times of danger.  After providing a brief summary of 
the events that led up to and composed the Whiskey Rebellion, this section focuses on 
Washington’s articulation of the threat the insurrection posed to the Constitution, and 
hence the principles upon which he would develop a response.  The next subsection 
focuses on Washington’s understanding of the President’s constitutional duties in 
times of crisis like the Whiskey Rebellion.    
 
What was the Whiskey Rebellion? 
The Whiskey Rebellion includes a series of events beginning with the passage 
of a federal excise tax on distilled spirits in 1791 until roughly the end of 1794, when 
the resistance, in effect, no longer existed.119   Though the so-called rebellion ended 
in a fizzle, at certain points it appeared as if the United States would descend into 
civil war, which would have meant a failure of the American experiment in self-
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government within five years of its establishment.   The seeds of the revolt sprouted 
from the excise tax on distilled spirits that Congress had passed in 1791.120  Whiskey 
was a principal commodity of the local economy in western Pennsylvania among 
other rural areas.  Excise taxes, or indirect duties levied against the production of 
specific goods, moreover, were long associated with tyranny and oppression, and for 
many Americans conjured up memories of the British taxes that justified the War for 
Independence.  So despised were excise taxes in the Anglican tradition that the 
notable author Samuel Johnson defined them in his Dictionary as: A hateful tax levied 
upon commodities, and adjudged not by the common judges of property, but wretches 
hired by those to whom excise is paid. 121  
That there were protests against the passage of the excise tax, hence, should 
not be too surprising.   Initial resistance to the tax organized by townhall meetings in 
Brownsville, Washington, and Pittsburgh, and, in September 1791 a local mob tarred 
and feathered the tax collector for Washington and Allegheny counties in 
Pennsylvania.  In August of 1792, the revenue office in Washington County was 
forced open, the excise tax posting torn down, and a portrait of President Washington 
filled with bullet holes.  On August 21, 1792 a second protest meeting was held in 
Pittsburgh, out of which result a report strongly condemning the tax and threatening 
ostracism to anyone who held the office of tax collection.  Congress attempted a 
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series of amendments easing the conditions of the tax in attempt placate the 
protesters, and violence subsided through much of 1793. 
Violence, however, erupted in 1794, with western Pennsylvanians again 
particularly agitated by the provision in the excise tax law requiring violators to 
appear before a federal court in Philadelphia, not before a local court.   They 
considered the cross-state travel too burdensome and, as a result, assembled again to 
protest the law.  This organized resistance boiled over into violence, and represents 
the period and events most commonly known as the Whiskey Rebellion.  The most 
violent event occurred on July 16, 1794 when roughly fifty armed men marched to 
the house of General John Neville, the supervisor for the federal excise tax in western 
Pennsylvania, to demand that he resign and turn over all records associated with the 
tax.  When Neville refused, shooting began.  The result was that five attackers were 
wounded with one later dying.  Neville and his slaves successfully defended his house 
and suffered no casualties.  The next day 400-800 western Pennsylvanians returned to 
the house defended by Neville, his slaves, and 11 soldiers reinforcing him from 
nearby Fort Pitt.  Another gunfight occurred, and accounts suggest that one or two 
aggressors were killed and perhaps one soldier killed with several others wounded. 
Neville escaped, the slaves and soldiers surrendered, and the mob torched the house 
and associated buildings.122   
The mob would march along, accumulating additional support.  By early 
August 1794, an estimated seven thousand western Pennsylvanians marched to the 
                                                
122 Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion, 3-6.  For a short but excellent overview of the 
insurrection see Bennett M. Rich, “Washington and the Whiskey Insurrection,” The 





outskirts of Pittsburgh, threatening the town’s residents and feigning attacks against 
Fort Pitt.  They banished seven people from the area who were known to support the 
tax and destroyed the property of several others.  Sympathizers in other communities 
emerged, with violence spreading to western Maryland where a crowd in Hagerstown 
began to march against the federal arsenal at Frederick; sympathetic resistance 
organized in Carlisle, PA and in the hills of western Virginia and Kentucky.  The 
insurgents also intercepted the federal mail service outside of Pittsburgh to determine 
who may be assisting the government in undermining their cause.  The Federal 
government across the state in the capital of Philadelphia received reports that 
western Pennsylvania was in open revolt and that some leaders of this mob were in 
discussions with representatives of Great Britain and Spain for aid to the burgeoning 
insurrection.  Therefore, the atmosphere in August 1794 was one of fear, anarchy, and 
violent civil war.  It was in this context that Washington formulated a response that 
eventually mustered an army of 12,950 soldiers to march into western Pennsylvania 
and crush the rebellion.   This was no trivial force, and the purpose for which it was to 
be used—crushing an armed insurrection comprised of fellow citizens—should not be 
considered lightly.  Had the insurrection not fizzled, there was every potential for a 
bloody civil war.   
“The Constitution and the laws must strictly govern:” Washington and Constitutional 
Self-Preservation 
 To Washington, the government’s response to the insurrection in western 
Pennsylvania was not simply an operation short of war; rather he viewed it as the use 





minority to refuse to obey laws legitimately passed by constitutional means amounted 
to anarchy or no government at all; in short, the United States could not survive for 
long if a small minority of armed citizens could use violence to stop the normal 
administration of constitutional government.  Facing the growing threat, Washington 
carefully articulated the danger it posed to the Constitution and, as such, his grounded 
his approach to the crisis and basis of his response in the principle of constitutional 
self-preservation.  Two important events served as the backdrop to Washington’s 
views of the Whiskey Rebellion and the potential threat it posed to the constitutional 
order: 1) Shays Rebellion of 1786 and 2) the French Revolution and the spread of 
radicalism.  Briefly discussing these in the context of the Whiskey Rebellion will help 
us gain better understanding constitutional mindset with which Washington 
confronted the crisis.    
 
The Ghost of Shays.  Washington’s reaction to the Whiskey Rebellion has roots in an 
earlier crisis that the Founding generation faced in August 1786 when Revolutionary 
War veteran and farmer Daniel Shays led a group of armed protestors against 
increasing debt and taxes that resulted from the War.  Shays Rebellion, though short-
lived, had convinced many of the Founding generation that the political order needed 
revamped and was one of the events that motivated them to revise the Articles of 
Confederation and convene the Convention of 1787. 123  Washington certainly saw 
the threat posed by armed resistance to legitimately enacted laws, and from his 
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retirement at Mount Vernon, he expressed his concerns and advice on handling the 
situation to Virginia delegate to the Continental Congress, Henry Lee:  
You talk, my good Sir, of employing influence to 
appease the present tumults in Massachusetts. I know 
not where that influence is to be found; and if 
attainable, that it would be a proper remedy for the 
disorders. Influence is no Government. Let us have one 
by which our lives, liberties and properties will be 
secured; or let us know the worst at once. Under these 
impressions, my humble opinion is, that there is a call 
for decision. Know precisely what the insurgents aim 
at. If they have real grievances, redress them if 
possible; or acknowledge the justice of them, and your 
inability to do it in the present moment. If they have 
not, employ the force of government against them at 
once. If this is inadequate, all will be convinced that the 
superstructure is bad, or wants support. To be more 
exposed in the eyes of the world, and more 
contemptible than we already are, is hardly possible. To 
delay one or the other of these, is to exasperate on the 
one hand, or to give confidence on the other, and will 
add to their numbers; for, like snow-balls, such bodies 
increase by every movement, unless there is something 
in the way to obstruct and crumble them before the 
weight is too great and irresistible. 
These are my sentiments. Precedents are dangerous 
things; let the reins of government then be braced and 
held with a steady hand, and every violation of the 
Constitution be reprehended: if defective, let it be 
amended, but not suffered to be trampled upon whilst it 
has an existence.124 
Washington’s letter to Lee has several implications for our understanding of his 
constitutionalism and his later response to the Whiskey Rebellion during his 
presidency.  First, Washington recognizes that at times, the underlying reasons for 
rebellion may be, in fact, justified.  If they are, he believes that the government 
                                                






should attempt to address them or at least acknowledge the grievances and work 
towards a transparent and peaceable solution.  If it cannot, it still should openly 
explain why it would be difficult to achieve this outcome.  This certainly was much 
preferred to resorting to force. However, if there are not just reasons underpinning the 
resistance, the “full force of the government” must be brought against them “at once.”  
Any measures short of a strong and immediate reaction to crush the resistance only 
will serve to further embarrass and weaken the government.  Inaction or weakness on 
the part of the government would embolden the insurrection and, like a “snowball,” it 
would gain momentum and grow beyond the government’s ability to control it.   
Washington, with this advice to Lee, also offers us a glimpse of his 
understanding of human nature and politics, specifically that the human passions, 
unless checked immediately by a superior force, will naturally feed off themselves 
until they grow uncontrollably and threaten the very existence of society.  Grounded 
in modern natural law, Washington holds that government serves the primary purpose 
of helping individuals within society secure their life, liberty, and property.   As such, 
Washington does not juxtapose security and liberty, suggesting that they are in a zero-
sum tension and must be balanced appropriately; rather, he implies that people must 
first be secure in their lives before they can enjoy their natural liberties and property.  
Part of this task requires government to contain and control the dangerous proclivities 
of excessively passionate groups and individuals within society so that it can preserve 
itself.   Passions have a tendency to grow as they go, and thus every rebellious or 
unlawful incident to which the government does not immediately and forcefully 





eventual dilapidation into anarchy.  It was with the above philosophical understanding 
of the purpose of government that Washington advocated for and supported a new 
constitutional order; and it was with this mindset that he would make decisions to 
defend that new order as its first executive officer.  That the ghosts of Shays 
Rebellion in 1786 were with Washington when he confronted the Whiskey Rebellion 
of 1794 should not surprise us.     
 
The Radicalism of the French Revolution.  Washington’s Presidency coincided with 
the French Revolution.  The Whiskey Rebellion, more specifically, occurred around 
the same time as the infamous Reign of Terror of 1793-1794, which spread genuine 
fears about the spread of radicalism and violence against existing political orders, 
including the recently constituted United States. In the United States, organized 
societies sympathetic to the principles of the French Revolution, known as 
“Democratic-Republican societies,” emerged.125  Though there is some historical 
dispute over the origins and inspiration of these societies, Elkins and McKitrick 
persuasively argue that they were deeply connected to spreading the ideals of the 
French Revolution.  They write, “[m]ost of the societies’ immediate inspiration 
actually came from France, and in deference to the fraternal sentiments believed to 
subsist between the two peoples a general effort was understandably made to impart 
                                                
125 Philip S. Foner (ed.), The Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800: A Documentary 
Sourcebook of Constitutions, Declarations, Addresses, Resolutions, and Toasts (1976).  
Historians have generally labeled these societies “Democratic-Republican,” however, few 
actually took such names, and Washington and most of his contemporaries usually referred to 
them as “Democratic,” perhaps so as to detach them from any association with republicanism.  





to their doings a certain French accent.”126  The underlying connections between the 
Democratic Societies and the French Jacobins only increased Washington and many 
of his advisors’ fears as news of the bloody Reign of Terror made its way across the 
Atlantic to Philadelphia.    
How much these societies actually instigated and fueled the excise tax 
resistance in western Pennsylvania is actually immaterial; what really matters is 
Washington’s understanding of that threat as he developed a response and articulated 
the constitutional basis of his actions.  Washington, without a doubt, felt that the 
Democratic Societies were behind the insurrection, pointing specifically to the Mingo 
Creek society in western Pennsylvania as the main perpetrator.127  As the crisis came 
to a head in mid-1794, Washington underscored on several occasions the 
revolutionary French connection of these societies and the Whiskey Rebellion.  “I 
consider this insurrection as the first formidable fruit of the Democratic Societies,” 
Washington wrote to Virginia Governor Henry Lee. 128   He continues, “[t]hat these 
societies were instituted by the artful and designing members (many of their body I 
have no doubt mean well, but know little of the real plan,) primarily to sow the seeds 
of jealously and distrust among the people, of the government, by destroying all 
confidence in the Administration of it; and that these doctrines have been budding 
and blowing ever since.”129  To Washington, this was not simply popular unrest 
against an unpopular tax but a burgeoning plot of foreign radicals threatening to 
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undermine and destroy the United States.  He acknowledges that some of those 
involved may not even recognize that they are part of “real plan” of the radical 
French government, but their purpose still remains the ultimate destruction of the 
political order.    
 
The Existential Threat to the Constitution.  Washington confronted the Whiskey 
Rebellion with the deeply held conviction that the insurrection, if not dispersed, could 
represent the beginning of a civil war that would tear apart the new nation.  Such 
fears only were exacerbated by his belief that the radicalism of the French Revolution 
had spread to the United States in the form of Democratic-Republican Societies that 
actively sought to undermine the United States.  In articulating the threat posed, 
Washington also outlines his philosophical understanding of republican government 
and the purpose of the U.S. Constitution, both of which were threatened by the mere 
existence of a minority faction violently rejecting the rule of law.  Washington 
expressed the gravity of the situation privately and publicly, and through analysis of 
his writings we can understand how he himself understood the situation: an existential 
threat to the United States that, if ignored, would amount to nothing less than the 
overthrow of the constitutional order and degeneration into anarchy and eventual 
tyranny.  The American experiment in self-government thus would come to an 
untimely end.     
 Washington, from its incubation in 1791, anticipated and carefully explained 
that the Whiskey Rebellion represented more than a group of disenchanted citizens.  





proclamation that described the resistance to the excise tax law as “subversive of 
good order, contrary to the duty that every citizen owes to his country and to the laws, 
and of a nature dangerous to the very being of a government.”130  From the onset, 
thus, he wanted the public to understand the existential threat—the “very being of a 
government”—that the insurrection posed. In August 1794 shortly after violence 
erupted in western Pennsylvania, Washington would issue a proclamation in which 
he, with “deepest regret,” again publicly stressed the looming existential threat: 
 
[A]nd I have accordingly determined so to do, feeling 
the deepest regret for the occasion, but withal the most 
solemn conviction that the essential interests of the 
Union demand it, that the very existence of Government 
and the fundamental principles of social order are 
materially involved in the issue, and that the patriotism 
and firmness of all good citizens are seriously called 
upon, as occasions may require, to aid in the effectual 
suppression of so fatal a spirit.131 
 
Washington’s somber tone and word choice reflect the gravity of the situation.  At 
stake was not simply the issue of a tax on distilled spirits but the fundamental 
principles of social order and government’s raison d’etre.  The dangerous 
circumstances “demand” that the insurrection be crushed, or to put it more directly, 
the Constitution’s preservation necessitated the use of whatever means available for 
the “effectual suppression” of the rebellion.  With American experiment in self-
government jeopardized, Washington clearly, carefully, and consistently 
demonstrated that there was no choice in the matter:  constitutional self-preservation 
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required the “fatal spirit” of insurrection to be suppressed, anything short would be in 
violation of the Constitution’s fundamental principles.  
Washington privately provided additional details of his understanding of the 
nature of the threat to the Constitution.  Shortly after writing the previously cited 
letter to Henry Lee, Washington would reiterate his fear of the danger of a foreign-
born conspiracy against the United States in a letter to his friend and fellow Virginian 
Burgess Ball.  In this letter, Washington also illuminates his essential understanding 
of the underlying principles of the Constitution and republican government.  This 
letter, worth quoting at length, was sent to Ball the same day Washington made a 
public proclamation (September 25, 1794) to call out the militia of several states to 
crush the rebellion in western Pennsylvania:   
 
I hear with the greatest pleasure of the spirit which so 
generally pervades the Militia of every State that has 
been called upon, on the present occasion; and of the 
decided discountenance the Incendiaries of public peace 
and order have met with in their attempt to spread their 
nefarious doctrines, with a view to poison and 
discontent the minds of the people against the 
government; particularly by endeavouring to have it 
believed that their liberties were assailed, and that all 
the wicked and abominable measures that cod. [could] 
be devised (under specious guises) are practiced to sap 
the Constitution, and lay the foundation of future 
Slavery. 
 
The Insurrection in the Western counties of this State is 
a striking evidence of this; and may be considered as 
the first ripe fruit of the Democratic Societies. I did not, 
I must confess; expect their labours would come to 
maturity so soon; though I never had a doubt, that such 
conduct would produce some such issue; if it did not 
meet the frown of those who were well disposed to 





be more absurd, more arrogant, or more pernicious to 
the peace of Society, than for self created bodies, 
forming themselves into permanent Censors, and under 
the shade of Night in a conclave, resolving that acts of 
Congress which have undergone the most deliberate, 
and solemn discussion by the Representatives of the 
people, chosen for the express purpose, and bringing 
with them from the different parts of the Union the 
sense of their Constituents, endeavouring as far as the 
nature of the thing will admit, to form that will into 
Laws for the government of the whole.132 
 
This letter, too, offers key insights into Washington’s constitutionalism and helps us 
understand the basis for the actions he took as President.  This crisis, in short, was the 
ripened fruit of the seeds planted by, or at least watered by, the radical agents of 
revolutionary France.133  Washington, surprised that the threat had matured so 
rapidly, nonetheless forcefully outlines his recognition that the Whiskey Rebellion 
represented a significant blow to the Constitution that, if not nipped immediately, 
would grow into a full-blown assault on the U.S. political order.  This statement also 
reflects Washington’s underlying political philosophy and his belief that the U.S. 
constitutional order offered the American people the best protection and means by 
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which they could enjoy their natural liberty.  Should it be undermined, as the 
insurrection threatened to do, the Constitution would be sapped of its energy, and 
deprive the individuals living under its protection of their natural liberties and 
property thereby putting them on a path to lawlessness and eventual tyranny. 
Washington’s logical understanding of the pathway to tyranny is worth reflection.  
For him, the government serves the primary purpose of providing for the safety of 
society so that its members could freely seek and enjoy their natural liberties.  Laws 
provided a means by which to secure society; when the laws go unexecuted, however, 
the security of society—the reason for which everyone agrees to live under 
government—is undermined and people, unsafe, will not be able to seek and attain 
their natural liberties.  The result is lawlessness and insecurity, resulting in the 
eventual sacrifice of natural liberties for protection under an illegitimate rule or 
tyranny.  Safety, in short provides the means to attaining life, liberty, and property.134    
 Furthermore, with this letter Washington describes how the insurrection 
undermines the basic principles and processes by which republican government 
functions, specifically the law-making process of the U.S. Congress.   Consistent with 
definition of republican government offered in Federalist 10, Washington implies the 
people are sovereign in republican government, represented by freely chosen 
individuals who would serve a specified time in the various institutions of 
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government.  Washington emphasizes that these representatives are “chosen for the 
express purpose” of carrying out the will of the people from the various parts of the 
United States.  They make laws, in other words, but do so at the behest of the people, 
and republican law-making ipso facto amounts to the act of transforming the will of 
the people into means to govern their political order.135  Washington recognizes that 
there are limitations on perfectly transforming a disparate peoples’ will into action, 
but the republican scheme of representation does offer the best, most practical means 
for doing so, or as he says, permits it “as far as the nature of the thing admits.”  
Representative law-making is a most essential republican process, the details of 
which are outlined by the Constitution, requiring extensive deliberation and “solemn 
discussion” before a law is actually made.136   
Washington’s understanding of the fundamental principles of republican 
government, particularly as they are defined in the U.S. Constitution, help further 
explain why he found the Whiskey Rebellion as such a grave threat.  A small 
minority, operating from a conclave of the republic, fomented by “self-created 
bodies” (i.e. Democratic-Republican Societies), violently resisting a constitutionally 
enacted law was by its very nature the most pernicious threat to constitutional 
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government.  After all, if a minority group simply could, with impunity, pick and 
choose which laws it wished to obey and disregard all others, what purpose would the 
Constitution, or the laws more generally serve?  Nothing could be more 
unconstitutional than rule of a minority over the will of the majority—constitutional 
reasoning that Abraham Lincoln would echo nearly seven decades later.  Washington 
argues that this minority, through its threats of violence, essentially become 
“Censors,” who filter out laws to which they object.  In short, they become an 
illegitimate regulator of the majority’s will, and undermine the fundamental principle 
of a constitutional republic.  Washington would emphasize this basic principle of 
republican government in his public proclamation that he was calling out the military 
force of the government to suppress the rebellion on September 25, 1794: 
 
[W]hen the opportunity of examining the serious 
consequences of a treasonable opposition has been 
employed in propagating principles of anarchy, 
endeavoring through emissaries to alienate the friends 
of order from its support, and inviting its enemies to 
perpetrate similar acts of insurrection; when it is 
manifest that violence would continue to be exercised 
upon every attempt to enforce the laws; when, 
therefore, Government is set at defiance, the contest 
being whether a small portion of the United States shall 
dictate to the whole Union, and, at the expense of those 
who desire peace, indulge a desperate ambition.137 
 
After outlining the violent seditious acts of insurrection and labeling the perpetrators 
treasonous, Washington again emphasizes the fundamental constitutional question:  
would a small part rule the whole, and thus result in an end to republican 
government?  In a letter to Charles Mynn Thruston of Kentucky, Washington 
                                                






succinctly reiterates this point, “But if the Laws are to be so trampled upon, with 
impunity, and a minority (a small one too) is to dictate to the majority there is an end 
put, at one stroke, to republican government.”138  Once again, he would return to this 
issue in his November 1794 Annual Address to Congress, which focused on 
recounting the Whiskey Rebellion:   
 
[T]he judiciary was pronounced to be stripped of its 
capacity to enforce the laws; crimes, which reached the 
very existence of social order, were perpetrated without 
controul, the friends of government were insulted, 
abused, and overawed into silence, or an apparent 
acquiescence; and the yield to the treasonable fury of so 
small a portion of the United States, would be to violate 
the fundamental principle of our constitution, which 
enjoins that the will of the majority shall prevail.139 
 
Paralleling his previous public and private statements, Washington again clearly 
articulates the principal constitutional issues that the Whiskey Rebellion posed. The 
survival of the Constitution was at risk, and the choices he would make to suppress 
the insurrection flowed from the principle of constitutional self-preservation.   
“Obedience to that High and Irresistible Duty”:  Washington’s Construction of 
Executive Power 
 
 That Washington found the insurrection a direct threat to the Constitution has 
been demonstrated.  What did he understand the President’s role to be in meeting that 
threat?  Did he find the Constitution assigns any particular role to the President, or 
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was the President to look to Congress or elsewhere to determine a response?   As this 
section will show, Washington held that the Presidential Oath consigns to the Office 
of the Presidency unique duties to preserve the political order, and he understood the 
Constitution as providing all the means necessary to meet any possible contingency 
the Whiskey Rebellion, or other such event, might present.  As such, Washington 
translated the underlying principles of the Constitution into practice, cementing the 
duties, responsibilities, and powers of the Presidency within the Founders’ 
Constitution. Washington’s construction of the executive power is essential not only 
to understanding his response to the Whiskey Rebellion but also to providing 
perspective on constitutionality of the wartime actions taken by those who have and 
will follow him.   
Though the Whiskey Rebellion presents an invaluable opportunity to explore 
Washington’s understanding of the constitutional basis of the President’s powers and 
responsibilities, it generally has been neglected for its insights.  What little attention it 
has garnered, unfortunately has obscured the lessons to be learned.  For instance, in 
the two paragraphs that he dedicates to the Whiskey Rebellion in his book 
Presidential War Power, Louis Fisher suggests “Washington acted expressly on 
authority delegated to him by Congress.”140  Fisher concludes this based on 
Washington’s August 7, 1794 Proclamation in which he explicitly cites the Militia 
Act of 1792, a series of statutes that outlined under what conditions state militias 
could be called into Federal service.  By Fisher’s reasoning, Congress had the 
legitimate responsibility to respond to the insurrection, and a subordinate President 
                                                





Washington merely carried out the duties as delegated to him.  As will be discussed in 
detail below, this is a narrow reading of one of Washington’s Proclamations during 
the crisis and infers too much from the fact that Washington did follow the Act’s 
guidelines.  The Act, simply put, provided Washington all the procedural means 
needed to execute his duty, or perhaps more importantly, it did not infringe upon the 
President’s particular powers and responsibilities to do so.   It gave him and others an 
agreed-upon process by which he could call out the militia in service to the national 
government but it was not the source of why or whether he could take such actions.  
However, one could reach a similar conclusion as Fisher if one reads only 
Washington’s August 7, 1794 Proclamation that explicitly references the 1792 Militia 
Act.  Washington cites that law, and shows how he is complying with it 
systematically.  Yet this proclamation must be understood as one piece of 
Washington’s broader attempt to develop a response to the situation, and should not 
be the sole source for interpreting how Washington understood the President’s role. 
That Congress has the responsibility for organizing, arming, and disciplining the 
militia and to provide for calling it forth to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress 
Insurrections and repel Invasions are granted by the Constitution.  The Militia Act of 
1792 did just that, “provided” the procedures for how the militia was to be called 
forth to meet threats to the nation.   
Washington notably followed those procedures, and did so undoubtedly 
because they enabled him to generate the forces necessary to meet the crisis with the 
full weight of the national government behind him.  As President, after all, he did sign 





viewed the Militia Act, or any other Congressional act, as the source of his powers 
and responsibilities. When understood against the backdrop of Washington’s 
construction of the role of the Presidency, as well as his public and private messages 
issued before and after the August 7, 1794 Proclamation, one sees that Washington 
clearly perceived the procedural and cooperative benefits of the 1792 Militia Act but 
did not believe that it was the basis for executive action in times of danger. As will be 
discussed in detail below, Washington clearly found his basis for response in the 
Constitution itself, and the duties and powers it assigns to the Presidency.  Hence, 
Fisher neglects Washington’s repeated reference to the President’s unique 
constitutional duty to ensure the faithful execution of the laws and preserve the 
constitutional order, and overall fails to understand Washington as he understood 
himself. 
As a backdrop to his construction of the executive power during the Whiskey 
Rebellion, we should pause and examine Washington’s Second Inaugural Address, 
which he delivered after the tumultuous summer of 1792 but before the open violence 
of mid-1794.  Though the bookend addresses of Washington’s presidency—the First 
Inaugural and his Farewell Address—are perhaps the most cited of his public 
presidential statements, his very brief Second Inaugural eloquently captures his basic 
understanding of the Presidency, latent with the pertinent constitutional themes of 
energy and responsibility.  Upon taking the presidential oath of office a second time, 
Washington briefly stated: 
 
I am again called upon by the voice of my Country to 





occasion proper for it shall arrive, I shall endeavour to 
express the high sense I entertain of this distinguished 
honor, and of the confidence which has been reposed in 
me by the people of United America. 
 
Previous to the execution of any official act of the 
President, the Constitution requires an Oath of Office. 
This Oath I am now about to take, and in your presence, 
that if it shall be found during my administration of the 
Government I have in any instance violated willingly, 
or knowingly, the injunction thereof, I may (besides 
incurring Constitutional punishmt [sic]) be subject to 
the upbraidings of all who are now witnesses of the 
present solemn Ceremony.141 
 
The words chosen, however few, and the tone used display the solemn and serious 
mindset with which Washington understood the Office of the Presidency.  
Washington, most notably, demonstrates the critical link between the Office of the 
Presidency and the sovereign people on behalf of whom he acts and to whom he is 
ultimately accountable. The President is not an officer whose sole purpose is to 
execute laws passed by Congress; rather it is a strong, independent office unto itself 
with solemn responsibilities to the people to whom the Constitution belongs.  More 
specifically, Washington focuses on the central connection between the Oath of 
Office has in the execution of his duties, and implores that if he should violate the 
“injunction” of the Oath he is to be subject not only “Constitutional punishment” of 
impeachment but also the criticism of his peers, which would tarnish his reputation 
and honor.  
Most importantly, however, Washington firmly roots the Presidency in the 
straightforward but unique and special duty to “preserve, protect, and defend” the 
Constitution, the violation of which he suggests should incur the harshest penalties 
                                                





possible.  Moreover, his interesting use of the term injunction, which implies a legally 
bound obligation or a command from someone in a position of authority, shows that 
he holds the President legally and morally duty-bound to a free and sovereign people 
who ultimately will determine whether he had upheld these most solemn 
responsibilities.   This would include those extraordinary times – “the occasion proper 
for it shall arrive” – when the Constitution must be defended and to which all eyes 
will turn to the duty-bound President.  Washington promises that even on these trying 
occasions, he will strive to show “high sense” or solemn understanding of the 
President’s special constitutional duty with which he will execute the functions of the 
office. 
The Whiskey Rebellion would present but one such occasion for Washington 
to put in practice his understanding of the President’s responsibilities in times of 
danger, and study of Washington writings and proclamations during this fearful time 
help explain his construction of the Constitution’s executive war power.  Throughout 
the crisis, as Washington described the existential threat to the government, he also 
carefully articulated that any and all responses he might take were clearly rooted in 
the President’s Constitution duty to preserve the political order and ensure the faithful 
execution of the laws.   In his September 15, 1792 Proclamation, Washington makes 
this clear: 
 
Whereas it is the particular duty of the Executive ‘to 
take care that the laws be faithfully executed,’ and not 
only that duty but the permanent interests and happiness 
of the people require that every legal and necessary step 





unwarrantable proceedings as to bring to justice the 
infractors of the laws and secure obedience thereto.142 
 
Washington underscores the unique nature of the President’s constitutional role when 
he cites the “take care” clause of Article II and that this duty is “particular” to the 
President.  Disruptions to the normal and orderly proceedings of government, whether 
from internal or external causes, are the sole duty of the executive to subdue.  Though 
their cooperation is expected and urged, neither the Congress nor the judiciary are 
assigned such a special responsibility.  It is the President’s alone.  
Washington, moreover, goes beyond the “take care” clause to root the 
President’s response in the broader obligation to preserve the political order or the 
“permanent interests and happiness of the people.”  In doing so, Washington returns 
to natural law reasoning and the principles underlying the Constitution, the 
fundamental purpose of which is to provide for the safety of individuals so that they 
may attain their natural happiness.  As discussed in Chapter II of this dissertation, the 
Constitution provides the framework of government under which equal citizens can 
securely enjoy the natural liberties as articulated in the Declaration of Independence.  
Washington follows the same foundational reasoning and roots the President’s 
protective duties in the broader societal needs and happiness of the people.  
In addition, by referencing pursuit of “every legal and necessary step” to 
counter the disruption to the political order, he also scopes the basis and extent of the 
measures the President may employ in protecting society.  For Washington, the 
President simply does not execute “legal” measures as prescribed by congressionally 
enacted laws; he also may take steps to protect society that are grounded in the 
                                                





necessity of the situation.  That is, the President is constitutionally bound to execute 
all “necessary” steps, even if they are beyond the measures set down by Congress, to 
counter violence against the political order.  Executive measures, accordingly, would 
be driven by the necessity of the situation but also clearly constitutional so long as 
they strive to achieve the permanent interests of society and the happiness of the 
people.  
Washington expanded upon this point in his Address to Congress in 
November 1792, which also sheds some light on his understanding that the President 
was an independent and equal organ of government, and that he had expectations of 
them as they did of him: 
Congress may be assured, that nothing within 
Constitutional and legal limits, which may depend on 
me, shall be wanting to assert and maintain the just 
authority of the laws. In fulfilling this trust, I shall 
count intirely [sic] upon the full cooperation of the 
other departments of Government, and upon the zealous 
support of all good Citizens.143 
This address, notably, does not have the tone of subordinate to superior, or of one to 
whom higher authority has been delegated.  Washington, for instance, does not state 
that he will act in accord with powers delegated to him by Congress, nor does he 
imply that he defers to Congress to establish the scope and extent of his possible 
response to the crisis.  Rather, Washington emphasizes that he would not hold back 
and that he is fully prepared to use any and all measures to ensure that he can carry 
out his duty to ensure the laws are obeyed, and that parameters of those measures 
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were not set by Congress alone but by the Constitution.  Washington, to be sure, 
certainly recognized that Congress had a significant role to play and that their 
cooperation was necessary to ensure success in whatever endeavor he might have to 
pursue. However, he also establishes that he, as the President, expects them to 
cooperate fully with him as he fulfills his constitutional duties as President.  The 
framework popular among many recent scholars of presidential power, Fisher 
included, pits questions of war power as a tug-of-war between Congress and the 
President.  Yet, as even this brief passage shows, Washington articulates it as a matter 
of constitutional duty, with each branch playing their respective role but with the 
executive explicitly responsible for ensuring the faithful execution of the laws for 
which he would call upon Congress to support.    
 When violent opposition to the excise tax law reemerged in mid-1794, 
Washington again cited Article II of the Constitution and held that it granted him, as 
President, the special responsibility to respond to the insurrection and ensure a 
tranquil domestic order:  
 
Now, therefore, I, George Washington, President of the 
United States, in obedience to that high and irresistible 
duty, consigned to me by the Constitution, "to take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed;" deploring that the 
American name should be sullied by the outrages of 
citizens on their: own Government.144 
 
Washington’s use of the words “high” and “irresistible” clearly show his recognition 
of the special and extraordinary nature of the President’s duty to the Constitution and 
the faithful execution of the laws legitimately enacted under its auspices.  The duty, 
                                                






furthermore, was especially given, or consigned, to the President from the 
Constitution; it was not delegated from Congress, nor does Washington make any 
such inference.  For Washington, this duty was something elevated above all else and 
no matter his personal feelings or desire, he could not refuse to carry out.  The oath to 
Washington is solemn and sacred—or as Lincoln would describe it seven decades 
later as an oath “registered in heaven”—a breach of which would be tantamount to 
violating the Constitution, and acting unfaithfully to that government that he was 
bound to protect.  Failing to take any and all measures necessary to carry out his duty, 
in other words, would make Washington no better, nay even worse, than the 
insurrectionists in western Pennsylvania.  In the sentiment of his Second Inaugural, if 
Washington did not carry out measures to effectively subdue the insurrection, he 
ought to be subjected to constitutional punishments and the upbraidings of his peers.   
 Finally, Washington’s Annual Address to Congress in November 1794 offers 
an exceptionally reflective statement on his understanding of the situation of the 
Whiskey Rebellion and his powers and duties in response to it.  Written in a very 
personal tone, Washington expresses that “On this call, momentous in the extreme, I 
sought and weighted what might best subdue the crisis,” and he proceed to outline 
each step that he took along the way.  He makes clear, that in such extraordinary 
situations that he, as President and Commander-in-Chief, has the constitutional 
discretion to determine the course to be pursued in meeting a crisis.  Washington 
again reinforces the central place that the Oath of Office has in his understanding not 
just of his response to the Whiskey Rebellion but, more broadly, to his construction of 





Having thus fulfilled the engagement which I took 
when I entered into office, ‘to the best of my ability to 
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the 
United States’, on you, gentlemen, and the people by 
whom you are deputed, I rely for support.145 
  
With the insurrection subdued, Washington confidently asserts that he has fulfilled 
his constitutional duty to which he swore an oath upon entering office.  Therefore, all 
actions he took during the insurrection he holds stem from the unique constitutional 
powers and responsibilities assigned to the Presidency.  He then continues that for the 
President to carry out his constitutional obligations, the office depends on support 
from both the Congress and the people.  He then states:  
 
In the arrangements, to which the possibility of a 
similar contingency will naturally draw your attention, 
it ought not to be forgotten, that the militia laws have 
exhibited such striking defects, as could not have been 
supplied but by the zeal of our citizens. Besides the 
extraordinary expense and waste, which are not the 
least of the defects, every appeal to those laws is 
attended with a doubt of its success.146 
 
For the Constitution to be successfully preserved, protected, and defended require the 
active and zealous support of the patriotic citizens but also proper laws passed by the 
Congress.  Washington affirms that in the recent crisis the former was present but that 
the latter unfortunately were absent.  In fact, the people’s zealous patriotism and 
commitment to their Constitution overcame the seriously defective laws of Congress, 
and Washington expresses his gratitude to the people for that.   
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However, with this statement, Washington clearly admonishes Congress for 
not having provided proper support to the President to carry out his constitutional 
duties in service of the people.  Washington goes on in his Address to request 
Congress to revise the Militia Act, to eliminate its inefficiencies and waste, and to 
examine what measures it can take to provide better support to the President in the 
fulfillment of his constitutional duties.  Returning to Louis Fisher’s contention that 
Congress delegated authority to a subordinate President Washington, this public 
rebuke is not that of a subordinate to a superior.  He does not express appreciation to 
Congress for powers delegated nor that he did what he could with the powers granted 
to him by Congress. Washington instead openly calls the Militia Act deficient, and 
suggests that the successful defense of the Constitution, which he is duty-bound to 
lead on behalf of the people, occurred in spite of Congress insufficient efforts.   It 
reflects, in other words, a strong and independent President, the ultimate protector of 
the political order and responsible solely to the people to whom that Constitution 
rightfully belong, calling on the people’s representatives to do their duty to support 
the Office of the Presidency in its unique obligations to the Constitution.   
 
Conclusion:  Washington’s Lessons in Statesmanship 
Posing an existential threat to the new political order, the Whiskey Rebellion 
presented President Washington the opportunity to clearly and cogently articulate the 
powers and duties of the Presidency in times of danger.  Though war fortunately was 
avoided, the event still provides observers numerous insights into how the first 





constitutional basis of the executive war power.  Washington, himself, recognized 
significant results from his Administration’s suppression of the Rebellion, exclaiming 
that it proved the superiority of the U.S. constitutional order to the monarchists of 
Europe that, “republicanism is not the phantom of a deluded imagination: on the 
contrary, that under no form of government, will laws be better supported, liberty and 
property better secured, or happiness be more effectually dispensed to mankind.”147  
Despite the significance assigned to this event by Washington and his 
contemporaries, scholars tend to be dismissive, or even critical, of the long-term 
lessons that may be learned from it.  Leading presidential scholars Sidney Milkis and 
Michael Nelson, for instance, conclude, that despite Washington’s success in 
avoiding civil war, “the Whiskey Rebellion and Washington’s response exacerbated 
rather than ended the political conflicts that divided Americans in the 1790s.”148  This 
conclusion unfairly views Washington’s response to the Whiskey Rebellion through 
Milkis and Nelson’s own lenses jaundiced by their present-day concerns with the rise 
of partisan politics.  Instead of trying to project their own biases onto Washington, 
scholars should first attempt to understand Washington as he understood himself.  
Doing so provides the marvelous opportunity to glean insights from the nation’s first 
President, who found himself in a national crisis and needed to reason through and 
return to his first principles of constitutionalism to understand the President’s proper 
role in resolving it.   
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As this chapter has shown, Washington’s response during the Whiskey 
Rebellion offers several key insights for interpreting the Constitution.  First, 
Washington understood that the Constitution was premised upon the principle of self-
preservation,149 and that its original design and intent was to provide a secure political 
order for people to enjoy their natural liberties and happiness. Perhaps Washington’s 
most concise statement reflecting his understanding that the primary purpose of the 
Constitution was to provide the security of individuals so that they might enjoy their 
natural liberties in a letter he sent to Major General Daniel Morgan of the Virginia 
Militia who was called out to suppress the insurrection.  Emphasizing the importance 
of Morgan’s mission to suppress the insurrection, Washington claims that if the laws 
are not faithfully executed: “there can be no security for life, liberty, or property.”150  
Again, Washington consistently suggests that security and liberty are not in tension 
but that the former is the principal means to the latter.   
Furthermore, Washington teaches us that measures taken in defense of the 
Constitution would have to be dictated by the necessity of the situation; put 
differently, he recognizes that when threatened, the Constitution permits all measures 
necessary to thwart the danger and ensure the preservation of the political order.  
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Washington also understood that the President has the special responsibilities to carry 
out the defense of the Constitution—a duty particularly consigned to the President 
alone.  This duty is higher than all other duties and cannot be resisted lest the 
President be in violation of the Constitution. Finally, Washington makes clear that he 
is accountable to the people, to whom the Constitution rightfully belongs, and who 
have the necessary constitutional means to punish him should he violate his trust with 
them. 
Contrary to the dominant scholarly views of Washington as only an 
indispensable symbol of national unity who did not have much to contribute to 
constitutional interpretation, this chapter finds that Washington possessed a firm 
grasp of the underlying republican principles of the Constitution. Washington did not 
write a treatise on government like many of his contemporaries.  However that should 
not diminish the contributions he made to American constitutional development.  
Through his public addresses and proclamation, as well as private letters to other 
individuals of influence, Washington helped Americans better appreciate and 
interpret the meaning of their Constitution.  Moreover, he expounded upon its 
meaning when it was under assault, when the stakes were high and the future 
uncertain, and used it to guide his actions in defense of the people and their political 
order.  As such, Washington performed the highest act of statesmanship: articulating 
and applying the unbending principles of the political regime in the most trying of 
time to meet the necessities of the situation and to enable a people to realize their 
Constitution as a form of government capable of preserving itself.  He and his 





exceedingly high expectations—for understanding the Constitution and the 
Presidency in the current trying times the United States faces 
In sum, Washington’s constitutionalism and construction of the executive 
power in times of danger are consistent with the analysis of the Constitution and The 
Federalist offered in Chapter II.  This should not be surprising since, after all, 
Washington was arguably the most influential of the Founding generation, and he 
probably made a much more significant imprint upon it even if the surviving records 
do not show him overtly doing so.151  Moreover, Washington’s constitutional 
reasoning under the threat of rebellion—in particular his recognition of the special 
responsibilities of the Presidency to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution—
foreshadow President Lincoln’s understanding of the Constitution during the Civil 
War nearly seventy years later.  This, too, should not come as surprise, for as we will 
discuss in greater detail in Chapter IV, Lincoln revered the Constitution and its 
Founders, and he would go to great lengths to articulate how the measures he was 
taking in response to southern secession were consistent with and rooted in the 
Constitution.  
                                                
151 I am referring here to Washington’s relative silence during the Constitutional Convention 
at least as it was captured by Madison in his Notes.  On the last day of the Convention, 
Madison speaks of the rare occurrence for Washington, President of the Convention to speak.  
On the question of the number and proportion of Representatives, Madison noted: “When the 
PRESIDENT rose, for the purpose of putting the question, he said that although his situation 
had hitherto restrained him from offering his sentiments on questions depending in the 
House, and it might be thought, ought now to impose silence on him, yet he could not forbear 
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that the objections to the plan recommended might be made as few as possible.”  Emphasis 
mine.  Furthermore, though a strong advocate of the newly signed Constitution, Washington 
also was neither a delegate to, nor did he openly weigh in, the ratification debates including 
that of his home state of Virginia.  For more on Washington during the ratification of the 
Constitution, see Paul O. Carrese, “Liberty, Moderation, and Constitutionalism:  The Political 











Chapter IV:  The Constitution and Lincoln:  The War Power, 
the Oath Registered in Heaven, and His Rightful Master 
 
The imperial presidency thesis has shaped the conception of presidential war 
powers for nearly four decades, and President Lincoln and his actions during of the 
Civil War have not been spared being viewed in this light.  Arthur Schlesinger Jr. 
contends that Lincoln was responsible for two “innovations” in our understanding of 
wartime emergency powers: “emergency power” as a weapon wholly within the 
Constitution and the connection of emergency powers with the duty and 
responsibility of the President.152  Thus, Lincoln’s decision to “call out the war power 
                                                
152 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.  The Imperial Presidency, 60-68.  Schlesinger, in this work, further 
contends that Lincoln’s constitutional claims “marked the beginning of a fateful evolution” in 
the expansion of Presidential powers, representing a departure from the Founders’ vision of 
the Constitution.  In a later essay published in 2005 (originally published as the new 
Introduction to his The Imperial Presidency), Schlesinger would sound more sympathetic to 
Lincoln but still claim that he [Lincoln] consciously took acts that he understood to be 
“beyond the Constitution” but that he never claimed them to be inherent in the Presidency, a 
trait of Presidents in the latter half of the 20th century.  Schlesinger, at least later, does not 
mind Lincoln’s departure from the Constitution since it set no precedent for future 
Presidents—a claim contrary to his earlier statement regarding Lincoln’s “innovations” in the 
constitutional justification for Presidential war powers.  Even more troubling, however, is a 
statement made by Schlesinger in 1988, when he defended Lincoln (and Franklin Roosevelt) 
suggesting that Lincoln had “remained faithful to the spirit, if not the letter, of the 
Constitution: acting on the spirit to save the letter.”  This statement, too, reflects a different 
conclusion by Schlesinger than his other works.  After, all how can Schlesinger claim that 
Lincoln acted “within” but also “beyond” the Constitution?  Schlesinger’s inconsistencies are 
indicative of the ambivalent nature of executive power, particularly in wartime, as well as the 
difficulty of reconciling executive power with constitutional government. However, it also 
displays Schlesinger’s overall lack of appreciation the fundamental purpose and intent of the 
Constitution as well as Lincoln’s own construction of the President’s constitutional duty.  See 
supra Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency, xiii-xiv; this essay also has been republished in 
Schlesinger, War and the American Presidency (with a new chapter) (New York:  W.W. 
Norton & Co. Ltd, 2005), 50-51.  For Schlesinger’s claim that Lincoln remained within the 





of the government” represents the ultimate act of an imperial president, violating the 
Constitution and establishing precedents that have proven instrumental in “rise of 
Presidential Wars” that continue to plague the United States.    
The novelty of Lincoln’s construction of “the war power” remains a thread 
that scholars have woven into histories of the Civil War and of Lincoln.   The eminent 
Civil War historian James McPherson, for instance, casually remarks “the 
Constitution makes no mention of war power; Lincoln seems to have invented both 
the phrase and its application.”153  Others seem not to be concerned about the 
constitutionality of Lincoln’s actions.  Clinton Rossiter, in discussing Lincoln’s 
wartime tenure, suggests that whether Lincoln’s actions were truly within the bounds 
of the Constitution or not is a “minor issue.”154  Similarly, former Supreme Court 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in reviewing Lincoln’s wartime actions, namely his 
proclamations to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, admits that she does not wish to 
“wade into the muddy waters” of the debate over whether the Constitution authorized 
Lincoln to undertake such actions.155   
This chapter, however, decidedly enters “the muddy waters” to discern the 
constitutional basis of Lincoln’s wartime words and deeds and holds that the 
constitutionality of Lincoln’s acts are central to understanding the Constitution in 
times of war and ultimately provide us a guide for determining the constitutional 
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boundaries of other wartime activities. The chapter counters claims that Lincoln 
departed from the Constitution or the intention of the Framers by “inventing” the war 
power.  Lincoln, perhaps more than any other president, revered the Founding 
generation and the Constitution they produced; and he consciously acted, even in the 
most calamitous event the United States has ever or since faced, within the spirit and 
letter of the Constitution.156  In constructing the war power of the government and the 
scope of executive power to exercise that power, Lincoln’s constitutionalism 
consistently flowed from the thought of the Framers.  Lincoln, if we must, would best 
be characterized as a Constitutional “conservative”,157 who sought to preserve and 
restore the Framers’ understanding of the Constitution, and who ultimately found the 
Constitution as the source of power necessary to preserve the United States during its 
most profound crisis.  
 The Civil War fundamentally was a Constitutional event,158 pregnant with 
those perennial political questions among which include: sovereignty and the nature 
of the political order; the principles of natural right; the tension between liberty and 
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asserted in the Declaration of Independence.  Prudent and practical in his statesmanship, 
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purpose.”  See Herman Belz, Abraham Lincoln, Constitutionalism, and Equal Right in the 
Civil War Era (New York:  Fordham University Press, 1998), 74.  
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order; and the ambivalence of executive power.  Lincoln, unlike any President since 
and possibly any previous, offers more wisdom and guidance to understand the 
underlying principles of the American constitutional order and the construction of 
executive power in times of war.  Therefore, if we accept that the Civil War stands as 
a significant constitutional event, President Abraham Lincoln ought to be recognized 
as a primary source of constitutional interpretation.  Hence, far from a “minor issue,” 
Lincoln’s constitutional construction of the war power and the executive’s duty to 
employ it in defense of the nation represents an important issue of inquiry, one that 
can help us better understand the nature of our Constitution in times of grave danger. 
As the brief analysis of the literature illustrates, however, Lincoln’s 
constitutional legacy has been (and continues to be) heatedly debated and the 
dominant view remains that he acted outside of or against the Constitution in his 
prosecution of the war.  Critics and admirers alike view his actions as un- or 
extraconstitutional and, as a result, he is characterized either as a tyrant who ruined 
the Constitution or a savior who rescued the Constitution from itself.  The more 
critical view holds Lincoln at fault for destroying the nation’s founding principles; 
admirers imply fundamental flaws in the Constitution and Lincoln a savior who 
overcame them in a time of need.  Both views, this dissertation argues, are incorrect 
for Lincoln, above all else, understood the Founders’ Constitution and, as its 
executive, employed all of the constitutional tools at his disposal to ensure the safety 
and survival of the political order.     
It would not be an overstatement to suggest that Lincoln’s presidency 





emergency powers.  He undertook a number of extraordinary actions in response to 
southern secession to include: calling forth the militia; blockading ports; raising and 
expanding the size of the Army and Navy (without initial Congressional 
authorization); suspending the writ of habeas corpus; emancipating slaves; and 
conducting military detentions and instituting martial law.  As one notable historian 
remarked, the Civil War represents “the high-water mark of the exercise of executive 
power in the United States…No one can ever know just what Lincoln conceived to be 
limits of his powers.”159  This surge in Presidential power leads many observers to 
conclude that the Constitution, at least for a time, ceased to function as a governing 
framework as the President wielding arbitrary and virtually unlimited power.  For 
example, the astute commentator on America, Henry Adams wrote that the Civil War 
“obliterated” the Constitution.160   Lincoln, himself, however, would deny such 
charges, and in fact would argue that the Constitution proved to be the source and 
purpose of the executive functions he performed throughout the Civil War.  As this 
chapter shows, he recognized his constitutional duties as well as the limits on his 
exercise of executive power.  
To argue that Lincoln did not violate the Constitution, this chapter builds upon 
Chapter II’s analysis of the Founders’ Constitution, in which we discerned three 
principles for Constitutional interpretation: 1) The necessity of self-preservation 
serves as the primary lens through which we should view the constitutionality of 
particular actions; 2) that the Presidency has a special duty to preserve, protect, and 
defend the Constitution; and 3) that the people, through various institutions, remain 
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the sovereign and ultimately determine whether the President adhered to the 
Constitution.  Organized around these three principles, this chapter first explores 
Lincoln’s understanding of the enduring nature of the Union and Constitution, and 
that the latter could not survive without the former.  He recognized that the 
Constitution, as a frame of government, must be understood to contain all the powers 
necessary for its own defense and preservation.  Lincoln’s calling out “the war power 
of the government” was neither an invention nor an innovation but a reflection of the 
Founders’ explicit design to create a frame of government capable of defending itself 
and enduring in the face of great challenges.   
The chapter then discusses Lincoln’s construction of the executive war power, 
and his understanding of his duty as President.  It specifically focuses on his 
interpretation of the Presidential oath – the “oath registered in heaven.” Unlike his 
predecessor, President James Buchanan, who refused to acknowledge that the 
President had the authority to prevent the break up of the Union, Lincoln quickly and 
forcefully asserted his special duty as the President to employ all necessary measures 
to ensure the survival of the constitutional order.161  In doing so, he acted within the 
spirit and letter of the Constitution, and did not resort to un- or extraconstitutional 
means.  Despite wielding tremendous executive power, Lincoln did not view his 
powers as “without limit” or with an “anything goes” mentality.  Instead, Lincoln 
clearly recognized the limitations of his power, deferring to Congress when 
appropriate, and most importantly, permitting elections to be conducted in the midst 
of a bloody civil war.  Lincoln always sought to be held accountable to his “rightful 
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master,” the American people.  Therefore, it is equally important to recognize that 
actions Lincoln did not take (e.g., postponing or canceling elections, preventing 
Congress from assembling) are as significant to understanding his constitutionalism 
as those actions that he did take.   
This chapter concludes with a brief discussion of why Lincoln’s writing and 
speeches should serve as an integral part of Constitutional interpretation, a point not 
without controversy and significance in our current milieu of case law and judicial 
supremacy.  To help realize why it remains important to think anew Lincoln’s 
constitutionalism, we shall begin with a brief literature review to highlight the 
persistent but erroneous notion that he violated the Constitution.     
Lincoln’s Mixed Reviews 
Early in his career in 1838, Abraham Lincoln delivered a speech to the Young 
Men’s Lyceum of Springfield, IL on “The Perpetuation of our Political Institutions” 
in which he argued that a reverence for the Constitution and laws ought to become the 
“political religion” of the nation.162  He warned that history is filled with the dangers 
of “men of ambition” who spring up among the people to “naturally seek the 
gratification of their ruling passion.”  These men – Alexanders, Caesars, and 
Napoleons – will not wish to maintain and perpetuate the political institutions 
inherited from our forefathers; rather, disdaining the beaten path, they will seek some 
new course and bow to no chief or principle other than their own ambition.  This, 
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Lincoln warned, would undermine and destroy the Constitution, and the principles of 
free government to which it aims. 
 
Lincoln as Tyrant, Despot, and Dictator 
 
Ironically, Lincoln is often portrayed as that ambitious man who undermined 
and altered the Framers Constitution for his own personal gain.  A contemporary of 
Lincoln’s, Senator Willard Saulsbury Sr. captured the critical view of Lincoln most 
vividly when he passionately cried out on the Senator floor:  “If I wanted to paint a 
despot, a man perfectly regardless of every constitutional right of the people, I would 
paint the hideous form of Abraham Lincoln…”163  The Lincoln-as-despot viewpoint, 
interestingly, is officially sanctioned by the state of Maryland in its state song which 
sings in one verse (to the tune of O Tannenbaum): 
The despot's heel is on thy shore, 
Maryland! 
His torch is at thy temple door, 
Maryland! 
Avenge the patriotic gore 
That flecked the streets of Baltimore, 
And be the battle queen of yore, 
Maryland! My Maryland!164  
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The despot whose heel is on the Maryland shore and whose torch is threatening the 
temple door is Abraham Lincoln.  The call to avenge the patriotic gore flecking the 
streets of Baltimore refers to the clashes between pro-secession mobs in Baltimore 
and Federal troops, called by President Lincoln to defend the Union, traversing the 
city on their way to Washington, DC.  It is worth recalling that Maryland though a 
slave state remained loyal to the Union; imagine the sentiment of those states that 
seceded.  Therefore, portraying Lincoln as a despot, tyrant, or dictator165 who behaved 
illegally and actively undermined the Constitution remains an enduring legacy of the 
Civil War.  
This view has been carried forth by self-described group of conservatives and 
libertarians, many of whom can best be characterized as neo-Confederates or southern 
sympathizers, highly (if not hyperbolically) critical of Lincoln.  The most prominent 
proponent of this view in recent years is economist Thomas DiLorenzo, who has 
made a career of “unmasking” Lincoln as a tyrant.166  DiLorenzo argues that 
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unjust rule. The term dictatorship, however, has been used too loosely and is often grouped 
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republican legacy as a legitimate emergency executive institution dating to the Roman 
Republic.  This distinction is significant since the view of Lincoln is split among critics who 
label him a tyrant or despot and admirers who call him a dictator but who praise him as a 
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an overview of the dictatorship, its Roman roots, and its role in democratic emergency 
government see, Clinton Rossiter, The Constitutional Dictatorship.  For Rossiter’s specific 
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Civil War Era (New York:  Fordham University Press, 1998), 17-43. 
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and an Unnecessary War (New York:  Random House, 2003).  DiLorenzo dedicates another 
book, Lincoln Unmasked:  What You’re Not Supposed to Know About Dishonest Abe (New 
York:  Crown Forum: 2006), to Mel Bradford, a prominent southern conservative scholar of 





Lincoln’s Presidency carried forth the Whig Party’s unconstitutional platform of 
strengthening the power of the national government at the expense of the states.  He 
further asserts that Lincoln rhetorically misled U.S. citizens, equating the Union and 
the Constitution as inseparable and thereby prosecuting an unconstitutional war 
against states that had the legitimate right to secede from the Union.  According to 
DiLorenzo, Lincoln’s handling of wartime liberties, namely the suspension of the writ 
of habeas corpus, and his use of a massive military machine to wage an “unnecessary 
war” against legitimate southern secessionists were part of Lincoln’s agenda to 
neutralize any opposition to his self-conceived mandate to destroy the Constitution 
and erect a new, highly centralized state.  He sums up his views that “in reality, 
Lincoln was a glutton for tyranny, as his actions proved time and again during his 
entire administration.”167  He further concludes, “that the Old Republic established by 
the U.S. Constitution has been effectively overthrown, with Lincoln leading the 
way.”168  In a similar vein – equally critical as well as hyperbolic – former Reagan 
Administration official and former editor of the Wall Street Journal, Paul Craig 
Roberts suggests:  
 
Lincoln was an American Pol Pot, except worse.  Pol 
Pot’s barbarism was justified by the Marxian doctrine 
of class genocide to which he adhered.  Lincoln’s 
barbarism was prohibited by the morality of his time 
and the U.S. Constitution, yet neither deterred him.169     
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DiLorenzo and Roberts are but two proponents of the school of thought 
characterizing Lincoln as a despot and tyrant who destroyed the Constitutional order 
of limited government and put America on a path to all the problems associated with 
the overly taxed and highly centralized welfare and warfare state.  Despite their 
attempts to juxtapose Lincoln and the Founding generation, this school of thought has 
difficulty with the explanation of the Constitution by none other than Publius.  After 
all, to form a “more perfect union” is a principal purpose of the Constitution, and 
Publius dedicates his initial 14 essays to explaining at the great length the importance 
of Union and why the national government must be empowered to ensure its 
preservation.  Furthermore, many of Publius’s most explicit statements on the need 
for national government power “without limit” reside in his chapters describing the 
importance of military and taxation.   
Southern sympathizers aside, the view that Lincoln acted beyond or even in 
violation of the Constitution remains a serious point of scholarly focus.  This line of 
reasoning stems, on the one hand, from the long-held view that the Constitution 
explicitly seeks to constrain executive power but, on the other hand, also from the 
broader challenge of discerning the ambivalent and ambiguous nature of executive 
power.  Undoubtedly, there is significant difficulty (discussed in Chapter I) 
                                                                                                                                      
but notice the grossly exaggerated comparisons used by critics of Presidential power.  
Whereas Roberts compares Lincoln to Pol Pot, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. argues that Presidents 
since World War II have wielded power on parallel with Chairman Mao, see The Imperial 
Presidency, xxvii.  Such views highlight the shallow opinions of the American elite—left and 
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reconciling executive power with constitutional government.  Therefore, that Lincoln 
violated the Constitution even if he did so for noble purpose of saving it remains the 
prevalent view, and unfortunately it limits what we might learn from Lincoln about 
the Constitution and executive power.170  
Admirers of Lincoln label his actions unconstitutional, illegal, or 
extraconstitutional,171 but praise him for prudently stepping outside of the 
Constitution in order to preserve it.  Some scholars go so far as to label Lincoln a 
dictator, albeit a “constitutional,” “democratic,” or “benevolent” one, suggesting that 
even if he violated the Constitution it was the right course of action for the public 
good.   Clinton Rossiter, for instance, suggests Lincoln’s actions during the secession 
crisis represent the “paragon of all democratic, constitutional dictatorships…For if 
Lincoln was a great dictator, he was a greater democrat.”172  The historian James 
Randall in his monumental Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln argues, “If 
Lincoln was a dictator, it must be admitted that he was a benevolent dictator.”173  The 
political scientist Richard Pious, moreover, writes Lincoln “in effect created a form of 
constitutional dictatorship: constitutional because the ultimate checks of election and 
                                                
170 Larry Arnhart, for example, writes Lincoln sets an “example of violation of the 
Constitution that could only have a pernicious effect upon his successors.” See Arnhart, "'The 
God-Like Prince: John Locke, Executive Prerogative, and the American Presidency," 
Presidential Studies Quarterly 9 (Spring 1979), 121-130. 
171 Forrest MacDonald, for example, bluntly states: “Lincoln took a number of 
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Problems Under Lincoln, revised edition, (Urbana, IL:  The University of Illinois Press, 
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impeachment remained, but a ‘dictatorship’ because he disregarded the proximate 
check and balances in the emergency.”174  As noted above, the dictatorship, in its 
original form, is a formal constitutional mechanism in which the legislature 
empowers an executive officer to handle an emergency—the absolute power of a 
single man—for a specified period of time.  The U.S. Constitution does not include a 
provision for a dictator or any such institution, and Publius even uses the Roman 
dictatorship in contrast to his description of the Presidency (Federalist 70).  
Therefore, to label Lincoln a dictator implies either the introduction of a foreign 
institution into the Constitution or to suggest that he acted beyond or outside the 
Constitution.   
 
Lincoln, the Lockean Prerogative, and Extraconstitutionalism  
Other scholars place Lincoln’s wartime actions in the context of the political 
philosopher John Locke’s notion of prerogative power.175  There is no evidence that 
Lincoln ever read Locke’s Two Treatises on Government176 and though Lincoln was 
well versed on the writings of the Founders, Locke’s discussion of prerogative power 
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was not used to describe executive power during the framing of the Constitution.  
Scholars examining Lincoln in this tradition usually begin with Locke’s basic 
definition of prerogative as “the power to act according to discretion, for the publick 
good, without the prescription of the Law, and sometimes even against it, is that 
which is called Prerogative.”177  They seize hold of executive discretionary power 
acting whenever the law is silent or even against the law if the ends are in the public 
interest. Locke brilliantly captures the fundamental problem of reconciling written 
law and discretionary executive power necessary in times of emergency. Yet Locke 
offers a more nuanced understanding of prerogative as he defines it at least five 
different times, grounding it in nature—beginning with his discussion of parental 
power—but also describes it as arbitrary and that it “never be questioned” under his 
discussion of tyranny. 178    
We must bear in mind several key points when considering Lincoln and the 
Lockean prerogative.  Lincoln never claimed to act against the Constitution nor wield 
arbitrary power that would “never be questioned.”  In fact, he went to great lengths to 
prove the Constitutionality of his actions to his “rightful master,” the American 
people.  As eminent Lincoln scholar Harry Jaffa remarks, “Throughout the war, 
Lincoln will take the greatest pains to prove in every instance that the authority he 
                                                
177 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, edited with an introduction and notes by Peter 
Laslett,  (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
178 Locke’s describes prerogative at some length in Chapter XIV of the Second Treatise, but 
he also discusses it in at least four other chapters: VI: Of Paternal Power; VIII: Of the 
Beginning of Political Societies; XIII: Of the Subordination of the Powers of the 
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exercises, however extraordinary it may appear, is genuinely derived from the people 
by means of the Constitution and that he has exercised no authority originating in any 
will or purpose of his own.”179  The people, Lincoln understood and indeed 
demanded, would question and ultimately judge his actions through multiple 
constitutional institutions, namely free elections.  Lincoln did employ discretionary 
action—that is actions that he alone made determinations upon without the 
prescription of written law—but that is to be expected as that is what leaders are 
expected to do.  Lincoln, moreover, in applying his judgment to particular challenges 
remained fully cognizant that he would have to explain his actions to the people who 
would either accept or reject them as in line with their understanding of the 
Constitution.  Lincoln went to great lengths not to construe the Constitution by any 
“hypercritical rules” but in ways that would be understood and recognizable to his 
fellow citizens.180  
Rather than focus on particular instances or passages where Lincoln might 
sound like Locke, it would be more prudent to examine both Locke and Lincoln 
through the prism of natural law and the principles of natural right that each saw as 
the foundation of political society.  We also should reexamine Locke’s discussion of 
prerogative and read him as a natural lawyer more than a liberal constitutionalist.  For 
the latter view, as many have adopted, focuses on the use of discretionary executive 
power in the absence of written prescriptive law.  However, when read as a natural 
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lawyer, Locke provides us with a more fundamental understanding of the primacy of 
self-preservation as the foundation of political society and that actions taken towards 
that end should be viewed as consistent with the natural foundations of political 
society.  Again, though Lincoln did not reference, or perhaps even read Locke, his 
actions to defend the Constitution were reflections of the expressed purpose of that 
document: self-preservation.  Only by creating a frame of government capable of 
attaining this latter primary objective could the Constitution secure the “blessings of 
liberty” for the current and future generations.  Locke’s natural law approach offers 
us much perspective not only on Lincoln, but also on constitutionalism and executive 
power more broadly.  
However, scholarly and popular opinion continue to promulgate the myth that 
Lincoln rescued the Constitution in spite of itself, primarily by breaking free of the 
shackles it places on executive power.  Sotirios Barber and James Fleming succinctly 
capture this reasoning when they write, “Lincoln violated the Constitution to save the 
Union and the Constitution.”181 Michael Nelson adds, “Lincoln departed from the 
Constitution in order to save it.”182  As a result of such thinking, Lincoln’s 
constitutional thought does, by default, become a “minor issue”183 since it is not to be 
repeated and offers no lessons to evaluate the actions of future Presidents.  Lincoln, 
hence, emerges to admirers as a unique leader, and, fortunately for the American 
political order, power during this great crisis fell in the hands of a man who in acting 
outside of the Constitution did not permanently transform the regime.  Former New 
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York Governor, and author of the popular book Why Lincoln Matters, Mario Cuomo 
captures this view when he writes regretfully, “I still wish the great Lincoln had stood 
by the Constitution despite the strong temptation no to.”  Cuomo presumptuously 
goes on to offer a speech that he believes Lincoln would have delivered to Congress 
in 2004 should he have been alive, expressing that “my [Lincoln’s] disputed actions 
in the past are a precedent that may be safely ignored today.  Either they will be 
considered wrong and should be ignored for that reason, or they will be considered 
right but for reasons that do not pertain in the current emergency [i.e., the post-9/11 
terrorist threat].”184  Cuomo’s Lincoln, therefore, offers us no lessons; or more 
accurately, the main lesson is: even if Lincoln was a great president, do not repeat 
after him for he did not act constitutionally.  This sentiment unfortunately not only 
fails to capture Lincoln’s own understanding of the Constitution but also neglects to 
gain perspective on the Constitution from one of its greatest interpreters and 
defenders.    
 
The Constitution and Lincoln 
Those who argue that Lincoln violated the Constitution, even if he did so 
nobly to save it, ignore Lincoln’s lifelong reverence for the Constitution as well as his 
articulation, as President, that the actions he took were not only consistent with, but 
also actually required by, the Constitution.  Beginning with the aforementioned 
speech that he gave as a young lawyer at the Springfield Lyceum in 1838, Lincoln 
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consistently showed reverence for the Constitution as well as the “iron men” who 
framed it.185  At Cooper Union in 1860, in a speech that secured him the Republican 
Party’s nomination for the Presidency, Lincoln outlined his understanding of the 
government framed by our “fathers” under which we should live.  In doing so, he 
showed his deep-rooted attachment to the Constitution by advocating “adherence to 
the old and tried, against the new and untried” and displayed his disinterest in and 
distrust of new modes and orders.  Therefore, when Lincoln took office on March 4, 
1861, he brought with him an entire political life dedicated to adherence to and 
reverence for the Constitution.  Even in the midst of the greatest calamity to face the 
United States, he would not buckle in his reverence for the Constitution, and in fact 
he found it as the reason for and source of legitimacy of all his actions.  The 
Constitution, at the highest level, empowered Lincoln to take the actions he did.  It 
would be more accurate to characterize Lincoln as saving the Constitution, the Union, 
and the natural right principles of the American political order, not by stepping 
outside or departing from the Constitution, but by adhering to its spirit and letter to 
prove that it provides all the means necessary to ensure its existence.186 
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Our primary question remains:  did Lincoln violate the Constitution?  To 
address that question, we must recognize that Lincoln’s construction of the executive 
war power hinges upon three core principles: 1) the symbiotic relationship between of 
the Union and Constitution and their role in protecting the natural right principles of 
the Declaration of Independence; 2) both the Union and the Constitution were 
designed explicitly to endure; and 3) the executive was duty-bound to ensure that they 
continued unimpaired.  By its very nature, secession represented the gravest threat to 
the Union and the Constitution.  Finally, and most importantly, the constitutional 
legitimacy of Lincoln’s actions depended upon the maintenance of the most basic 
republican institutions specifically elections and mechanisms of Congressional 
accountability. Not unexpectedly, the concepts found in this section—constitutional 
self-preservation and necessity; duty, energy and responsibility in the executive; and 
accountability to the people—parallel the discussion of the Founders’ Constitution in 
Chapter II. 
 
The Union and the Constitution in Perpetuity 
Lincoln’s understanding of the Constitution and Union was underscored by 
two key tenets: the Constitution created the frame of government for a Union of 
sovereign people politically organized as states dedicated to the principles of natural 
right as outlined in the Declaration of Independence; and that the Constitution and 
Union were expressly designed by the Founders to endure and serve as the most 
effective means of protecting and promulgating the natural right principles of the 





secession expressly violated the “universal law” of the social compact upon which the 
United States was founded, challenged the underlying principle that a proper 
government does not contain a provision for its own termination, and contradicted the 
“history of the Union itself.”187  For Lincoln, secession was the paramount 
unconstitutional act, and served as the primary basis of his construction of the 
executive power necessary to preserve the Union.  For if the Constitution legally 
permitted secession, Lincoln’s understanding of the deep-rooted connection between 
the Union and the Constitution would be null and any use of force to resist secession 
de facto would be unconstitutional. 188  Therefore, Lincoln is careful to articulate why 
secession is unconstitutional and he never recognizes Southern secession as anything 
but a treasonous act of insurrection and rebellion.  He also very carefully articulates 
the social compact foundations of the Union and the nature of the Constitution, 
stressing that it cannot be altered or undermined by one party electing to withdrawal. 
This underscores his grasp of the enduring nature of the Constitution as well as the 
powers it enables to ensure its survival.  
One of Lincoln’s most profound and philosophical writings on the foundations 
and causes of the Constitution comes in a fragment he penned in the winter of 1860-
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61.  Faced with the distinct possibility of secession and the destruction of the United 
States, Lincoln again worked out an understanding of the foundations of the 
American regime that would serve as the basis for his arguments on the 
unconstitutionality of secession.   Recognizing the relationship between the 
Declaration, the Union, and the Constitution – which is consistent with the Founding 
generation’s – Lincoln writes that the natural right principle of Declaration “was the 
word, ‘fitly spoken’ which has proved an ‘apple of gold’ to us.  The Union, and the 
Constitution, are the picture of silver, subsequently framed around it. The picture was 
made, not to conceal, or destroy the apple; but to adorn, and preserve it. The picture 
was made for the apple not the apple for the picture.”189   
Lincoln’s use of this Biblical metaphor (Proverbs 25:11) to describe the 
nature of the Union would become fundamental to his construction of the “war power 
of the government” and his duty to take all measures to ensure the survival of the 
Constitution.  He concludes, “So let us act, that neither picture, or apple shall ever be 
blurred, or bruised or broken.”  For Lincoln, any threat to break or bruise the 
Constitution posed a fundamental danger to the apple of natural liberty and thus, all 
actions taken to defend it were legitimate and necessary.  The Union was indissoluble 
and the Constitution inviolable for they were the silver frames protecting the golden 
apple of liberty.  He sought not to alter the frame or the apple, nor did he seek to 
bruise or violate the silver picture to preserve it.  He, in fact, wished to prevent any 
blurring, bruising, or breaking of the frame; he did not wish to see it violated even if 
such an act was carried out with the purpose of protecting it.   This fragment provides 
                                                





insight into his constitutional reasoning, showing that he did not believe that the 
Constitution or Union should be violated or broken, even if to preserve or protect the 
natural right foundations of the United States.  Taking his metaphor one step further, 
Lincoln refrains from juxtaposing security and because he views them as intertwined 
(i.e., “made for each other”), and that the former is necessary to preserving and 
promoting the liberty.   Free government and a free people depended upon the Union 
remaining intact and the Constitution unbreached.  
Building upon this philosophical foundation, Lincoln’s First Inaugural 
Address on March 4, 1861 makes the case for why secession is not constitutional, and 
why if permitted, it violates the expressed constitutional purpose of forming a “more 
perfect union.”  Though Lincoln’s constitutional reasoning in the First Inaugural 
provides the foundation for understanding his wartime words and deeds, it is 
imperative to recognize Lincoln was not foreshadowing the exercise of extraordinary 
executive power for it was an attempt to demonstrate his commitment to the 
Constitution and a desire to prevent the eruption of violence.   In other words, if we 
wish to understand Lincoln as he understood himself, we cannot read the First 
Inaugural through the bloodied lens of the Civil War that would occur after it; we 
must recognize what Lincoln was trying to say at that time.  However, the First 
Inaugural does provide insight into Lincoln’s constitutional and political thinking, 
thereby offering us a glimpse of the philosophical foundations of his words and deeds 
through the war.  The First Inaugural, most pertinently, shows Lincoln’s grounding 






I hold, that in contemplation of universal law, and of 
the Constitution, the Union of these States is perpetual. 
Perpetuity is implied, if not expressed, in the 
fundamental law of all national governments. It is safe 
to assert that no government proper, ever had a 
provision in its organic law for its own termination.190 
 
Lincoln echoes the principles upon which the Framers had created the constitutional 
order.  For they, as we discussed in Chapter II, abandoned the government under the 
Articles of Confederation since it lacked the requisite powers and structure to ensure 
a perpetual union.  The Constitution, furthermore, was ordained and established by 
“the people” and represented an explicit break with the league or alliance structure of 
the Articles to form a binding national union.  In contemplating universal law, 
Lincoln reflects the Framers’ thought, particularly that of Publius who argued from 
the universal principles and maxims of politics to show the importance of Union and 
why the Constitution must be understood to be self-perpetuating. Paralleling the 
reasoning of the Founders, Lincoln asks:   
 
Again, if the United States be not a government proper, 
but an association of States in the nature of contract 
merely, can it, as a contract, be peaceably unmade, by 
less than all the parties who made it? One party to a 
contract may violate it—break it, so to speak; but does 
it not require all to lawfully rescind it?191 
 
After briefly emphasizing the historical and natural roots of the Union, he 
answers his question: 
 
But if destruction of the Union, by one, or by a part 
only, of the States, be lawfully possible, the Union is 
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less perfect than before the Constitution, having lost the 
vital element of perpetuity.192 
 
To Lincoln, consistent with the Founders, the Union provides the best means of 
achieving the political liberty for which the American Revolution was fought.  The 
explicit purpose of the Constitution is to provide a frame of government that forms a 
more perfect union to secure that liberty in perpetuity.  Without the Constitution, the 
Union would be less perfect, and the Constitution would be hollow without the 
Union.  Secession, thus, threatened the very foundations of both.  Lincoln 
unequivocally states that secession is the “essence of anarchy,” actions to that effect 
are “legally void” and either “insurrectionary or revolutionary, depending on the 
circumstances.”  Though Lincoln recognizes the natural right of revolution (as 
embodied in the Declaration), he decidedly makes the case that southern secession 
represents an insurrectionary movement, one that threatens the very fabric of the 
Union and the Constitution thereby obliging him to take actions that would protect 
the nation from dissolution.  Thus, proving it as insurrection serves as the basis upon 
which he constructs the war power and executive’s special duty to exercise that 
power. 
Although Lincoln’s belief in the Union and Constitution has been criticized 
and characterized by some as mystical or, even worse, as lyrical mysticism cloaking 
sophistry,193 his uncompromising position on the natural connection between the 
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Union and Constitution, and that the act of secession represented the gravest of 
threats to them, are critical to the legitimacy of his construction of war and executive 
power.  For if we accept that his underlying philosophy of the naturalness of the 
Union and Constitution was mere sophistry, his Presidency would amount to nothing 
more than tyranny shrouded in misleading interpretations.  However, Lincoln’s 
emphasis on the Union and its natural relation to the Constitution rests on the solid 
ground of the Framers, directly adapted from the Constitution’s opening language of 
the expressed purpose of forming a “more perfect Union.”  Furthermore, for all the 
criticism of Lincoln’s Unionism being “religious mysticism,” it was no more so than 
that discussed by Publius in his opening Federalist essays, specifically that of 
Federalist 2 which refers to the natural union as a “design of Providence” that “should 
never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties.”  The 
people, Publius and Lincoln both argued, are uniquely and strongly tied by union and 
sought a federal government wisely constructed to ensure their liberty in perpetuity.  
Thus Lincoln, building upon Publius and other Framers, recognized that the United 
States was the embodiment of modern natural right, in which government was formed 
among an inseparable union of people to provide their basic security and enjoy their 
natural liberties.  Lincoln’s sole focus, in sum, was to preserve the Union and its 
Constitution that protected the natural right principles of the Declaration, and do so 
while adhering to and remaining within the boundaries of the Constitution.   
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The War Power of the Government and the President’s Responsibility to Execute It 
In his address to a special session of Congress on July 4, 1861, Lincoln’s used 
of the phrase “war power of the government” to explain the measures the Executive 
had taken in response to the Southern use of force at Fort Sumter.  His use of the term 
“war power of the government” reflects an interesting word choice since that term 
does not explicitly appear anywhere within the four corners of the Constitution. To 
recognize what Lincoln meant by the war power of the government, we must clear 
away all current definitions and discussions of this term.  The use of the term war 
power(s) over the past several decades unfortunately have become synonymous with 
the initiation of military hostilities, or the “war-making power” or “war declaring” 
power, and the debates between Congress and the Presidency over this issue.  This is 
a legacy of modern scholarship, particularly the imperial presidency thesis.  In fact, 
the War Powers Resolution of 1973 focuses only on the deployment of military forces 
abroad and constraints on the President’s entry into military hostilities.  It reflects 
nothing of Lincoln’s understanding of measures taken in defense of the nation, nor 
the constitutional basis of this term.  Despite James McPherson’s contention that 
Lincoln “invented the phrase” or Geoffrey Perret’s suggestion that the war power was 
“Lincoln’s creation,” the specific phrase had been used in the ante bellum most 
notably in a speech delivered by John Quincy Adams (which was reproduced and 
distributed by some radical republicans after Fort Sumter.)194  
                                                
194 See supra note McPherson, Tried By War, 24 and Geoffrey Perret, Lincoln’s War:  The 
Untold Story of American Greatest President as Commander in Chief (New York:  Random 
House, 2001), xv.  For more on Adams’s speech and its influence early in the Civil War see 





Lincoln, however, discerned its greatest meaning, expounding upon the 
thought of the Framers, who created a constitutional order containing all requisite 
powers for its own survival.  The time between Lincoln’s April 15 Proclamation 
calling forth the militia and his July 4 speech, in which he outlined the constitutional 
justification of those measures, represent the book-ends of an eleven week period 
during which Lincoln as Clinton Rossiter posits “was the Government.”195   More 
importantly, this reflects the critical time period in which he defined, acted upon, and 
articulated the constitutional meaning of the war power.  Examining Lincoln’s words 
and deeds during this period serve as the primary point of inquiry into his 
construction of the war power and the executive’s duty to implement it.  
Lincoln applied the term war power to the collection of measures necessary to 
“resist” destructive internal forces and ensure the restoration and long-term 
preservation of the political order.196  The war power, at its core, is organic to the 
Constitution and Lincoln’s articulation of the war power specifically reflects the 
“authority” referenced in Federalist 23, in which Publius states: “it must be admitted 
to be necessary consequence that there can be no limitation of that authority which is 
                                                                                                                                      
latter are derived from “internal municipal sources” while the latter from “the laws and 
usages of nations.”  Notably, Adams discussion of the war power emphasizes two key themes 
that the power is indeed extraordinary (and potentially dangerous) but that it is “vested by the 
Constitution of the United States.”  He states, “The power is tremendous; it is strictly 
constitutional, but it breaks down every barrier so anxiously erected for the protection of 
liberty, of property, and of life.”  See Speech by The Hon. John Q. Adams, The First Session, 
24th Congress, The Congressional Globe:  Sketches of the Debates and Proceedings, edited 
by Blair and Rivers, (City of Washington: Printed at the Globe Office For the Editors, 1836), 
Volume II-III, 447-451.  Adams speech on the war power, delivered before Congress in 1836, 
was widely referenced and distributed in the opening days of the Civil War particularly 
among abolitionist who saw it as a means for Lincoln to emancipate slaves at the initiation of 
hostilities.   
195 Rossiter, The Constitutional Dictatorship, 224. 






to provide for the defense and protection of the community in any matter to its 
efficacy--that is, in any matter essential to the formation, direction, or support of the 
NATIONAL FORCES.” These were not just military measures, but broader political, 
economic, and diplomatic efforts that the nation could legitimately undertake in its 
own defense.  For Lincoln, as with Publius, measures taken in defense of the 
Constitution and the Union could not, by definition, be understood as un- or 
extraconstitutional, since the overriding purpose of the Constitution is self-
preservation.  Therefore, the Constitution must be understood to contain all of the 
means necessary to ensure that end.    
Prior to the Southern attack on Fort Sumter on 12 April 1861, Lincoln’s 
speeches are marked by a hope, fleeting perhaps, that the secession crisis could be 
handled without resort to violence.  He was firm that secession was unconstitutional 
and an act of treason, and that as President, he was duty-bound to “run the machine as 
it is” with the Union intact.197  However, he did seek to assuage Southerners by 
stating unequivocally that he would not order an act of aggression or coercion against 
them.  His duty obliged him to ensure the laws were faithfully executed but nothing 
permitted him to do more.  Lincoln consistently placed the onus on the Southern 
states not to make peace, stating that he did not represent a threat, and that he only 
sought to uphold the Constitution and the laws, as his constitutional duty conferred 
upon him.   
                                                
197 A week prior to South Carolina’s formal declaration of secession from the Union, Lincoln 
directly addressed his opinion on secession in a letter to Thurlow Weed, “I believe you can 
pretend to find but little, if anything, in my speeches, about secession; but my opinion is that 
no state can, in any way lawfully, get out of the Union, without the consent of the others; and 
that it is the duty of the President, and other government functionaries to run the machine as it 





Once the Southern insurrectionists fired the first shot, Lincoln saw that a 
violent insurrection and rebellion that threatened the nature of the Union was 
underway, and he looked to the Constitution to guide his actions.  Fewer than 72 
hours after the first shots were fired, Lincoln issued a proclamation calling the militia 
into service and convening Congress.  The proclamation stands as his very first act as 
a wartime president and the act by which he “called out the war power of the 
government.” The militia requests were made in reaction to a threat emanating from 
seven secessionist states “by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the 
ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the Marshals by 
law.”198  The size, scope, and overall threat, in other words, made it impossible to 
arrest individuals for treasonous or threatening acts and prosecute them in the normal 
proceedings of the courts.  It required a national response on a much greater scale and 
Lincoln, as President of the United States, made this determination “in virtue of the 
power in me vested by the Constitution, and the laws.”  The President, after all, is 
obliged to ensure that the laws are “faithfully executed.” Lincoln’s April 15 
Proclamation provides the overarching purpose for his actions,  
 
I appeal to all loyal citizens to favor, facilitate and aid 
this effort to maintain the honor, integrity, and the 
existence of our National Union, and the perpetuity of 
popular government; and to redress wrongs already 
long enough endured.199  
  
From the outset, Lincoln framed the war as a people’s contest, and effort in national 
self-preservation and constitutional perpetuation.  Secession, and threats of it, had 
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gone on long enough, too long in fact, and all powers of government would be needed 
to crush it.   
In that same proclamation, Lincoln would convene Congress, a constitutional 
power of the President, asking them to meet in special session on July 4, 1861, nearly 
11 weeks after Fort Sumter.   That speech provides the most cogent and philosophical 
justification of the constitutionality of the war power that he “called out” in the days 
following Sumter.  The date for convening has obvious symbolic meaning, but 
practically it also took into account ongoing Congressional elections and travel time 
required to meet in Washington.200  By choosing July 4, Lincoln symbolically 
enforced his point that the Declaration of Independence (signed 85 years earlier) was 
an act of Union that preceded the Constitution of 1787 and the principles of which 
form the cornerstone of the natural rights foundation of the United States.  Invoking 
the Declaration in a speech about his extraordinary executive actions and in which he 
spoke of being forced to call out “the war power of the government” underscored the 
point that principles of natural right could not be preserved and protected without a 
government capable of defending itself.  Free government, in other words, could not 
continue unless the government was sufficiently powerful to ensure domestic 
tranquility and protect its citizens.   
 Equally important to understanding the war power is not what Lincoln says in 
the July 4th speech but how he says it.  Lincoln uses the third-person singular 
throughout this speech, which to my knowledge, is the only speech Lincoln delivered 
in this way.  In his Inaugural speech several months prior, Lincoln was very personal 
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as he took the oath of office, and provided his views on the Union, the Constitution, 
and slavery.   The July 4th speech, however, takes a very impersonal tone with 
Lincoln referring to himself as “the Executive” as he explains the actions undertaken 
since the firing on Fort Sumter.  The entire speech gives the sense that powers 
exercised and activities undertaken in defense of the Constitution are not choices but 
an obligation, the natural reaction of self-defense and that no one, unless acting 
against the natural course of matters could have behaved differently. Similar to man 
in the state of nature, the nation was forced to take actions to prevent itself from being 
devoured and destroyed.  Harry Jaffa captures the natural law reasoning underpinning 
Lincoln’s thought:  “And just as there is no assignable limit to what is permitted to 
individuals by the law of self-preservation in the state of nature, there can be no 
assignable limit to what a government may do on behalf of those to whose care that 
preservation has been entrusted.”201  The use of the third-person singular, moreover, 
conveys the sense of the officer “with the imperative duty” to execute his office, like 
any other person in his position would or at least should do.   It is not Abraham 
Lincoln acting on his own accord or by personal prerogatives but the person who has 
been elected by a free people and in whom they confided with such a sacred trust of 
executing the office of the Presidency to provide for their safety and preserve their 
natural liberty.  
Lincoln uses this occasion to frame and then answer the fundamental question 
presented to the “whole family of man” whether “a constitutional republic or 
democracy—a Government of the people, by the same people—can or cannot 
                                                





maintain its territorial integrity against its own domestic foes.”  He would simply 
pose the question as: "Is there, in all republics, this inherent and fatal weakness?  
Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or 
too weak to maintain its own existence?"  The answer centers around his declaration 
“no choice was left but to call out the war power of the Government; and so to resist 
force, employed for its destruction, by force, for its preservation.”  This phrase 
contains several key characteristics that merit elaboration.  Like the obligatory tone of 
his use of the third-person voice, he states there was “no choice” explicitly 
referencing the obligation that he, as an officer of the Constitution, has to prevent its 
demise.  No law-abiding, constitutional officer, from the President to a postal clerk, 
could lawfully ignore the Constitution’s explicit right to self-preservation. Acting 
otherwise, in fact, would have violated the Constitution. 
The purpose of the power employed is “to resist” destructive force with 
sufficient force to ensure “its preservation.”  This phrase shows what Lincoln clearly 
understood, but overlooked by others, that the war power had limits and that it was 
bound by the Constitution for which it is designed to protect.  It could not be 
employed to achieve ends not expressed by or even prevented by the Constitution.  
Only when those specific provisions harmed or undermined the nation’s ability to 
defend itself could the overarching principle of self-preservation override specific 
laws or constitutional provisions.    The most explicit example of this is the issue of 
slavery and emancipation.  Senator Charles Sumner and other radical Republicans, 





bounds and could therefore be used, inter alia, to squash slavery permanently. 202   
Lincoln, however, rejected such arguments based upon the limitations that the 
Constitution placed upon the exercise of power in its own defense.  Lincoln, in fact, 
rescinded the emancipation declaration of his subordinates early in the war since he 
felt slavery, at least initially, did not need to be destroyed as an institution for the 
Union and Constitution to be preserved.203  He did this despite his deep personal 
hatred of the institution of slavery;204 however, he recognized that the Constitution 
had protected it as an institution—restricted and put on a path to eventual 
extermination—but nonetheless unfortunately protected it.  Furthermore, Lincoln 
initially viewed emancipation as “purely political” and “not within the range of 
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constitutionally conferred powers.  He later wrote of his personal views in a public letter to 
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nothing is wrong. I can not remember when I did not so think, and feel. And yet I have never 
understood that the Presidency conferred upon me an unrestricted right to act officially upon 






military law, or necessity”205 and issuing a proclamation when it was not a military 
necessity would represent a permanent law-making function on the issue of property 
in states loyal to the Union.  This would amount to, as Lincoln describes, a 
“dictatorship” or the President, or generals, performing the “permanent legislative 
functions of the government.”  Only when emancipation became a military necessity 
that could help undermine the stubborn war effort of those secessionist states did 
Lincoln, as Commander in Chief, issue the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863. The 
war power is responsive to the demands of constitutional self-preservation, as dictated 
by the necessity of the threat to the Union, and not the personal views of the 
executive or his subordinates.  
 Lincoln acknowledges that his actions in response to Fort Sumter are 
extraordinary and therefore would require explanation.206  Speaking specifically to his 
executive orders suspending the writ of habeas corpus, Lincoln articulates the 
Constitution’s higher purpose and provides the overriding principle of constitutional 
interpretation.  Primarily, Lincoln argues that the necessity of preserving the 
Constitution—the whole of laws—could in times require ignoring or even violating a 
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specific law or require executive initiative to begin acting on laws not yet made by 
the legislature.  Lincoln’s plain reasoning echoes the legal axiom discussed in 
Federalist 40 that “the lesser should give way to the more important part.”  In times 
when adherence to specific law would actually violate the Constitution, the higher 
law triumphs.  Lincoln continues to peel the proverbial onion: 
 
To state the question more directly, are all the laws but 
one to go unexecuted and the Government itself go to 
pieces lest that one be violated? Even in such a case 
would not the official oath be broken if the Government 
should be overthrown, when it was believed that 
disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it?207   
 
Posing the question as such points to the absurdity of idly standing by and watching 
the Union crumble and the Constitution cease to function as a frame of government so 
long as one law, “made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty” not be 
violated “even to a limited extent.”  Upon reflection and choice, no reasonable 
individual could conclude that a specific law should be prioritized over the “whole of 
laws.”  This is a fundamental axiom of constitutional interpretation, one emphasized 
by the Founders and demonstrated by Lincoln.  He, however, proceeds to show that, 
in fact, there was no violation of the law since the constitutional provision on the writ 
of habeas contains language as to when it can be suspended.  The Constitution’s 
framers, therefore, recognized that in certain times, the writ may need to be suspend it 
as required by “public safety.”  The Constitution does not say that the sacred writ 
shall never be suspended but quite the contrary.  Lincoln drives home the point: 
 
                                                





It was not believed that any law was violated. The 
provision of the Constitution that ‘the privilege of the 
writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless 
when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety 
may require it,’ is equivalent to a provision -- is a 
provision -- that such privilege may be suspended when 
in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety does 
require it. It was decided that we have a case of 
rebellion, and that the public safety does require the 
qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ which 
was authorized to be made.208 
 
Was not secession the ultimate act of rebellion? Acknowledging the possibility of 
such contingencies, the Constitution’s Framers wisely provided a constitutional 
exception to the provision preventing the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus 
thereby not fettering future leaders from employing tools that though potentially 
dangerous could prove necessary to the nation’s survival.  Barring the suspension of 
the writ, in other words, was not an absolute constitutional guarantee but an 
acknowledgement that it is a dangerous measure that might necessarily be employed 
by future national governments to suppress rebellion or thwart invasion.209   
Therefore, Lincoln decided to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, an act well within 
the Constitution’s parameters, to combat the violent insurrection.  It is worth 
repeating a point made previously:  Simply because a measure (e.g., suspending the 
writ of habeas corpus) may pose a danger, it does not mean it is unconstitutional.  The 
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genius of the American Constitution is that it was made to endure, and therefore, does 
not shackle future leaders from actions that may be necessary in dangerous times.  
However, as we will discuss below, it also erects multiple institutions to ensure that 
the nation’s officers remain accountable to the people, by and for whom the 
Constitution is established and ordained.   
 Despite making the case that no such law was violated, Lincoln poignantly 
articulates the overriding principle of constitutional interpretation: specific laws, 
provisions, or actions must be viewed first and foremost through a lens of self-
preservation.  Lincoln outlines the relationship between the Union and Constitution 
and constitutional self-preservation as an overriding interpretative principle when he 
asks in a letter to Albert Hodges in 1864:  
 
Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve the 
constitution? By general law life and limb must be 
protected; yet often a limb must be amputated to save a 
life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt 
that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might 
become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the 
preservation of the constitution, through the 
preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed 
this ground, and now avow it. I could not feel that, to 
the best of my ability, I had even tried to preserve the 
constitution, if, to save slavery, or any minor matter, I 
should permit the wreck of government, country, and 
Constitution all together.210 
 
Though this passage has been cited as evidence to suggest Lincoln acted beyond or 
outside of the Constitution in order to save the nation—i.e. trading or violating the 
constitutional limb to save the nation’s life and to conduct measures beyond or 
outside of the Constitution—it actually provides a succinct outline of Lincoln’s 
                                                





principles of constitutional interpretation. Lincoln’s metaphor demonstrates the 
inextricable link between the Constitution and the nation.  Without the latter, the 
former would be meaningless.  However, the Constitution also provides the nation 
with its sense of purpose, and therefore, the nation would be incomplete or 
fundamentally altered should the Constitution be violated.  Notice also that Lincoln 
uses the word “constitution” twice, once capitalized, the other lower case.  From this, 
we can infer that Lincoln did have different conceptualizations of the “constitution”, 
one (the lower case) representing but a general code of laws common to all political 
organizations, the other (capital “C”) being those “principles, ideals, institutions, 
laws, and procedures tending toward the maintenance of republican liberty by which 
the American people agreed to order their political existence.”211  Put differently, the 
former (lower case constitution) represents positive law, whereas the Constitution is 
the manifestation of those higher, more normative purposes upon which the American 
people founded their nation.  
Amputating as massive a limb as the Constitution would result in a severely 
weakened and handicapped nation, one with neither a frame of government nor a 
political purpose.  In the latter part of the passage, Lincoln explains why times of 
emergency permit the exercise of particular measures that would be considered 
unconstitutional in peaceful times.  The most apt example is the suspension of the 
writ of habeas corpus, which the Constitution permits but only in times of rebellion or 
invasion.  That is, the needs of national security determine whether the writ of habeas 
corpus can be justifiably suspended.  If the government suspended the writ when 
                                                





there no legitimate and generally recognizable threat to the nation’s security existed, 
it would be an unconstitutional act.  However, when a legitimate threat is recognized, 
a measure such as the suspension of the writ can be taken, if it will help defeat the 
threat and ensure the preservation of the nation.  The latter would be fully consistent 
with the Constitution.   
Lincoln, furthermore, shows the primacy of national self-preservation as a 
principle for determining the constitutionality of particular measures.  When 
constitutional provisions conflict, priority is given to that one which best meets, or 
does the least damage to, the expressed purpose of the Constitution.  This is 
particularly applicable in times of national danger, as specific provision must give 
way the broader purpose of securing the nation.  Again, as Federalist 40 indicates, a 
part is always given to the whole but the whole never given in favor of a part.  
Michael Stokes Paulsen summarizes, 
 
Lincoln did not believe that circumstances might justify 
violating the Constitution; he believed that the 
Constitution itself supplied a meta-interpretive principle 
of necessity, justifying – constitutionally justifying – 
subordination, temporarily, of specific provisions.212 
 
 In addition to discussing the necessity of the war power to defend the nation, 
Lincoln also articulated why the President had the Constitutional duty to “call out” 
that power to ensure the faithful execution of the laws and to preserve, protect, and 
defend the Constitution.  This is the second principle of constitutional interpretation 
and for understanding the war power:  The President has a special duty to preserve, 
protect, and defend the Constitution, and therefore, all measure taken towards those 
                                                





ends are to be considered constitutional.  Before discussing specific cases of 
Lincoln’s exercise of power in support of his presidential duty, it is worth reflecting 
upon the source upon which he based his understanding:  Article II’s Presidential 
Oath and its specific provision that the President “take care that the Laws are 
faithfully executed.”  Lincoln understood that the Presidential Oath placed upon him 
a special duty; it was deeply personal and arguably the most solemn obligations—an 
“Oath registered in heaven.”  He believed that he would be judged not only by the 
people but also by God as to whether he did all he could to meet the obligations of 
that oath.  Writing on the seriousness of the oath to Lincoln, Allen Guelzo remarks 
“And anyone who imagined that Lincoln took the oath of office as a mere rhetorical 
formality would soon discover how painfully dear the idea of honor—of fidelity to 
promises above all things—was to him.”213 The oath, however, did not grant the 
President power nor did Lincoln think it did; rather, it stated the overarching purpose 
to which the President’s exercise of power should aim.   
For Lincoln, the central issue, despite the enormous consequences, was rather 
simple:  the President either exercised his powers to achieve his constitutional 
obligations or he did not thereby conducting as unconstitutional and treasonous act as 
secessionists and insurrectionists.  Lincoln ties the necessity of defending the nation 
as the President’s principal duty throughout the July 4th speech to a Special Session 
of Congress, but he drives home the point:  
It was with the deepest regret that the Executive found 
the duty of employing the war power, in defense of the 
                                                





Government, forced upon him. He could but perform 
this duty or surrender the existence of the Government.  
This was his second reference to the “war power”, the first referring generally to the 
nation’s power to resist its destruction with force.  The second use of the term, 
however, links that power with the duty of the executive. Lincoln regretted this move 
since he preferred for the southern secessionists to settle their disputes peaceably.  
However, his hands were tied and the Constitution obliged him to defend the nation 
lest it collapse. It was the executive’s duty to employ the war power to achieve the 
explicit purpose of defending the government from collapse.  Again, Lincoln presents 
the situation in a very matter-of-fact manner, showing that as President he could 
either perform his constitutionally assigned duty to “preserve, protect, and defend the 
Constitution” or simply watch the United States cease to exist.  The latter was not an 
option for he had “no moral right to shrink” from this crisis, and had he done so, it 
would be as unconstitutional as the act of secession itself.  As Lincoln cogently states, 
not resisting secession and break of the Union would represent a  “betrayal of so vast 
and so sacred a trust as these free people had confided to him.”214 The President was 
sworn to carry out his duty to the best of his ability, and that meant using all means at 
his disposal to ensure the political order survived.  In short, the President was 
responsible for energetically applying all means at his disposal to ensure the safety 
and security of the nation.  
Returning briefly to Lincoln’s decision to suspend the writ of habeas corpus 
provides additional insight into how Lincoln constructed the executive 
responsibilities and power.  Though he would ultimately conclude that his orders to 
                                                





suspend the writ of habeas corpus (as discussed above) were lawful, Lincoln’s 
discussion of that issue in his July 4th speech emphasizes the duty of the President to 
the Constitution.  In response to criticism that he should not have suspended the writ 
of habeas corpus, Lincoln again emphasizes that as President he would be acting 
unconstitutionally—by violating his constitutionally prescribed oath to “preserve, 
protect, and defend the Constitution”—had he not employed measures he thought 
necessary to put down the rebellion.  He rhetorically asks, “Even in such a case would 
not the official oath be broken if the Government should be overthrown, when it was 
believed that disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it?”  Furthermore, in 
explaining that the executive does have the constitutional authority to suspend the 
writ, Lincoln states that the Constitution is “silent” as to which branch can suspend it 
only saying that it cannot be suspended unless in a case of rebellion or the public 
safety requires.  The Constitution does not say the President can suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus but also does not forbid the executive from doing so either.  The 
President, constitutionally vested with the powers of the Commander in Chief and 
with the overarching duty to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution, has the 
authority and duty to determine those constitutional measures necessary to the war 
effort.  
In this regard, Lincoln shows that the President, as an independent and equal 
branch of government, has both the authority and the duty to interpret the 
Constitution and adjudicate conflict or ambiguous provisions depending upon the 
circumstances at hand, particularly in matters of national security.  In essence, 





understand the fundamental principles of the political order, act upon them given the 
circumstances confronted, and explain them to those who have entrusted in him the 
authority to rule.  This concept is rooted in Aristotle’s notion of phronesis, that is 
prudence or practical judgment, determining what actions will achieve a desired end 
by applying broader knowledge of universals to particular circumstances.215  
Statesmanship requires such practical judgment, or the ability to understand broader, 
fundamental principles and how they apply (or not) in particular circumstances to 
achieve the ends of the political regime.   
Lincoln, more specifically, stresses that the Presidency has an independent 
and equal (but not necessarily superior) voice on the meaning of the Constitution and 
“to say what the law is.”  This counters the notion of judicial supremacy, the school 
of thought that argues that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of constitutional 
interpretation.  Lincoln shows, however, that the democratically elected executive, 
whose conduct is held accountable through formal constitutional mechanism such as 
periodic elections and the possibility of impeachment, also has the interpretive 
powers particularly on matters pertaining to the preservation and protection of the 
political order.  After all, the President’s interpretation of his authorities and exercise 
of his powers must be sound otherwise he faces the possibility of impeachment or the 
people may not reelect him.  Thus through executive interpretation, the people 
ultimately have a voice in constitutional questions of such magnitude such as self-
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preservation and national defense, a voice that does not resonate as much with an 
“eminent tribunal” of unelected judges appointed for life.216  
 Less than three weeks after his first war power measure of calling up the 
Militia, Lincoln found the security situation even more dire and determined it 
necessary to further expand the size of the armed forces in his May 3 Proclamation.  
He explains the immediate gravity of the situation:      
Whereas existing exigencies demand immediate and 
adequate measures for the protection of the National 
Constitution and the preservation of the National Union 
by the suppression of the insurrectionary combinations 
now existing in several States for opposing the laws of 
the Union and obstructing the execution thereof, to 
which end a military force in addition to that called 
forth by my proclamation of the fifteenth day of April 
in the present year, appears to be indispensably 
necessary.217 
 
Whereas the April 15 Proclamation was undoubtedly within the President’s purview 
due to the 1795 Militia Act, his decision to call forth additional volunteers for 
military service appeared, at least on the surface, to cross into Congress’s 
constitutional authority to “raise and support” an army and a navy.  Lincoln clearly 
recognized the potential controversy, and showed its constitutional basis in his July 
4th speech:  
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Other calls were made for volunteers to serve for three 
years, unless sooner discharged, and also for large 
additions to the Regular Army and Navy. These 
measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured 
upon under what appeared to be a popular demand and 
a public necessity, trusting then, as now, that Congress 
would readily ratify them. It is believed that nothing has 
been done beyond the constitutional competency of 
Congress. 
 
Scholars have focused on Lincoln’s phrase “whether strictly legal or not” as proof 
that Lincoln exceeded his constitutional boundaries.  Louis Fisher, for instance, 
concludes, “In ordering those actions, Lincoln never claimed to be acting legally or 
constitutionally and never argued that Article II somehow allowed him to do what he 
did.”218  However, Fisher’s claims are much too broad and he misses the Lincoln’s 
fundamental point that the President’s constitutional duty required him to take such 
measures.  Returning briefly to Lincoln’s understanding of his duty:  either he obeyed 
the Constitution by taking measures to take adequate measures to resist the 
dissolution of the nation or he violated his constitutional duty and allowed it to 
collapse.  Moreover, Lincoln may have questioned the strict legality of his action but 
never suggests that it was unconstitutional.  In fact, expanding the size of the armed 
forces was well within constitutional “competency” of Congress, however they were 
not in session to take such measures and had not yet provided any laws on the books 
to enable it. Lincoln was not splitting constitutional hairs, rather he was initiating a 
measure to expand the size of the armed forces in response to “popular demand and 
public necessity” to defend the nation a constitutional obligation of the President’s.  
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He never claimed that expanding the size of the armed forces was a routine executive 
function; rather his justification was grounded in the overriding principle that the 
President has a special (but not exclusive) responsibility to defend the Constitution 
from disintegration.   
 The executive, accordingly, is to act with energy in executing its duties and 
responsibilities, and that could include initiating measures of expediency in times of 
need.  Nonetheless, Lincoln also recognized that he could no “go it alone” and that 
Congress too has constitutional responsibilities.  In the Proclamation itself as well as 
in his July 4 speech, Lincoln recognized Congress’s role in this matter, and asked 
them approve his measure.219  They had a choice at that juncture either decided 
against Lincoln’s call for additional volunteers, or if they disagreed with his 
justification of his actions, to deny funding to the expanded armed forces.  Even more 
drastic, Congress could have deemed his actions to be illegal or unconstitutional and 
begun impeachment proceedings against the President for a high crime of abuse of 
power.  Instead, they approved the measure, at least tacitly acknowledging Lincoln’s 
constitutional principle that defending the nation would at time require the executive 
to initiate measures when existing laws did not explicitly prescribe what was to be 
done.  
 Had the July 4th speech been Lincoln’s last word on this matter, the arguments 
of Louis Fisher and others might be on more solid ground.  However, Lincoln would 
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reference the weeks after Fort Sumter on several future occasions, explaining his 
constitutional reasoning and his construction of the executive war power.   Nearly a 
year later, Lincoln reiterated the reasoning behind his actions just after Fort Sumter: 
 
There was no adequate and effective organization for 
the public defense. Congress had indefinitely 
adjourned. There was no time to convene them. It 
became necessary for me to choose whether, using only 
the existing means, agencies, and processes which 
Congress had provided, I should let the government fall 
at once into ruin or whether, availing myself of the 
broader powers conferred by the Constitution in cases 
of insurrection, I would make an effort to save it, with 
all its blessings, for the present age and for posterity.220 
 
Lincoln is relying upon very straightforward reasoning to explain the 
constitutionalism of his actions.  Again, he presents the stark choice of either 
inadequately addressing the insurrection and letting the nation break apart or he could 
employ broader constitutional powers for its own defense.  Following the former 
course of action would have violated his constitutional duty; the latter was legitimate, 
consistent within the constitutional framework.  Lincoln’s Secretary of War would 
similarly issued an executive order that offered additional insight into the President’s 
responsibility: 
 
In this emergency the President felt it his duty to 
employ with energy the extraordinary powers which the 
Constitution confides to him in cases of insurrection. 
He called into the field such military and naval forces, 
unauthorized by the existing laws, as seemed necessary. 
221 
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The use of the words energy and duty related to extraordinary executive powers 
reflects Publius’s explanation of the U.S. Constitution, in which he put forth the 
proposition that “Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of 
good government” (Federalist 70).  The Civil War would test that hypothesis, and 
Lincoln would validate it by explaining how the Constitution conferred upon the 
President the special responsibility to “preserve, protect, and defend the 
Constitution.”  Lincoln effectively demonstrated that the Executive had no choice in 
times of emergency but to exercise the full scope of the Constitution’s power 
vigorously and energetically to ensure the nation’s survival.  All measures taken to 
that end were not only consistent with the Constitution but also required by it and 
acting otherwise would have been an unconstitutional act. 
 
Accountable to his Rightful Master 
 Arguably one most significant yet overlooked aspects of Lincoln’s 
construction of the war power and executive duty to exercise it was his constant effort 
to inform the Congress and the public of the reasoning behind his actions.  Lincoln 
did not view his power as “without limit” or as “anything goes” and he certainly did 
not see it as never to be questioned like the Lockean prerogative.  Lincoln’s views, in 
fact, were quite the opposite.  Though Lincoln understood the Founders’ Constitution 
permitted the exercise of extraordinary power to ensure the survival of the political 
order and that it placed upon the President a special duty to exercise that power, he 
consistently acknowledged that he ultimately would be held accountable to the people 





Though it is common to examine the constitutionality of particular actions that 
Lincoln undertook, ironically it is what Lincoln did not do that emerges as equally 
important element of his constitutionalism.  Lincoln never tried to prevent scrutiny or 
accountability of his actions or to stop legitimate institutions from holding him 
accountable.  For example, he never prevented Congress from assembling; on the 
contrary, he called it into session to review his actions and asked for its support.  He 
was not looking for a legislative fig leaf to cover his unconstitutional actions nor was 
he bowing to Congressional superiority; he acknowledged Congress as an equal and 
independent branch of the United States government. After explaining his exercise of 
the war power in the immediate aftermath of Fort Sumter, Lincoln stated that he had 
performed what he saw as his duty but also recognized Congress, as the people’s 
representatives, also had a duty.  He states, “In full view of his great responsibility he 
has, so far, done what he has deemed his duty. You will now, according to your own 
judgment, perform yours.”  
Lincoln, furthermore, did not stifle Congressional inquiries into the conduct of 
the war, even if he considered it to be a distraction and a nuisance.  On December 10, 
1861 Congress established a Joint Select Committee on the Conduct of the War 
(CCW) to investigate matters related to the war.  The CCW was formed principally 
response to the unhappiness of Congress with early military failures and a perceived 
initial weakness and incompetence on the part of the Lincoln Administration.222  
Throughout the war, the CCW would exercise broad authorities and conduct wide-
ranging investigations in Lincoln’s conduct of the war.  As historian Bruce Tap 
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suggests, “the committee investigated military disasters and subjected defeated 
generals to rigorous examinations, prompting some observers to draw a comparison 
with the famous Committee on Public Safety of the French Revolution.”  Overall, the 
CCW was deeply involved in the war, constantly scrutinizing the decisions of Lincoln 
and of his civilian and military subordinates.  Carl Sandburg captures the mixed 
reviews of the CCW, when he suggests it “helped Lincoln, and more often interfered 
with him, for a long time.”223  Yet Lincoln never stopped the CCW from assembling, 
and even cooperated with them, providing them information and allowing them to 
hold hearings with members of his cabinet and military officers.  This provides but 
one more example of how those who declare Lincoln a tyrant, despot, and dictator 
simply fail to account for Lincoln’s words and deeds.  What tyrant or despot would 
permit a legislature to scrutinize and even harangue his actions?  Moreover, what 
dictator—constitutional or otherwise—would permit such legislative activity?  The 
very purpose of the dictatorship, at least in its original republican form in the Roman 
Republic, was to avoid legislative interference in the executive’s conduct of the war.  
Lincoln, however, never threatened to halt Congress’s legitimate wartime 
responsibilities. 
A key tenet of Lincoln’s constitutional thought and his construction of 
executive power, moreover, revolves around the Constitution as a reflection of the 
will of the people and that he, as the executive officer, was ultimately accountable to 
them.  He acknowledged his subordination to the people in his First Inaugural: 
 
                                                





Doing this I deem to be only a simple duty on my part, 
and I shall perform it so far as practicable, unless my 
rightful master, the American people, shall withhold the 
requisite means, or, in some authoritative manner, 
direct the contrary. 
 
He consistently held throughout the Civil War that he was executing a duty confided 
in him by the Constitution, and that the people were to judge whether he had 
appropriately carried out that duty.  The American people had multiple means of 
holding Lincoln accountable, including through their Congressional representatives.  
Not surprisingly, democratic elections represent the most important institution of 
constitutional accountability, and Lincoln emphasized the necessity of their conduct.  
Though in the run up to the 1864 election he warned that "it was not best to swap 
horses when crossing streams,"224 he insisted that the elections were a necessity and 
would occur even if he were sure to lose.  On the eve of the 1864 election, when 
facing the distinct possibility that the people would not reelect him and thereby freely 
choose to allow the southern states to secede and the Union collapse, Lincoln 
eloquently captured the popular foundations of American constitutionalism when he 
declared: 
 
Their will, constitutionally expressed, is the ultimate 
law for all.  If they should deliberately resolve to have 
immediate peace even at the loss of their country, and 
their liberty, I know not the power or the right to resist 
them.  It is their own business, and they must do as they 
please with their own.  I believe, however, they are still 
resolved to preserve their country and their liberty; and 
in this, in office or out of it, I am resolved to stand by 
them.225 
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A tyrant or despot would not willingly let the people take his power from his hands, 
and certainly would not insist upon holding an election that could have resulted in 
undermining his rule. Speaking on the extraordinary nature of the elections during the 
Civil War, Clinton Rossiter posits, “the congressional elections of 1862 and 1864 and 
the presidential election of 1864 were probably the first general elections ever held in 
a nation at war since manhood suffrage was adopted.”226 Furthermore, Herman Belz 
notes, “in facing the Democratic challenge in 1864, Lincoln accepted the risk and 
permitted his power to be threatened in a way that no dictator, constitutional or 
otherwise, would have tolerated.”227  That the election occurred testifies to Lincoln’s 
constitutional roots, and the legitimacy of his executive actions.  
Elections must be understood as an integral component the war power, for 
they are the primary mechanism by which the exercise of executive power is held 
accountable and judged.  Shortly after being reelected, Lincoln revisited the question 
he originally posed in his July 4, 1861 speech:  “It has long been a grave question 
whether any government, not too strong for the liberties of its people, can be strong 
enough to maintain its own existence, in great emergencies.”228  A free and fair 
Presidential election, even in the “severe test” of a great civil war, definitively 
answered that government could adequately maintain the liberties of its people while 
having the strength to ensure its survival. The conduct of elections, Lincoln declared, 
was a “necessity” and any hindrance or delay in the constitutional institution by 
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which the sovereign people expressed their will and judged their elected leaders 
would have fundamentally undermined the constitutional republic.  That Lincoln 
chose to use “necessity”—the same word that he used to justify the Executive calling 
out the war power—to the holding of elections, demonstrates his understanding that 
constitutional republics could generate extraordinary power to defend themselves 
while still remaining republican.  Necessity for Lincoln meant that there were no 
alternatives to holding a democratic election—it was a constitutional obligation.  
Lincoln poignantly draws out the implications of not having an election when he 
states:  “We can not have free government without elections; and if the rebellion 
could force us to forego, or postpone a national election, it might fairly claim to have 
already conquered and ruined us.”  
The conduct of scheduled elections in the midst of a grave emergency – 
“occurring in regular course during the rebellion”—underpinned the constitutionalism 
of Lincoln’s construction of the executive war power.  The Constitution, after all, 
reflects the higher purpose of a people coming together under a common frame of 
government to strengthen their security and maintain their liberties.  Through the 
election of the President, the people confided in an individual the great responsibility 
to “preserve, protect, and defend” their Constitution through the execution of that 
office.  Whether the President fulfilled that solemn duty, and did so constitutionally, 
was left to the people to decide. Lincoln’s extraordinary actions remained within the 
bounds of the Constitution so long as he maintained the basic institutions of 
constitutional expression.  Like all Presidents, he continuously had to account for his 





promise not to construe the Constitution by any “hypercritical rules” for he 
recognized that events surrounding secession and insurrection would create 
controversy, and that his constitutional reasoning must resonate with the people writ 
large.  After all, the Constitution is for the people, and by the people. 
People freely choosing their representative is the very definition of republican 
government. Though it is common today to take elections for granted to the point of 
almost dismissing them, the significance of holding an election in the midst of such a 
violent and bloody civil war with the country teetering on collapse, the President 
wielding extraordinary power, and a large armed force deployed throughout the 
country, cannot be understated. The 1864 Presidential election proves a remarkable 
event and arguably represents the “high water mark” of republican war power, 
demonstrating that that free government can generate the power necessary for its 
defense and survival without transforming into autocratic rule.  Those who 
characterize Lincoln as a tyrant, despot, or dictator fail to grasp the importance of a 
wartime election.  His rule was not absolute and his conduct not spared scrutiny.  
Rather, the election permitted the people to assess the legitimacy of their leaders’ 
action, and, determine whether the President upheld his duty and the Constitution he 
was sworn to “preserve, protect, and defend.” 
Conclusion:  Lincoln as a Constitutional Guide 
 Though Lincoln understandably occupies an important place in American 
history, his contribution to political and constitutional thought has not been given its 





outside of the Constitution’s boundaries. As this chapter has shown, Lincoln’s 
construction of the “war power” provides significant constitutional lessons regarding 
the nature and purpose of the Constitution, interpretive principles for exercise of 
power, and the proper role and responsibilities of the executive.  However, 
constitutional scholars tend not to look to Lincoln as a way to interpret and 
understand constitutional matters today.  Rather they seem to prefer the case study 
method, using judicial opinions as the basis for determining the constitutional and 
legal framework of Presidential decisions.  However, this is done at the expense at 
using executive writings as constitutional commentary; Lincoln, thus, has been 
neglected as a result of this bias to judicial opinion.  Michael Stokes Paulsen captures 
this problem when he writes:   
 
Given the centrality of Lincoln and the Civil War to the 
constitutional order we have today, it is little short of 
incredible how little attention modern scholarship pays 
to the Civil War as an event of constitutional 
interpretation or to Lincoln as a Constitutional 
interpreter.  In part, the neglect is a byproduct of the 
Langdellian “case” method of teaching and study, with 
its reliance on written judicial opinion producing the 
occupational habit (and hazard) of thinking of the law 
solely in terms of such opinions.  But this cannot be a 
sufficient explanation.  The constitutional issues framed 
by the Civil War provide excellent case studies 
appropriate to the case method, and Lincoln produced 
great legal texts worth of study alongside the most 
classic of judicial opinions.229 
 
As this chapter has stressed, Lincoln’s explanation of the connection between the 
Union and Constitution, and his emphasis on the overriding interpretative principle of 
                                                





constitutional self-preservation should serve as an important component of the basis 
for understand the Constitution in times of war.  After all, Lincoln lived in a time of 
war, when the nation’s survival was at stake affording him the experience of such 
circumstances to apply his broader knowledge of the principles of the American 
constitutional order.  Put differently, Lincoln’s constitutionalism was forged in the 
cauldron of a great Civil War, and he proved that the Founder did create a “more 
perfect union” capable of securing the “blessings of liberty” for posterity.  Though 
prudence or phronesis cannot, by definition, be scripted, Lincoln offers us a basis for 
what can be achieved and what we should expect from America’s leadership in times 
of crisis.  Too often, we rely on commentary and analysis produced in times of safety 
and peace when the experience of war is but a distant past.  
Writing in the midst of the Civil War, Sidney George Fisher eloquently 
captured this thought:  
Books, laws, facts, even words and phrases, sometimes 
assume a new aspect, when seen through the medium of 
feelings produced by important events and a novel 
situation.   Like many others, I had been content to sit at 
the feet of the learned doctors of our law, and accept 
their interpretation as correct.  But the war has shed 
new light on the principles and meaning of our 
Constitution, and revealed in it imperfections, perhaps 
also powers, scarcely perceived by its makers, and 
hidden from the superficial and unsuspecting glances of 
the people, during our long period of prosperity and 
peace.230 
 
Projecting times of peace and tranquility onto the constitutional construction formed 
in times of great danger, when the circumstances may require a different application 
                                                





of the Constitution.  Yet the Founders’ genius was not to prescribe specific written 
laws or rules of conduct for future leaders for every possible situation but to provide a 
framework of government that would enable a statesman at the helm to adapt to the 
circumstances at hand.  Lincoln was such a leader, and his ability to apply and 
articulate the broader meaning and purpose of the Founders Constitution to the 
particulars of America’s most trying and calamitous event make him a statesman 
whose writings and speeches should be given priority by any serious student of 






Chapter V: The Once and Future Presidency  
Upon completion of the final deliberations of the Constitutional Convention of 
1787, a Mrs. Powel of Philadelphia approached delegate Dr. Benjamin Franklin to 
ask, “Well, Doctor, what have we got—a Republic or a Monarchy?”  Franklin 
famously responded, “A Republic, if you can keep it.”231  Mrs. Powel and Franklin’s 
simple exchange underscores the perennial question that political founders must 
address:  who rules?  The exchange also smacks of irony for, as this dissertation has 
argued, what the Americans “got” and how they have “kept” it centers around the 
Framers contrivance of “a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a 
republican, together with the external force of a monarchical government” (Federalist 
9).232  That is, the Office of the President represents an innovation in government, 
with which the Framers ably reconciled a strong and energetic executive—necessary 
to ensure the nation’s defense—with the principles of republican government, 
primarily a free people retaining sovereignty.  
With this dissertation, I have tried to reconnect the Presidency with the 
Constitution by exploring the constitutional basis and republican nature of the 
exercise of executive power in times of war and crisis.  In doing so, I offer an 
alternative perspective to the dominant trends in scholarship, which view it as a 
modern invention of the 20th century unrecognizable to those who created it.  It is 
often characterized as imperial, usurping the rightful powers of Congress, particularly 
those related to war and national defense.  In addition, presidency scholars, following 
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in the footsteps of Richard Neustadt, are often more concerned with the particular 
actions or behavior of the individuals who occupy the office rather than with the 
constitutional foundations of the office itself.  As a result, the study of the Presidency 
has become detached from the Constitution, and we are often left trying to discern a 
standard of judgment for understanding it and its exercise of power, particularly in 
trying times such as war when the nation relies most upon it.   
 Furthermore, a strong undertone from Edward Corwin’s famous claim that the 
Constitution invites a “struggle” between the President and Congress over their 
respective roles in foreign relations reverberates in the scholarly literature on 
presidential power.233  Scholars treat the President’s powers over war and the nation’s 
defense as just another dispute with Congress over interaction with foreign countries, 
and they have focused most of their attention to the debate over the initiation of 
military hostilities.  This narrow focus on the Presidency-Congress debate over the 
meaning of the “declaration of war” clause has unfortunately come at the expense of a 
broader, more profound understanding of the Constitution and the role it particularly 
assigns the President for preservation, protection, and defense of the constitutional 
order against enemies internal and external.  Among scholars, the term “war power” 
has become narrowly construed and synonymous with the initiation of military 
hostilities, as opposed to a recognition of those measures broadly defined that the 
government can constitutionally employ in its own defense.  The scholarly debate, in 
many ways, has missed the proverbial forest for the trees, focused on settling specific 
debates between the branches of the government without exploring constitutional first 
                                                





principles. As such, it has obscured a more profound understanding of the nature of 
executive power within the constitutional order. 
A Matter of Interpretation  
In attempting to recover the constitutional foundations of the Presidency, I 
sought to address the specific question:  What is the constitutional role of the 
Presidency in times of war and danger?  However simple that question may appear to 
be, it requires returning to first principles and asking: what are the ends of the 
Constitution and to what higher, normative purpose(s) does it aim?  After addressing 
this fundamental question, we then must ask:  What role does the Presidency serve in 
achieving the Constitution’s overarching purpose?  Moreover, what constitutional 
means does the Presidency possess to achieve the Constitution’s ends?  Addressing 
these basic questions permits a view of the Presidency from the Founding, a view that 
remains constant no matter who occupies the Office or the challenges the nation 
faces. 
To answer these essential questions, I first examined the text of the 
Constitution, and relied upon The Federalist to help interpret and explain its 
meaning—the primary purpose for which those essays were written during the 
Constitution’s ratification.  I then examined the constitutional thought of Presidents 
Washington and Lincoln as each made decisions, took actions, and exercised the 
executive power in defense of the political order.  In each case, the dissertation found 
a consistent interpretation of the Constitution, its purpose and meaning, and more 





purpose of the Constitution is to furnish an overarching frame of government to 
provide for the safety of its citizens so that they may enjoy their natural liberties, as 
articulated in the Declaration of Independence.  Lincoln best captures the relationship 
between the Constitution and the Declaration in his Fragment on the Constitution, 
writing that the Declaration is like an “apple of gold” within by a “picture of silver,” 
meaning that the latter serves to protect the principles of the former. That the need for 
security and safety formed the bedrock around which the rest of Constitution is 
framed is evident when Publius writes, “Among the many objects to which a wise and 
free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety 
seems to be the first” (Federalist 3).  Other objectives may be more noble or more 
desirable, but they will be impossible to attain if the political order is unable to 
provide for basic security.   A free and wise people, in constructing a political order, 
must first turn their attention to how best to effectively satisfy their essential security 
needs while they aim to set higher, more noble goals.  
Grounded in modern natural law reasoning, this essential understanding of the 
Constitution shows that it must be read through a lens of self-preservation, implying 
that the long-term safety of the political order serves as the principal objective to 
which all measures must first aim and be understood.  The Constitution, designed 
explicitly to endure and serve future generations, contains all the necessary means for 
its survival.  Any and all measures taken in defense of the political order thereby 
should be considered legitimate and sanctioned by the Constitution itself.  This 
understanding does not, as many commentators do, juxtapose security with liberty, 





order, fully equipped to defend itself against internal and external threats, provides 
the best means for individuals to attain their natural liberties. That the threats to the 
political order are unforeseen and their scale cannot be measured in advanced, the 
Constitution’s power to defend itself must exist ad infinitum. Publius also informs us 
that the Constitution rests upon those “simple” but “universal” axioms that the 
“means ought to be proportionate to the ends” and that any agency assigned a specific 
role or responsibility ought to be understood to have all the requisite powers 
necessary to carry it out effectively. 
 What role does the Constitution assign the Office of the Presidency in this 
primary objective of providing for the safety of the political order?  And how ought 
we to understand its exercise of power in service to that role?  After arguing that the 
Constitution must be viewed through a perspective of self-preservation, this 
dissertation then suggested a second interpretative principle:  That the Constitution 
assigns to the Office of the President the primary responsibility for preserving and 
protecting the Constitution, and thus the safety of the nation.  It also vests the 
President with the executive power, or the means necessary to execute the purpose of 
the laws and the Constitution.  Measures that the President takes to achieve these ends 
ought to be understood as legitimate and Constitutional.  The Constitution requires 
the President to take a special oath to “preserve, protect, and defend” the Constitution 
before the execution of the office.  This oath is unique to the President, and provides 
the end toward which the President’s executive powers are to be exercised.  
 When taken together, these interpretive principles are dangerous and radical 





for the safety of the nation, and that the President is the institution primarily (but not 
exclusively) responsible for determining the extent and scope of the exercise of this 
power.  With this dissertation, I challenge the notion that the purpose of the 
Constitution is to delineate and limit government power; instead I argue that those 
powers exist without limit and that the Constitution expresses the purpose and ends 
for which that power should be exercised.  It has become fashionable among 
presidential scholars to view the President’s power in times of crisis as stemming 
from some extraconstitutional executive prerogative or to be the result of 
constitutional vagueness.  As Richard Pious remarks, “The President claims the 
silences of the Constitution.”234  I counter such opinions, explaining in detail that the 
Constitution properly understood, is not silent on such matters and serves as the basis 
for President’s wartime powers.   
It is imperative to recognize, however, that though the President is obliged to 
“preserve, protect, and defend” the Constitution and can wield all necessary power to 
do so, the Office of the Presidency is structured in such a way to ensure a “due 
dependence” on the people, who have multiple constitutional means to judge his 
behavior and hold him accountable.  As Publius explains, every ingredient of the 
Presidency—from its eligibility requirements, unitary form, mode of election, and 
term of office—received the most careful attention to ensure it combines the energy 
necessary for the effective execution of its solemn duties while remaining safe “in the 
republican sense.”  
                                                





Though the Constitution and Publius’s explanation of it provide the basis for 
this dissertation argument, echoes of constitutional self-preservation and the 
President’s special duty to ensure the safety of the political order were clearly found 
in the analysis of Washington during the Whiskey Rebellion and Lincoln during the 
Civil War.  That is, both Washington and Lincoln understood the Constitution in the 
same way as those who created it, and Publius who explained it.  Washington and 
Lincoln read from the same constitutional script as Publius and the other Framers, and 
the meaning of the Constitution clearly and consistently presented itself to them as 
they publicly and privately articulated its meaning.  Perhaps Washington’s 
consistency with the Constitution should not come as a surprise; after all, he was 
among those who framed the Constitution.  Yet Washington has not been considered 
among the intellectual heavyweights behind the Constitution, and his political thought 
has been dismissed as insignificant to its formation.  However, as I have discussed in 
some detail, Washington as President cogently articulated the underlying principles of 
the Constitution and rooted his actions in his understanding of the President’s duties 
and powers in times of danger.  Washington understood the Constitution to include all 
requisite means for its preservation.  He also recognized that the Constitution assigns 
the President a special duty to ensure the faithful execution of the laws, including that 
higher law of the Constitution, and that he, as President, was duty-bound to preserve, 
protect, and defend the Constitution.  He recognized his  “high and irresistible oath” 
to the Constitution, and that this, above all else, enabled the President to take all 
measures necessary to ensure the common defense and a tranquil political order.  This 





western Pennsylvania.  Washington’s statesmanship during the Whiskey Rebellion 
proved critical to the young nation at a formidable time, and following constitutional 
principles he constructed the executive power to respond to threats to the political 
order.  His words and deeds, moreover, helped translate the Constitution into practice 
as he applied energy to the Office of the Presidency, articulating and putting into 
effect the constitutional duties and powers of that office in defense of the nation.  He, 
in other words, put into practice the proposition put forward by Publius that energy in 
the executive is the leading character of good government, and in doing so served as 
the Founder of the Constitution.     
 Seventy years later, in a situation that proved to be even more dire, President 
Lincoln would be forced to call out the “war power” of the government, using all 
means to ensure the preservation and long-term safety of the constitutional order.  
Echoing Washington, and reflecting Publius’s explanation of the Constitution, 
Lincoln confronted Southern secession as an existential threat to the United States 
and interpreted the Constitution as providing all requisite means to its own defense.  
Lincoln similarly saw the President as bound by a high and irresistible oath—one that 
he considered to be “registered in Heaven”—to take any and all measures to 
prosecute the war and ensure the nation’s safety.  He exercised the executive power 
energetically, relying upon all its advantages—decision, activity, secrecy, and 
dispatch (Federalist 70)—to carry out his unique and special duty to preserve, protect, 
and defend the Constitution in a time of grave danger.  Equally, if not more 
importantly, Lincoln’s construction of the executive war power depended as much on 





that the executive power remains safe “in the republican sense,” President Lincoln 
displayed his due dependence upon the people, permitting and ensuring the conduct 
of the regular election process and cooperating with the peoples’ representatives in 
Congress.  He ensured that these basic republican institutions persisted throughout the 
most perilous times, and more importantly agreed to abide by their judgment even if 
they were not favorable to him.  In doing so, Lincoln proved that the Constitution 
combined in the executive the energy necessary for national defense with the requisite 
safety measures to remain true to its republican principles even in the most 
extraordinary times. 
 In short, the most remarkable takeaway from this dissertation is the striking 
similarity and consistency among Publius, Washington, and Lincoln in their 
construction of the Constitution and the Presidency in times of danger.  In this 
dissertation, I do not introduce any unique notions of executive power that could be 
categorized as “Washingtonian” or “Lincolnian,” for that would counter both the 
spirit and the letter of each of these Presidents.  Instead I demonstrate what each of 
them sought to do: articulate the constitutional powers and duties of the office they 
each temporarily held.  This dissertation, in essence, can best be described as a 
discussion of the establishment, completion, and restoration of the Constitution.  In 
other words, the Constitution along with Publius’s explanation of it permits us 
understand how, why, to what ends it was ordained and established; Washington 
helped complete the Constitution by translating its meaning and purpose from words 
into deeds, and demonstrating what it actually looks like in practice; finally, Lincoln 





the Civil War but, more importantly, it was necessary to recognize and restore the 
original understanding of the Constitution.  
 
The Future of War and the Constitutional Presidency 
 After addressing these basic questions about the constitutional basis of the 
executive war power, and offering an alternative perspective to the conventional 
scholarship on the Presidency, one immediate practical question remains to be 
addressed directly:  so what?  Or to put it slightly more elegantly, how does my 
discussion of the Constitution and executive war power help us better understand the 
United States and the national security challenges that we face today or that lie 
ahead? After all, one could argue, my dissertation focuses on a mindset of those who 
framed the Constitution in 1787 and that of Presidents who faced crises in 1794 and 
1861.  What could we possibly infer from the Constitution and these cases about the 
exercise of Presidential power today and in the future, when the United States with 
the world’s most sophisticated military engages in daily operations globally?  Simply 
put, one might critique, the world is such a different place as is the United States, and 
I merely offer a quaint discussion of an antiquated issue.  My terse response to such 
inquiry would: we have a great deal to learn.  
The optimistic projections of a more peaceful world that emerged with the end 
of the Cold War at the end of the 20th century did not carry over too far into the 21st.  
The September 11, 2001 attacks ended the perceived invulnerability of the United 
States, and displayed the significant destruction that a relatively small group of 





communications and financial networks, the proliferation of increasingly 
sophisticated weapons and tactics, and the spread of radical ideologies internationally 
will only increase the scale and scope of the threats likely to be faced.  The overall 
threat increases when one considers the likely possibility that states will seek to 
exploit technologies to disrupt and undermine U.S. military advantages.  Therefore, 
the future appears to present even greater challenges than the past, and these threats 
likely will require increasing investments in technologies and capabilities to protect 
the United States.  However, such investments are only a partial solution.   
The greatest challenge to the United States will not be whether it can keep 
apace materially and technologically with the emerging threats; rather it will be 
whether the United States can maintain its constitutional republic when facing new 
threats of attack.  Can it, in the wise words of the notable scholars Carl Friedrich, 
preserve its “inner-most self” while defending its “outer-most boundary?”235  
Undoubtedly, as new threats emerge, questions will arise on the adequacy and 
relevance of the Constitution for a brave new world, and discussions will emerge on 
the need for new legal regimes and alternative constitutional forms.236  However, as I 
have argued, the United States will be best served if it adheres to its tried and true 
constitutional principles and focuses on trying to uncover and truly understand them.  
In other words, in the most trying times, we should focus on recovering the 
Constitution instead of jettisoning it at the first sight of danger.  After all, the Framers 
did not even attempt to anticipate with precision and legislate for the manifold threats 
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likely to emerge; rather they sought to develop a political framework capable of 
handling those threats, no matter how extraordinary.  Their primary solution lie in an 
energetic executive, armed with the full strength of the government and duty-bound 
to protect it.  The executive power, the Framers clearly recognized, could prove 
dangerous but it would be necessary, and thus they explicitly designed a political 
order capable of mitigating some of that danger, making the executive safe in the 
republican sense.  
The principal safety mechanism is the President’s relationship with the 
people, for the latter hold the necessary constitutional means to hold that office 
accountable and inflict constitution punishments upon it, if necessary. The Framers 
specifically designed the President to be a republican executive, having a due 
dependence on the people to whom the Constitution belongs.  Unlike the prerogative 
exercised by Locke’s god-like princes, against which the people have no appeal “but 
to heaven,”237 the American people have multiple constitutional appeals to their 
President’s exercise of executive power.  This requires, however, a people attached to 
their Constitution, actively seeking to understand it and its underlying principles, and 
applying them regularly in their political affairs.  In this way, they remain grounded 
in the foundation of their political regime, and have a basis from which they remain 
vigilant in setting expectations for and holding accountable their leaders.  Therein lies 
perhaps the greatest challenge to the United States constitution order:  Whether the 
people will continue to rely upon their Constitution as the basis for their security and 
liberty?  Should the people become further removed from it or abandon it altogether, 
                                                





the Constitution’s republican principles could fail to mitigate and hold accountable 
the energy necessary for its defense for future turbulent times.  This imbalance likely 
will result in weakened republican safety mechanisms and potentially could cause the 
gradual erosion of the American constitutional order.  
Adherence to the Constitution has been under fire for some time.  None other 
than Woodrow Wilson railed against "an undiscriminating and almost blind worship" 
of the Constitution, and questioned “whether the Constitution is still adapted to serve 
the purposes for which it was intended.” Seeking to extinguish attachments to a 
“literary theory of the Constitution,” Wilson and his colleagues put into motion the 
theory of a “living constitution,” which is “Darwinian in structure and practice.”  To 
Wilson and other progressives, the Constitution must be understood as a natural 
organism, the content of which changes with the external social and political 
environment.  Similarly, Wilson and others approached the U.S. Constitution a la 
Hegel, rooting its meaning and purpose in the historical development of American 
society.  Wilson went on to argue that the political order was  “eminently adapted to 
express the changing temper and purposes of the American people from age to age.”  
It was not, in other words, grounded in sound principles of natural right or the 
reflection and choice of a wise and free people. Instead, Wilson and progressives 
argued, it should be understood as part of the Hegelian historical development, based 
upon the evolving spirit of society and not anything permanent like the Founding 
principles.238 
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  Such ideas continue to pervade popular and scholarly understanding of the 
Constitution, resulting in a growing disconnect from the principles of the Founders.  
With of a people increasingly unhinged from their Constitution and uninformed about 
their sovereign responsibilities, wars and crises in the future could lead to an 
unaccountable and irresponsible use of executive power.  But to paraphrase Lincoln, 
how do we “fortify” against this growing detachment from the Constitution?  Lincoln, 
expressing similar fears early in his career, offers an answer that is just as applicable 
today as it was in 1838: 
The answer is simple. Let every American, every lover 
of liberty, every well wisher to his posterity, swear by 
the blood of the Revolution, never to violate in the least 
particular, the laws of the country; and never to tolerate 
their violation by others. As the patriots of seventy-six 
did to the support of the Declaration of Independence, 
so to the support of the Constitution and Laws, let every 
American pledge his life, his property, and his sacred 
honor; let every man remember that to violate the law, 
is to trample on the blood of his father, and to tear the 
character of his own, and his children's liberty. Let 
reverence for the laws, be breathed by every American 
mother, to the lisping babe, that prattles on her lap—let 
it be taught in schools, in seminaries, and in colleges; 
let it be written in Primers, spelling books, and in 
Almanacs; let it be preached from the pulpit, 
proclaimed in legislative halls, and enforced in courts 
of justice. And, in short, let it become the political 
religion of the nation; and let the old and the young, the 
rich and the poor, the grave and the gay, of all sexes 
and tongues, and colors and conditions, sacrifice 
unceasingly upon its altars.239   
 
The most important “check” against a runaway wartime executive is neither blindly to 
criticize its exercise of power as imperial nor simply to focus on “rebalancing” its 
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relationship with Congress.  Nor does the answer lie in studying the significance of 
the Presidency solely in the behavior of the individuals who occupies it at the expense 
of understanding the constitutional powers and duties of the office.  Rather it requires 
a more constitutionally minded approach to the Presidency by the people whom it 
serves.  For the American experiment to continue to succeed, the people must 
recognize the republican nature of the Presidency and that it offers the best prospect 
for ensuring executive energy is applied safely to current and emerging threats to the 
political order.  The Framers originally understood it as such, and Washington and 
Lincoln recognized it as such during the crises they faced; therefore, this 
understanding should apply equally today and in the future.  Improving our 
understanding of the Constitution and strengthening the peoples’ attachment to it 
ultimately provides the best, most practical means for a safe and secure political order 
in which the people have the greatest opportunity to attain their natural liberties as 
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